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with the cognitions listed above they have also identified more 
fundamental cognitive processes as being the mechanisms by which these 
cognitions Eire generated. Researchers have suggested that four classes 
of cognitive Eu^tivity contribute to the generation of these cognitions. 
These sure attentional processes, relational processes, response 
repertoire features, Euid experiential feedback. The relationship between 
these processes and thoughts, attitudes, belief systems, expectations 
and assumptions will be examined further in Chapter 4.
2.3 The Interface Between Cognition and Emotion
In the strictest sense the interface between cognition and emotion 
is undefinable. The nature of this point of contact depends entirely on 
what is Eiccepted eis cognition and what is accepted as emotion. As has 
been discussed in the preceeding sections there is a considerable 
vEiriation in what researchers claim defines cognition and emotion.
It is possible to define either of the terms sufficiently broadly 
to totally incorporate the other concept. However, in order to talk 
about the relationship between them it is necessary to establish some 
kind of definitional boundary for the two concepts. Most approaches to 
research with either cognition or emotion assume implicitly or 
explicitly that some differences in emotional and cognitive processes 
Eire operationally definable suid while they may not Eigree on the precise 
boundary certain processes are usually Eissigned to one concept or the 
other. For example, in ELn experiment investigating the impact of 
cognition on emotion cognitive set or instructions may be used as 
independent vEiriables and a self report measure of emotion may be used 
as a dependent VEiriable. Alternatively, a study investigating the impact 
of emotion on cognition may use a self report or psychophysiological 
measure of emotion to define different experimental groups and then test
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their memory functioning. It would be generally accepted that the 
variables included in these examples are representations of cognitions 
and emotions respectively.
Current opinion on the interaction of cognition and emotion falls 
into one of three categories. There are those authors who argue 
cognition is a sufficient but not necessary cause of emotion, those that 
contend that cognition is both a sufficient and necessary cause of 
emotions and there are those that argue that the issue is irrelevant.
The former group have been most recently represented by the 
extensive arguments put forward by Zajonc and his colleagues who view 
cognition as a sufficient but not necessary cause of emotional response 
(Zajonc, 1980, 1984). The central hypothesis of this position is that 
emotional experience and expression can result from pure sensory input 
to the brain. Zajonc (1980) postulates that the neuroanatomical 
structures that are responsible for this transformation from pure 
sensory input to emotional response include the right hemisphere, the 
limbic system, and more specifically the hypothalamus. He claims that 
these structures in the absence of mediation by higher mental processes 
can bring about a full emotional response. The intriguing question at 
this stage left unanswered is just how these neural structures transform 
pure sensory input into emotion.
The alternative opinion that cognitions are both a sufficient and 
necessary precursor of emotional response has recently been extensively 
presented by Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus, 1982, 1984). The 
essence of this position is that in order for pure sensory input to 
produce an emotional response it must undergo some transformation such 
that the receiver comprehends that it has implications for his/her well 
being. That is, the sensory input must have some significance that is 
understood by the receiver before an emotion can occur. The
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transformation of sensory input into a meaningful form is said to be a 
cognitive activity.
Along with researchers from the first two categories the last group 
recognize that the relationship between cognition and emotion is 
bidirectional (Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Meichenbaum & Butler, 1980). That 
is, cognitions can cause changes in emotion and vice versa. Therefore, 
this group see the debate over primacy as meaningless. There is ample 
evidence of cognitions influencing emotions (Hale & Strictland, 1976; 
Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus et al, 1962; Lazarus & Launier, 1978; 
Velten, 1968) and of emotions influencing cognitions (Gilligan & Bower, 
1984; Zajonc, 1980) to support this contention. Unfortunately, this does 
not resolve the basic argument over primacy. The fact that there is 
little doubt that there can be chain reactions of cognitions influencing 
emotions and emotions influencing cognitions does not throw any light on 
the question of whether each emotion in the chain must be preceded by a 
cognition or whether each cognition in the chain is necessarily preceded 
by an emotion. The issue then becomes one of the importance of pursuing 
the primacy question. It will be argued in Chapter 5 that this issue is 
of some theoretical importance for cognitive learning therapists.
1.4 The Current Research Problem
The initial research problem is to determine if the evidence 
available from the Velten style mood induction research provides a valid 
demonstration of cognitive processes mediating emotions. The contentious 
issues associated with this research and an experimental investigation 
of these issues is outlined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
SELF STATEMENT MOOD INDUCTION RESEARCH
In an attempt to demonstrate that cognitive processes mediate 
emotions researchers have frequently adopted an experimental strategy 
involving what have become known as mood induction procedures. The 
general strategy is to apply a procedure which supposedly activates in 
subjects the cognitive processes thought to be necessary for generating 
the emotion in question. The strategy has been used to investigate the 
resultant mood both as a subjective state and for it’s effect on 
behaviour (Goodwin & Williams, 1982).
As was outlined in Chapter 1 the most widely used mood induction 
procedure is the self-referent statements first described by Velten 
(1968). Velten had groups of subjects read and try to experience the 
mood the statements represented. Different sets of statements reflected 
either happy, or sad events and experiences which were worded so as to 
relate personally to the subject. A set of emotionally neutral 
statements were also included as a control. These were referred to as 
the "elation", "depression", and "neutral" statement sets. Although some 
subsequent researchers have varied the number of statements (Alderman, 
1972; Schare & Lisman, 1984; Sherwood, Schroder, Abrami & Alden, 1981; 
Sutherland, Newman & Rachman, 1982), the content of statements (Teasdale 
& Fogarty, 1979), or used a group administration (Brewer, Doughtie & 
Lubin, 1980; Coleman, 1975) investigators have reported the general 
procedure to be an effective manipulator of mood as measured by visual 
analogue scales (Mathews & Bradley, 1983; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; 
Teasdale, Taylor & Fogarty, 1980; Williams, 1980), the depressive 
multiple adjective check lists (Alderman, 1972; Brewer et al, 1980; 
Frost, Goolkasian, Ely & Blanchard, 1982; Frost, Graf & Becker, 1979; 
Hale & Strickland, 1976; Mukherji, Abramson & Martin, 1982; Polivy,
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1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Strickland, Hale & Anderson, 1975; Velten, 
1968), semantic differential rating scales (Gouaux & Gouaux, 1971; Frost 
et al, 1979; Natale, 1977) and the Beck depression inventory (Brewer et 
al, 1980; Finkel, Glass & Merluzzi, 1982; Frost et al, 1979).
In spite of the wide acceptance of the procedure several recent 
studies have raised doubts about its apparent effectiveness as a mood 
inducer.
Sutherland et al (1982) reported a significant proportion (32 per 
cent) of their subjects failed to reach a criterion 10 per cent mood 
change. Their findings suggest that self statements may not be a 
reliable mood induction method.
Another recent study failed to establish a relationship between 
self statement valence and physiological arousal (Rogers & Craighead, 
1982). Since most current concepts of emotion (see Izard, Kagan & 
Zajonc, 1984) include physiological arousal as an essential element this 
study must bring into question the validity of the self report mood 
changes documented in the mood induction research.
Still other workers have explored the possibility that the self 
report mood changes associated with self statement mood induction 
procedures are in some way due to experimental demand characteristics 
(Buchwald, Strack & Coyne, 1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980). These 
researchers believed that the content of the statements and the 
experimental instructions would lead subjects to predict the kind of 
post-induction mood that was expected and that they would be likely to 
comply with this demand.
Both studies concluded that this possibility could not be rejected. 
However, Polivy & Doyle (1980) also determined that while demand 
characteristics contributed to subjectsresponding their reported mood 
shifts were not entirely due to experimental artifact.
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These concerns have been sufficient to encourage some researchers 
to look for improved induction techniques. Autobiographical 
recollections (Brewer et al, 1980) and personally meaningful music 
(Sutherland et al, 1982) have both been shown to be superior to the self 
statement approach (Velten, 1968).
The common element between these two alternative techniques is the 
personal relevance for the subject of the induction material. In the 
autobiographical recollections procedure subjects nominated three 
autobiographical mood-evoking events to be used as mood induction 
material. In the music procedure subjects were asked to choose from a 
selection of taped music two pieces that they felt would be capable of 
influencing their mood. In contrast, the Velten self statements are of a 
general nature and the procedure does not take into account the personal 
relevance of the statements for each subject. It has been pointed out 
that there is a critical difference between saying something to oneself 
and believing it (Buchwald et al, 1981; Lazarus, Coyne &■ to lknA n , 1982). 
It would follow that something that is personally relevant to the 
subject is more likely to be experienced as real than something that is 
not. This proposition is lent some support by the finding that self 
referent statements were superior mood inducers to nonself referent 
statements (Sherwood et al, 1981).
From a cognitive learning theory point of view, the biggest 
difficulty with using the Velten strategy to demonstrate that cognitions 
mediate emotions is that subjects are asked to read self statements 
without taking account of whether or not they believe them. The 
statements are assumed to reproduce the same constructed reality for 
subjects as an actual life experience that generates the kind of 
cognitions represented by the statements. That is, the Velten strategy 
assumes but does not demonstrate that the self statements generate a
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constructed reality that is isomorphic with the content of the 
statements (Lazarus et al, 1982).
It is apparent that the inconsistent findings from mood induction 
studies, reported earlier, could result from any of three possibilities. 
The first is that the Velten statements may no longer be adequate mood 
induction material. The Velten statements were generated in 1968 and 
what may have been a socially and culturally acceptable mood statement 
then may not be as appropriate now. The second and more likely 
possibility is that the personal relevance of the statements would quite 
likely depend on prior experience of the statement content and, 
therefore, be idiosyncratic to individual subjects. In either case it is 
possible some subjects failed to identify with a significant proportion 
of the statements; that is, found than unbelievable and did not actually 
experience the kind of cognitive activity thought to be associated with 
the particular mood change represented by the statements. The third 
possibility is that the believability of the mood statements is 
irrelevant and the mood changes that have been reported are largely due 
to experimental demand characteristics.
These issues have been investigated in the following two studies. 
The first addressed the question of whether what are currently 
considered to be believable mood statements are consistently superior 
mood inducers to what are considered to be unbelievable mood statements. 
The second investigated if the differential believability of mood 
statements was idiosyncratic to individual subjects. Since both these 
studies involved mood induction a that were not expected to be 
effective they were also able to assess the impact of demand 
characteristics.
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3.1 Experiment 1
The value of the Velten approach to cognitive learning theory was 
that it seemed to demonstrate in a general way that cognitive processes 
could mediate emotion. If the inconsistencies in the data can be 
explained in terms of the differential believability of the mood 
statements then the general conclusions drawn from the data would be 
reasonable. However, if the mood changes reported in the self statement 
mood induction studies are largely artefactual then the claim that this 
type of research provides empirical support for the cognitive learning 
theory approach to therapy would obviously be invalid.
Based on the assumption that the believability of the Velten mood 
induction statements would vary, the present study was designed to test 
the hypothesis that the believability of the mood statements would 
influence their effectiveness as mood inducers.
In order to hold the potential for demand characteristics constant 
across the experimental conditions the mood inductions were carried out 
in groups. By including subjects from all the experimental conditions in 
the induction groups and by ensuring all the subjects received the same 
experimental instructions the possibility of demand characteristics 
being responsible for any group differences was minimized.
It was hypothesized that the more believable mood statements would 
be more effective mood inducers than the less believable mood statements 
and that both the more and less believable mood statements would be 
superior mood inducers to neutral statements.
3.1.1 Method 
Subjects
The 85 subjects were volunteers from a group of 150 first year
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behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education. The subjects had not had any prior contact with the 
experimental material. The subjects ranged from 18 years to 47 years 
with a mean age of 25.84 years. There were 33 males and 52 females. The 
students who took part in the experiment received course credit for 
participating.
Design
The design was a one-way factorial design with five levels of 
statement believability (believable elation, unbelievable elation, 
believable depression, unbelievable depression and neutral).
Materials
Mood induction statements. The 20 most and 20 least believable 
elation and depression statements, along with 20 neutral statements, 
from the Velten (1968) experiment were used as mood induction stimuli in 
this study.
In order to determine how believable mood induction subjects would 
currently find the statements,the elation and depression statements used 
by Velten (1968) were rated by 62 second year administration students at 
the Canberra College of Advanced Education for their degree of 
believability as mood induction statements (see appendix A-l for details 
of this experiment). The 20 highest and 20 lowest rated statements were 
chosen from each of the original, sets of 60 statements and 20 neutral 
statements were randomly selected from the original neutral set. This 
provided the five sets of mood induction statements used in this 
experiment (see Appendix A-2 to A-6 for the sets of statements).
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Mood assessment instruments.
Three different types of mood assessment instruments that have been 
used previously in mood induction research were selected for the current 
study.1 These were tests of motor speed (Berndt & Bemdt, 1980; Coleman, 
1975; Frost et al, 1979; Hale & Strictland, 1976; Natale, 1977, 1978; 
Teasdale & Rezin, 1978b; Velten, 1968), visual analogue scales (Mathews 
& Bradley, 1983; Sutherland et al, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; 
Teasdale, Taylor & Fogarty, 1980; Williams, 1980), and a self report 
mood scale (Richardson & Taylor, 1982; Robbins, 1980; Teasdale & Rezin, 
1978a). The motor speed tests included writing numbers backward from 100 
(Velten, 1968), the digit symbol sub test from the Weschler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Weschler, 1955) and the letter symbol sub 
test from the Naylor-Harwood Intelligence Scale (NHAIS) (Naylor & 
Harwood, 1972). The visual analogue scales were a set of 100 mm lines on 
which subjects indicated how they were feeling "right now" by placing a 
mark. The lines were labeled at either end "I am not feeling at all X" 
and "I am feeling extremely X", where "X" was one of eight (four 
positive and four negative) commonly used mood adjectives (relaxed, 
anxious, irritated, calm, frustrated,/ excited and happy). The four
1 As well as being an elusive concept emotion is difficult to 
measure. To date researchers have relied largely on self report measures 
of mood. This may be because behavioural, physiological, and self report 
measures typically show poor correlations (Polivy, 1978). There is a 
wide range of self report measures that have been used by mood 
researchers but none has shown outstanding reliability. One method 
which has been adopted to improve reliability is to use a variety of 
measures (Coleman, 1975). There is also a substantial and growing body 
of opinion that emotions don't occur singularly but that the occurance 
of one emotion will cause other emotions to occur at the same time 
(Izard, 1972; Polivy, 1978, 1981; Schwartz & Weinberger, 1978). Finally 
there is considerable evidence that emotions are unipolar rather than 
bipolar. This evidence dates back to factor analytic studies of the Mood 
Adjective Check List (Nowlis & Nowlis, 1956) where unipolar factors were 
found (Nowlis, 1965). These findings guided the selection of measurement 
instruments for this study that were varied, unipolar, and capable of 
monitoring a variety of moods.
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positive and four negative scales were also combined to produce a Visual 
Analogue Positive Scale (VAPS) and a Visual Analogue Negative Scale 
(VANS). The self report mood scale was the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS)(McNair & Lorr, 1964). The POMS consists of six subscales: 
tension/anxiety, depression, anger/hostility, vigor, fatigue, and 
confusion and a total mood score (IMS) which is a combination of the six 
subscales.
Pre-Induction Mood Assessment
The pre-induction mood assessment consisted of two motor speed 
tests (writing numbers backward from 100 and digit symbol), all eight 
visual analogue scales and the POMS.
Post-Induction Mood Assessment
The post-induction mood assessment involved writing numbers 
backward from 100, letter symbol, the eight visual analogue scales and 
the POMS.
Procedure
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental 
conditions: believable statements designed to produce elation 
(believable elation), unbelievable statements designed to produce 
elation (unbelievable elation), believable statements designed to 
produce depression (believable depression), unbelievable statements 
designed to produce depression (unbelievable depression), and neutral 
statements not expected to influence mood (neutral). The random 
assignment was restricted to ensure even numbers across experimental 
conditions. This was done by a procedure of sampling without replacement 
(Keppel, 1982). That is, as a subject weis Eissigned to a condition that
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eondition was not available for assignment until all other conditions
had been assigned a subject.
The experiment was run in small groups of 10-20 subjects. Each 
group was comprised of subjects from all five experimental conditions.
Each subject was given a test booklet and a set of mood induction 
cards. The test booklet contained the experimental instructions and mood 
assessment instruments.
Subjects were asked to read the initial instructions. After the 
subjects had read them through the experimenter also read them aloud. 
The instructions were:
This exercise is part of a research project which is 
evaluating techniques used to investigate emotions.
The sets of statements you are about to see are used by 
researchers to artificially induce different mood states.
However, before doing the exercise I would like to give you a 
series of simple tasks to assess your current mood.
In order that the information you provide may remain 
confidential please don’t write your name on any of the 
material.
Your participation in this exercise is completely voluntary so 
if now or at any stage you would rather not take part please 
feel free to so indicate.
Are there any Questions?
The initial instructions were followed by the pre-induction mood 
assessment. After completing the pre-induction mood assessment subjects 
were given the experimental instructions to read. These were also read 
aloud by the experimenter after the subjects had read them through. The 
instructions were:
Your task is to read each statement and then try to 
experience the feeling expressed by the statement.
To do this read each card to yourself and then go over 
the statement again and again in your head with the
determination and willingness to really believe it. Try to 
experience each idea and concentrate your full attention on 
it. Your success will be largely a question of your
willingness to be receptive and responsive to the idea in each
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Statement, and to allow each idea to act on you without 
interference.
Different people move into moods in different ways. 
Whatever induces the mood in you fastest and most deeply is 
the best way for you to use. Some people simply repeat the 
statements over and over again to themselves with the 
intention of experiencing them. Other people find it natural 
and easy to visualize a scene in which they had or would have 
had such a feeling or thought. Perhaps some easy combination 
of repeating the statements and imagining scenes will come to 
you.
As you move through the cards try to concentrate your 
full attention on experiencing the feeling expressed by each 
statement. Try to resist the impulse to reject or resist 
statements that are contradictory to your own opinions or how 
you currently feel yourself to be. Try to feel the way someone 
who believed the statement would most likely feel.
There will be a certain amount of time devoted to each 
statement. Try to use the time to concentrate on experiencing 
the feeling expressed in that statement. The experimenter will 
indicate when to move on to the next statement.
Even if some of the statements seem to be a little 
unusual for this task try to concentrate on them for the full 
time period.
In summary, the whole purpose of this exercise is to see 
whether a person can talk themselves into a mood. Some of 
these mood statements may have no relation to anything you 
have ever thought, said or done. However, your task is to 
concentrate on them and try to experience whatever emotion 
they may represent, rather than comparing each single 
statement to your life experience and then deciding whether it 
applies to you.
If you feel the urge to laugh, it will probably be 
because humour is a good way to counter unwanted feelings. 
Please try to resist these reactions. Also, because this is a 
group exercise, please reserve any questions or comments you 
have until the exercise has been completed.
After the statements have been read there will be a 
further series of simple exercises to perform.
IF FOR ANY REASON YOU FEEL YOU CANNOT CONTINUE PLEASE
FEEL FREE TO STOP TAKING PART.
If possible just sit quietly until the end of the 
exercise. If this is not possible or desirable please indicate 
to the experimenter it is necessary for you to withdraw.
Do you have any questions ?
When the experimenter has answered any questions please 
read the first card only.
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The subjects were allowed 30 seconds to concentrate on each card. 
The experimenter indicated when the time period for each card had 
expired by saying "next". After all the cards had been processed for the 
prescribed'the post-induction mood assessment was completed.
After the post-induction mood assessment had been completed 
subjects were debriefed which included giving those subjects who had 
used depression mood induction statements a list of elation statements 
to read. Care was taken to ensure that subjects were not experiencing 
any lingering negative mood effects as a result of taking part in the 
experiment.
3.1.2 Results
The pre-induction and pre- to post-induction mood data were 
analyzed by separate one-way analyses of variance. The results of these 
analyses are outlined below.
Pre-Induction Mood Measure
Contrary to expectations there were some pre-induction mood 
differences between the experimental groups. However, all the 
significant pre-induction mood differences were between the neutral and 
the elation, and the neutral and depression induction groups. There were 
no significant pre-induction mood differences between any of the elation 
and depression induction groups. The differences that did occur are 
detailed below for each of the mood measures.
Visual analogue scales. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a 
significant between groups effect for the scale relating to the
36
adjective "despondent" 2, F(4,80) = 2.6, p< .05 (see Table 1). Contrasts 
between the groups showed the neutral group to be significantly 
different from the believable elation, unbelievable elation, and
unbelievable depression groups, t(80) = 2.82, 2.50, 2.54 and p< .006,
.02, .01 respectively.
Table 1
Pre-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Scores for the Five Bxperinental Groups.
Hood Induction Statenent Valence
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Believable
Blation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<* Contrast1
Relaxed 62.5 61.5 54.5 57.8 47.0 1.05 NS
Anxious 31.5 33.3 28.1 32.5 42.2 0.66 NS
Irritated 24.4 24.1 14.5 16.0 32.8 1.48 NS
Cali 68.2 61.7 60.1 63.2 50.5 1.00 NS
Frustrated 32.1 20.9 20.1 19.4 37.4 1.71 NS
Despondent 20.1 23.1 29.8 22.7 45.9 2.62 .04 dij
Bxcited 38.1 25.1 24.1 28.2 33.0 1.06 NS
Happy 53.8 51.5 57.0 55.4 50.4 0.21 NS
VAPS 55.7 49.9 48.9 51.1 45.2 0.52 NS
VANS 27.0 25.3 23.1 22.6 39.6 0.12 NS
* Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for fanilywise error
1 believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral : j
2 From now on the scales representing the adjectives relaxed, 
anxious, irritated, calm, frustrated, despondent, excited, and happy 
will be referred to as the "relaxed scale" etc.
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Profile of Hood States (POMS). A one-way analysis of variance 
showed a significant between groups effect for the depression, F(4,80) = 
4.8, p< .002, anger/hostility, F(4,80) = 4.7, p< .002, and confusion, F 
(4,80) = 3.1, p< .02, scales (see Table 2). Contrasts between the groups 
revealed the neutral group to be significantly different from all the 
other mood induction groups for all three of these scales. That is, 
there was a significant difference between the neutral group and the 
believable elation, unbelievable elation, believable depression, and 
unbelievable depression groups for the depression scale, t(80) = 3.34, 
3.38, 3.5, 3.6 and p< .001, .001, .001, .001, the anger/hostility scale, 
t(80) = 2.02, 2.92, 3.5, 3.8 and p< .05, .005, .001, .0001, and the
confusion scale, t(80) = 2.42, 2.57, 3.27, 2.39 and p< .02, .02, .01, 
.002 respectively.
Motor speed. A one-way analysis of variance indicated that there 
were no significant differences between any of the groups on either of 
the two motor speed tests (see Table 3).
Pre- to Post-Induction Mood Change
To remove potential bias resulting from nonsignificant pretreatment 
differences in individual mood states and to control for the significant 
mood differences between the neutral and induction groups, mood change 
scores, from pre- to post-induction, were calculated. This was done such 
that irrespective of mood valence or scoring convention, a positive 
score represented a mood change in a positive direction and a negative 
score represented a mood change in a negative direction for all scales. 
Therefore, on a positive scale such as "happy”, a positive mood change 
score means the subject became happier and a negative mood change score 
means the subject became less happy. Alternatively, on a negative scale 
such as "disappointed", a positive mood change score means the subject
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Table 2
Pre-Induction POMS Scale Mean Scores for the Five Brperiaental Groups.
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
POMS
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<‘ Contrast1
Tension/
anxiety
9.2 7.7 8.2 9.2 13.4 1.53 NS
Depression 6.0 5.9 5.5 5.2 15.6 4.79 .002 dgij
Anger/
hostility
7.2 4.9 3.4 2.7 12.4 4.66 .002 dgij
Vigor 14.4 11.7 14.4 16.8 13.0 1.37 NS
Fatigue 9.9 10.7 10.1 8.4 12.5 0.72 NS
Confusion 7.2 7.2 6.9 5.8 11.1 3.08 .02 dgij
THS 4.2 4.1 3.3 2.4 8.7 3.66 .009 dgij
* Confidence level for contrasts p( .02 to account for faailywise error.
1 believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
became less disappointed and a negative mood change score means the 
subject became more disappointed.
Contrary to expectations the significant pre- to post-induction 
mood change differences were only between the elation, depression, and 
neutral groups. There were no significant differences between the 
believable and unbelievable elation and the believable and unbelievable 
depression groups respectively. These results are outlined below for 
each of the mood measures. The significance level for all contrasts was 
set at p< .02 to account for familywise error.
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Table 3
Pre-Induction Motor Speed Test Mean Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups.
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
Motor Speed Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Tests Blation Blation Depression Depression Neutral F Ratio p<*  Contrast*
Writing No. 54.4 52.5 52.5 55.1 53.6 0.49 NS
Digit Symbol 60.0 58.1 56.7 59.6 64.1 1.59 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailywise error
* believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
V i s u a l  a n a l o g u e  s c a l e s .  A o n e - w a y  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  
c h a n g e  s c o r e s  s h o w e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  b e t w e e n  g r o u p s  e f f e c t s  f o r  f i v e  s c a l e s .  
T h e s e  w e r e  r e l a x e d ,  F ( 4 , 8 0 )  = p<  . 0 0 6 ,  i r r i t a t e d ,  F ( 4 , 8 0 )  = 3 . 3 ,  p<  . 0 1 ,  
h a p p y ,  F ( 4 , 8 0 )  = 2 . 9 ,  p<  . 0 3 ,  V A PS, F ( 4 , 8 0 )  = 2 . 6 ,  p<  . 0 5 ,  a n d  VANS, 
F ( 4 . 8 0 )  = 3 . 0 ,  p <  . 0 2  ( s e e  T a b l e  4 ) .  C o n t r a s t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  g r o u p s
i n d i c a t e d  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  g r o u p  d i f f e r e n c e s  v a r i e d  a c r o s s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
m o o d  s c a l e s  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  p i c t u r e  b e i n g  so m e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  
e l a t i o n  a n d  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p s  a n d  a l s o  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  g r o u p s  a n d  t h e  
n e u t r a l  g r o u p .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  c o n s i s t e n c y  w i t h i n  t h i s  p a t t e r n .  
F o r  t h e  r e l a x e d  s c a l e  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p  w a s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n ,  u n b e l i e v a b l e  
e l a t i o n ,  b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n ,  a n d  n e u t r a l  g r o u p s ,  t ( 8 0 )  = 2 . 4 1 ,  3 . 4 3 ,  
3 . 3 9 ,  2 . 6 7  a n d  p<  . 0 2 ,  . 0 0 1 ,  . 0 0 1 ,  . 0 0 9 .  F o r  t h e  i r r i t a t e d  s c a l e  t h e
b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  g r o u p  w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  
u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p ,  t ( 8 0 )  = 2 . 4 6 ,  p<  . 0 2  a n d  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e
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Table 4
Pre- to Post-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Change Scores for the Five Experinental Groups
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<* Contrast1
Relaxed 0.5 8.1 7.8 -17.5 2.4 3.94 .006 behi
Aniious 4.2 7.5 -2.3 -12.2 -5.2 1.97 NS
Irritated -2.7 3.3 -12.2 -26.7 -22.0 3.32 .01 bhj
Call -0.4 8.9 2.3 -11.8 -4.6 1.13 NS
Frustrated 3.1 0.4 -7.9 -16.2 -13.9 1.56 NS
Despondent 0.4 0.3 -12.2 -10.1 2.6 1.32 NS
Excited 10.7 11.5 -5.6 0.2 -0.2 1.60 NS
Happy 5.9 1.0 -21.0 -7.1 -5.1 2.91 .03 af
VAPS 4.2 7.4 -4.1 -9.0 -1.9 2.45 .05 h
VANS 1.3 2.9 -8.7 -16.3 -9.6 3.00 .02 bh
J Confidence level for contrasts p( .02 to account for faailywise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression : e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral : g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
elation group was significantly different from both the unbelievable 
depression and neutral groups, t(80) = 3.06, 2.58 and p< .003, .01
respectively. For the happy scale the believable depression group was 
significantly different from the believable and unbelievable elation 
groups, t(80) = 3.19, 2.61 and p< .002, .01 respectively. For the VAPS 
and the unbelievable depression group was significantly different from 
the unbelievable elation group, t(80) = 2.78 and p< .007. For the VANS
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the unbelievable depression group was significantly different from both 
the believable and unbelievable elation groups, t(80) = 2.68, 2.9 and p< 
.009, .004 respectively.
Profile of Mood States (FOMS). A one-way analysis of variance 
revealed significant between group differences for the depression, 
F(4,80) = p< .005, vigor, F(4,80) = 7.4, p< .0001, fatigue, F(4,80) = 
3.7, p< .01, confusion, F(4,80) = 4.1, p< .005, and TT4S, F(4,80) = 5.3, 
p< .0008 scales (see Table 5). Contrasts between the groups showed that 
the pattern of relationships between the groups for the individual 
scales was generally significant differences between the depression 
groups and both the elation groups and the neutral group. That is, for 
the depression scale the believable depression group was significantly 
different from the unbelievable elation and neutral groups, t(80) =
2.83, 3.35 and p< .006, .001 respectively and the unbelievable
depression group was significantly different from the neutral group 
t(80) = 2.62, p< .01. For the vigor scale the believable and
unbelievable depression groups were significantly different from the 
believable elation, unbelievable elation, and neutral groups, t(80) = 
3.33, 4.10, 3.06 and p< .001, .0001, 0.003 and t(80) = 3.24, 4.01, 2.97
and p< .002, .0001, .004 respectively. For the fatigue scale both the
believable and unbelievable depression groups were significantly 
different from the unbelievable elation, and neutral groups, t(80) =
2.85, 2.79 and p< .006, .007 and t(80) = 2.43, 2.37 and p< .02, .02
respectively. For the confusion scale the believable depression group 
was significantly different from the believable elation, unbelievable 
elation, and neutral groups, t(80) = 2.73, 3.10, 2.50 and p< .008, .003, 
.01 respectively and the unbelievable depression group was
significantly different from the believable and unbelievable elation 
groups, t(80) = 2.73, 3.10 and p< .008, .003 respectively. For the 1>IS
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Table 5
Pre- to Post-Induction POMS Mean Change Scores for the Five Bxperiaental Groups
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
POMS
Believable
Blation
Unbelievable
Blation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<> Contrast1
Tension/
anxiety
2.1 1.8 -0.4 -1.5 0.5 1.46 NS
Depression 0.2 2.0 -6.5 -4.3 3.5 4.01 .005 fgi
Anger/
hostility
0.06 1.1 -2.5 -4.0 1.5 2.13 NS
Vigor 0.7 2.2 -5.9 -5.7 0.2 7.44 .0001 abfghi
Fatigue 2.1 3.3 -2.3 -1.5 3.2 3.65 .009 fghi
Confusion 1.7 2.2 -2.7 -1.9 1.3 4.05 .005 abfgh
■ms 1.1 2.1 -3.4 -3.2 1.7 5.32 .0008 abfghi
J Confidence level for contrasts p( .02 to account for fanilyvise error
‘ believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral : g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
scale the believable and unbelievable depression scales were 
significantly different from the believable elation, unbelievable 
elation, and neutral groups, t(80) = 2.70, 3.30, 3.04 and p< .008, .001, 
.003 and t(80) = 2.58, 3.17, 2.92 and p< .01, .002, .005 respectively.
Motor speed. There were no significant differences between the 
groups for the pre- to post-induction mood change scores of either the 
writing number's or copying symbols tests (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Pre- to Post-Induction Motor Speed Test Mean Change Scores for the Five Bxperiaental Groups
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
Motor Speed 
Tests
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<‘ Contrast*
Writing No. 3.4 3.8 2.4 3.1 4.4 .04 NS
D/L Syabol -1.7 -0.2 0.7 0.1 -1.4 0.55 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts j>< .02 to account for faailywise error
* believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral : j
3 . 1 . 3  D i s c u s s i o n
T h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h i s  s t u d y  f a i l e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  m a j o r  h y p o t h e s i s  
t h a t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  r a t e d  a s  m o r e  b e l i e v a b l e  w o u ld  b e  m o r e  
e f f e c t i v e  m o o d  i n d u c e r s  t h a n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  r a t e d  a s  l e s s  
b e l i e v a b l e .  T h e  s e c o n d  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  a l l  t h e  m o o d  i n d u c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  
w o u ld  b e  s u p e r i o r  m o o d  i n d u c e r s  t o  t h e  n e u t r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  w a s  s u p p o r t e d .  
T h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  b e l i e v a b i l i t y  r a t i n g  o f  t h e  V e l t e n  s t a t e m e n t s  ( s e e  
A p p e n d ix  A - l ) s h o w e d  t h e  h i g h  a n d  lo w  r a t i n g  g r o u p s  o f  s t a t e m e n t s  f r o m  
b o t h  t h e  e l a t i o n  a n d  d e p r e s s i o n  m o o d  i n d u c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t  s e t s  w e r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  b e l i e v a b i l i t y .  T h i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  s e t s  o f  e l a t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  
t h e  tw o  s e t s  o f  d e p r e s s i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  / c o n f i r m e d  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
s t a t e m e n t s  b e l i e v a b i l i t y  v a r i e s  f o r  e x p e r i m e n t a l  s u b j e c t s .  T h e s e  
f i n d i n g s  a n d  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  c o g n i t i v e  l e a r n i n g  t h e o r y  a n d  t h e
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mood induction procedure itself will be expanded below.
It is apparent from the significant difference between the elation
and depression groups’ mood change on both the visual analogue scales and
the POMS (see Table 4 and 5), that both the sets of elation statements
generated a more elated a * \ d  fAtft both the sets of
00*41*4+4?/ /X oL&/>r'€-SSG0l 56// /'Cfzcn-boM *^6cc>l *3^f><zcdiuedi^
depression statements/ However, there was no consistent pattern of
results across the different sets of elation and depression statements.
The believable f 'f - f -e c 4 / ^<Z as /n c e o f t'n 0 tu c e r 'S .
iasv\ Utsf 5 / - t c f & s y n -/<?✓» 5 e <?/ /"/h? m c x o d  's c a le s A That is
<x*~0{ fe d  ies'ofh-ert nccct *zcaJe<!.
there was a difference between the elation and depression statement sets 
but the different sets of elation and the different sets of depression 
statements themselves did not have a differential impact on mood (see 
Tables 4, 5, and 6).
The failure to find any significant difference between the mood 
changes reported by the believable and unbelievable elation and
depression groups, means there is no evidence from this study to support 
the hypothesis that the believability of the statements influences their 
effectiveness as mood inducers. If statements that were expected to have 
a differential impact on mood are equally effective as mood inducers 
then it is possible that the self reported mood changes observed here 
are a function of some factor other than the statements1 believability. 
Therefore, these findings are consistent with the view that 
experimental demand characteristics could account for the self reported 
mood changes that result from self referent statement mood induction 
procedures (Buchwald et al, 1981; Pol ivy et al, 1980). The obvious 
implication of these findings for the cognitive learning therapists is 
that if the self statements are not responsible for the mood changes 
reported in the mood induction research, this evidence can not be used 
in support of their assumption that cognitive processes mediate emotion.
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The data is also supportive of previous findings about the 
procedure itself. The reliability of the self referent mood induction 
procedure had been questioned by a study that showed it was inconsistent 
as a mood inducer across individual subjects (Sutherland et al, 1982). 
The inconsistent findings for the effectiveness of the different 
statement sets in this study must be seen as further evidence for 
questioning the reliability of this mood induction procedure.
Also, the failure to find an effect of mood induction on 
psychomotor functioning as measured by the motor speed tests, would 
appear to support the findings of Rogers and Craighead (1982). They 
queried the validity of the self reported mood changes attributed to 
self referent statement mood inductions after failing to find a 
relationship between self statement valence and physiological arousal.
However, there may be an alternative explanation for the failure of 
the motor speed tests that could also account for the indifferent 
results obtained by previous researchers who used these measures of 
psychomotor functioning. Writing speed has been shown to differentiate 
depression induction subjects from controls when used as a within 
subject measure of change (Natale, 1977, 1978) but not when used as a 
between subject measure (Coleman, 1975; Frost et al, 1979; Velten, 
1968). As it has been shown that the complete Velten statement sets are 
more effective than reduced sets (Schare & Lishman, 1984), the failure 
of writing speed which was used here as a within subject measure of 
change, to differentiate between the elation and depression induction 
groups may have been due to the reduced number of statements used in the 
present research. The previous studies that have found writing speed to 
be a sensitive index (Natale, 1977, 1978) used complete sets of 
statements. These may have produced mood changes of greater intensity 
and thereby effected psychomotor functioning as well as self reported
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mood. Since the purpose of this study was to compare the effectiveness 
of subsets of statements, the reduced effectiveness of smaller statement 
sets could not be avoided. Hale and Strictland (1976) also failed to 
find a differential effect of mood induction on symbol copying. It is 
possible the symbol tests which are more complex tasks than writing 
numbers are not sufficiently sensitive to register the level of mood 
change associated with self referent statement mood inductions.
It can be concluded that the results from this study are consistent 
with the general pattern of results from those previous studies that 
have used a Velten style mood induction procedure. There appears to be a 
between groups effect for subjective (self report) mood change measures 
for the elation and depression induction conditions and less convincing 
evidence in terms of objective mood change measures (psychomotor 
functioning). In addition to finding a similar pattern of results to the 
previous studies, in this study the believability of the mood induction 
statements did not appear to influence their effectiveness as mood 
inducers.
However, on the basis of this evidence it would be premature to 
reject the major hypothesis supported by the cognitive learning 
theorists (Buchwald et al, 1981; Lazarus et al, 1982) that the 
believability of mood induction statements influences their 
effectiveness as mood inducers. It is necessary to acknowledge that the 
current methodology does not take account of the possibility that the 
believability of the statements may be totally idiosyncratic. That is, 
this experiment did not assess how believable each subject found the 
statements but tested the assumption that statements would be 
universally more or less believable. This may not be the case. 
Therefore, it was necessary to conduct a follow up experiment that 
assessed the believability of the statements for each individual
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subject.
3.2 Experiment 2
There is no evidence from Experiment 1 to support the view that 
mood induction statements are intrinsically more or less believable for 
mood induction subjects. However, if the believability of the statements 
was determined by prior experience of the individual statement content 
or some other idiosyncratic variable, then the believability of the 
statements could also be idiosyncratic to each individual subject.
The current experiment was designed to test this proposition. It 
was hypothesized that there would be a differential mood change between 
the believable elation and unbelievable elation, and the believable 
depression and unbelievable depression mood induction groups when 
subject assignment to these groups was based on the each subject’s own 
ratings of the statements’ believability rather than on the statements 
prior believability evaluation. The previously rated statement sets were 
also retained for this study in order that the results could be checked 
against those of Experiment 1.
3.2.1 Method 
Subjects
The 100 subjects were volunteers from a group of 280 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education. The subjects had not had any prior contact with the 
experimental materials. The subjects age ranged from 17 to 47 years with 
a mean age of 23 years. There were 44 males and 56 females. The students 
who took part in the experiment received course credit for
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participating.
Design
The experimental design was the same as that used in Experiment 1.
Materials
Hie mood induction statements and mood measures were the same as 
those used in Experiment 1. However, the visual analogue scales were 
revised and extended. Three of the adjectives were replaced and two 
additional ones were added. "Despondent" was replaced with 
"disappointed" because some of the subjects in Experiment 1 were 
unfamiliar with the adjective "despondent", "anxious" and "calm" were 
replaced with "tense" and "lighthearted", and "discouraged" and 
"pleased" were added to give a better coverage of nonclinical mood 
states.
A seven point scale was added to measure how believable the 
induction statements were to each individual subject. The details of 
this scale are outlined below.
Procedure
The procedure and instructions were the same as those used in
Experiment 1. However, after the post-induction mood assessment was
completed subjects rated the believability of each of the statements
they had used on a seven point rating scale. Subjects were given the
following instructions to read. After subjects read than through they 
were also read aloud by the experimenter. The instructions were:
Your task now is to read each statement again and to rate how
believable it was for you as a mood induction statement.
For example, if you thought the statement:
"This is the greatest day of my life"
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w as e x t r e m e ly  b e l i e v a b l e  ( i . e .  i t  i s  b e l i e v a b l e  t o  im a g in e  t h e  
s t a t e m e n t  e a s i l y  a p p ly in g  t o  y o u ) t h e n  yo u  w o u ld  r a t e  i t  els 
f o l l o w s :
extreiely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
H ow ever, i f  y o u  th o u g h t  i t  w as a n  e x t r e m e ly  u n b e l i e v a b l e  mood 
s t a t e m e n t  ( i . e .  i t  i s  u n b e l i e v a b l e  t o  im a g in e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  
e a s i l y  a p p ly in g  t o  y o u ) t h e n  y o u  w o u ld  r a t e  i t :
eitreaely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
I f  you  r e a l l y  c a n n o t  d e c id e  how b e l i e v a b l e / u n b e l i e v a b l e  i t  w as 
els a  mood s t a t e m e n t  t h e n  y o u  w o u ld  r a t e  i t :
1 2 3 <P 5 6 7
extreaely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
I f  t h e r e  i s n ’ t  a  w o rd  t h a t  e x a c t l y  r e p r e s e n t s  how y o u  w o u ld  
r a t e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  c i r c l e  t h e  num ber a b o v e  t h e  w o rd  t h a t  i s  
c l o s e s t  t o  y o u r  e v a l u a t i o n .
T h e re  a r e  no  r i g h t  o r  w rong  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  b u t  
i t  i s  im p o r t a n t  y o u  a n s w e r  a s  t r u t h f u l l y  a n d  a s  a c c u r a t e l y  els 
you  c a n .
Make s u r e  you respond to a l l  the statements ELnd only circle 
one number for each statement.
Rem em ber, y o u r  t a s k  i s  t o  r a t e  how b e l i e v a b l e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  
w e re  f o r  y o u  a s  mood i n d u c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  n o t  how w e l l  t h e  
s t a t e m e n t  d e s c r i b e s  y o u r  c u r r e n t  f e e l i n g .
A f t e r  c o m p le t in g  t h i s  t a s k  t h e  s u b j e c t s  w e re  d e b r i e f e d  w h ic h  
in c l u d e d  g i v i n g  t h o s e  s u b j e c t s  who h a d  u s e d  d e p r e s s i o n  mood s t a t e m e n t s  a  
l i s t  o f  e l a t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  re s u i.  Care  wels t a k e n  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  
s u b j e c t s  d i d  n o t  l e a v e  t h e  e x p e r im e n t  w h i l e  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a n y  
e x p e r i m e n t a l l y  in d u c e d  n e g a t i v e  mood e f f e c t s .
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3.2.2 Results
The mean statement believability ratings were calculated for each 
of the statement sets and these were compared to the previous ratings 
(see Appendix A-l for original ratings). The rating data indicated that 
the statements are not consistently believable or unbelievable across 
individual subjects. Therefore, subjects'own ratings were used to assign 
the subjects to groups that found the statements believable or 
unbelievable. The pre-induction and pre- to post-induction mood data 
were again analyzed by separate one-way analyses of variance. This was 
done first for groups based on the original statement sets and second 
for groups based on each subject’s own statement believability ratings. 
These data are presented below.
Statement Analysis
When the original believability ratings of the statement sets (see 
Appendix A-l) are compared to the ratings by subjects in this experiment 
there are considerable differences. The believable elation and 
depression sets receive similar ratings by both groups of subjects. In 
the original evaluation subjects discriminated between the believable 
and unbelievable elation, and between the believable and unbelievable 
depression sets. However, in this experiment subjects did not 
distinguish between the two elation statement sets. Also, the difference 
in the ratings between the two depression statement sets by subjects in 
this experiment is reduced, with the unbelievable statement set being 
seen as more believable in the present study.
Subjects were then reassigned to believable and unbelievable groups 
according to their own statement believability ratings. All subjects who 
received an elation induction were rank ordered according to their mean
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statement believability score. A median split was used to reassign 
subjects to either believable or unbelievable statement groups. The same 
procedure was followed for the depression groups. The average
believability ratings of statements in these reassigned groups were 
calculated. The mean believability ratings for the believable and 
unbelievable elation and depression groups were then similar to the 
original statement ratings (see Table 7).
The mood data we^ analyzed first for groups based on the original 
statement sets and second for groups based on subjects* own statement 
ratings.
Table 7
Hean Believability Ratings for Hood Induction Stateaents by Set and Rater
Stateaent Sets
Stateaent
Rating
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Blation
Neutral Unbelievable
Depression
Believable
Depression
Original 2.9 3.9 - 4.2 3.1
Current 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.0
Reassigned 2.4 3.8 3.5 4.3 2.5
Mood Scores of Groups Based on Original Statement Sets 
Pre-Induction Mood Measure
Again contrary to expectations there were some minor pre-induction 
mood differences between the experimental groups. These are outlined 
below for each of the mood measures.
Visual analogue scales. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a 
significant between groups effect for the happy scale, F(4,92) = 2.59,
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p< .0 4  ( s e e  T a b le  8 ) .  C o n t r a s t s  b e tw e e n  t h e  g ro u p s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  
n e u t r a l  g ro u p  w as s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  h a p p y  t h a n  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  
g ro u p ,  t ( 9 2 )  = 2 . 8 8 ,  p< .0 0 5 .  T h e re  w e re  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e tw e e n  t h e  g ro u p s  f o r  a n y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l  s c a l e s  o r  t h e  tw o 
co m b in e d  s c a l e s  VAPS a n d  VANS.
Table 8
Expedient 2 Pre-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups Based on Original Ratings
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Mood Induction Statenent Valence
F Ratio p(* Contrast1
Believable
Blation
Unbelievable
Blation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral
Pleased 54.5 59.4 53.2 59.0 46.9 1.25 NS
Relaxed 46.3 50.4 53.4 59.1 48.3 0.72 NS
Tense 48.5 46.7 45.9 39.9 51.0 0.43 NS
Irritated 30.1 21.8 23.0 30.1 31.8 0.58 NS
Lighthearted 43.2 58.8 38.5 50.8 45.1 1.77 NS
Frustrated 33.3 31.0 34.6 31.4 39.6 0.24 NS
Disappointed 28.9 28.6 25.7 20.9 28.7 0.32 NS
Excited 31.2 48.2 28.5 31.8 32.2 2.14 NS
Happy 53.7 67.7 53.9 63.3 46.1 2.59 .04 j
Discouraged 37.2 30.3 29.5 29.4 37.9 0.38 NS
VAPS 46.0 56.9 45.5 52.8 43.7 2.18 NS
VANS 64.3 68.3 68.3 69.6 62.2 0.40 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts j>< .02
i believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
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Profile of Mood States (POMS). A one-way analysis of variance
showed that there were no significant between group differences for any 
of the POMS scales (see Table 9).
Table 9
Biperiient 2 Pre-Induction POMS Scale Kean Scores for the Five Bxperiaental Groups Based on Original Ratings
POMS
Hood Induction Stateaent Valence
F Ratio p(J Contrast*
Believable
Blation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral
Tension/ 11.3 9.2 9.4 9.1 12.8 1.14 NS
aniiety
Depression 10.1 8.3 9.1 11.6 13.5 0.72 NS
Anger/ 6.7 7.0 4.9 5.9 7.4 0.34 NS
hostility
Vigor 12.1 15.4 12.1 14.3 13.2 0.69 NS
Fatigue 9.6 9.7 10.1 13.9 11.4 1.16 NS
Confusion 11.2 9.2 9.7 10.6 12.4 1.25 NS
TMS 36.8 27.9 31.1 36.7 44.3 0.63 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts p( .02
* believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
Motor speed. A one-way analysis of variance showed a significant 
between groups effect for the digit symbol test F(4,92) = 3.12, p< .02 
(see Table 10). Contrasts between the groups showed the believable 
depression group to be significantly different from the believable 
elation, unbelievable depression and neutral group, t(92) = 2.38, 2.43,
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.002 respectively. There was no significant3.11 and p< .02, .02,
between groups effect for the writing numbers test.
Table 10
Bxperiient 2 Pre-Induction Motor Speed Test Mean Scores for the Five Bxperiiental Groups Based on Original Eatings
Hood Induction Stateient Valence
Motor Speed Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Tests Elation Blation Depression Depression Neutral F Ratio p(* Contrast* 1
Writing Ho. 52.2 54.0 52.7 51.5 54.5 0.44 HS
Digit Syabol 65.9 62.3 59.2 66.3 67.9 3.12 .02 g
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation : h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
Pre- to Post-Induction Mood Change
Mood change scores were calculated in the same way as in Experiment
1. Hie results are similar to those obtained in Experiment 1. There were 
substantial differences between the elation groups and the depression 
and neutral groups. There were no differences between the believable and 
unbelievable elation groups nor between the believable and unbelievable 
depression groups. These results are detailed below for each of the mood 
measures.
Visual analogue scales. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a 
significant between groups effect for six individual scales and the two 
combined scales. These were pleased, relaxed, disappointed, excited, 
happy, discouraged, VAPS and VANS scales, F(4,92) = 5.45, 3.75, 2.75,
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3.67, 5.78, 3.53, 3.86, 6.92 and p< .0006, .007, .03, .008, .0003, .01,
.006, .0001 respectively (see Table 11). Contrasts between the groups 
showed the believable and unbelievable elation groups were significantly 
different from the believable and unbelievable depression groups on the 
relaxed scale, t(92) - 3.03, 3.13 and p< .003, .002 and t(92) - 3.45,
3.54 and p< .001, .001 respectively, and the happy scale, t(92) = 3.19,
3.76 and p< .002, .001 and t(92) = 2.98, 3.55 and p< .004, .001
respectively. The unbelievable elation group was significantly different 
from the believable and unbelievable depression groups on the
discouraged scale, t(92) = 3.14, 2.9 and p< .002, .005 respectively,
and the disappointed scale, t(92) = 2.37, 2.73 and p< .02, .008 
respectively, and the unbelievable depression and neutral group on the 
relaxed scale, t(92) = 2.92, 3.28 and p< .004, .001 respectively. The
believable elation group was significantly different from the believable 
and unbelievable depression groups and the neutral group on the excited 
scale, t(92) = 3.31, 3.19, 2.7 and p< .001, .002, .008 respectively. All 
of the differences were in the hypothesized direction. For the VAPS the 
believable and unbelievable elation groups were significantly different 
from the believable and unbelievable depression groups and the neutral 
group, t(92) = 2.86, 3.88, 2.6 and p< .005, .001, .01 and t(92) = 3.03,
4.04, 2.78 and p< .003, .001, .007 respectively. For the VANS the
unbelievable elation group weis significantly different from the 
believable and unbelievable depression and the neutral group, t(92) =
3.01, 3.04, 2.36 and p< .003, .003, .02 respectively.
Profile of Mood States (POMS). A one-way analysis of variance 
revealed the change scores were significantly different for four of the 
scales. These were depression, vigor, fatigue, and TMS, F(4,92) = 4.2, 
7.89, 2.75, 4.93 and p< .004, .0001, .04, .001 respectively (see Table
12). Contrasts between the groups indicated the elation groups and
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Table 11
Bxperiient 2 Pre-to Post Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Change Scores for the Five Experiiental Groups 
Based on Original Eatings
Mood Induction Stateient Valence
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<* Contrast1
Pleased 7.2 10.4 -16.3 -17.7 -3.5 5.45 .0006 abfh
Relaxed 6.3 13.2 -2.1 -8.1 -10.1 3.75 .007 hj
Tense 8.9 15.2 4.5 -2.0 0.1 1.45 NS
Irritated -0.1 6.7 -12.3 -8.7 -9.4 1.48 NS
Lighthearted 3.1 5.8 3.7 -12.8 -11.6 2.07 NS
Frustrated 9.2 8.0 -5.8 -8.1 -1.9 1.41 NS
Disappointed 4.1 8.7 -11.9 -16.1 -6.3 2.75 .03 h
Bicited 23.3 6.6 -4.8 -4.4 0.4 3.67 .008 abd
Happy 9.0 7.8 -13.4 -18.1 -1.8 5.78 .0003 abfh
Discouraged 6.8 15.3 -13.8 -12.8 -2.0 3.53 .01 fh
VAPS 7.7 8.8 -6.6 -12.2 -5.3 6.58 .0001 abdfhj
VANS 5.8 10.8 -7.9 -8.6 -3.9 3.76 .007 fhj
* Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailyvise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
particularly the unbelievable elation group tended to be more elated 
than the depression and neutral groups. For the depression scale the 
unbelievable depression group was significantly different from the 
believable and unbelievable elation and neutral groups, t(92) = 2.38,
3.41, 2.66 and p< .02, .001, .009 respectively and the believable
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depression was significantly different from the unbelievable elation 
group, t(92) = 2.87, p< .005. For the vigor scale the believable and 
unbelievable elation groups were significant different from the 
believable and unbelievable depression and the neutral groups, t(92) = 
4.22, 4.19, 2.92 and p< .001, .001, .004 and t(92) = 3.6, 3.59, 2.32 and 
p< .001, .001, .02 respectively. For the fatigue scale the unbelievable
elation group was significantly different from the believable and 
unbelievable depression groups, t(92) = 2.92, 2.76 and p< .004, .007
respectively. For the TMS scale the believable elation group was 
significantly different from the unbelievable depression group, t(92) = 
2.84, p< .006 and the unbelievable elation group was significantly 
different from the believable and unbelievable depression and neutral 
groups, t(92) = 3.12, 3.92, 2.39 and p< .002, .001, .02 respectively.
Motor speed. A one-way analysis of variance showed a significant 
between groups difference for the change score of the symbol tests, 
F(4,91) = 3.99, p< .005 (see Table 13). Contrasts showed the
unbelievable depression group to be significantly different from the 
believable elation, unbelievable elation, believable depression, and 
neutral groups, t(92) = 2.81, 3.18, 3.69, 2.64 and p< .006, .002, .001, 
.01 respectively. There was no between groups effect for the writing 
numbers test.
Mood Scores of Groups Based on Subjects Own Believability Ratings 
Pre-Induction Mood Measure
Again there were some minor pre-induction mood differences between 
the experimental groups. These are outlined below for each of the mood 
measures.
Visual analogue scales. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a
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Table 12
Bxperiient 2 Pre-to Post-Induction POMS Scale Mean Change Scores for the Five Biperiiental Groups 
Based on Original Ratings
Mood Induction Statenent Valence
POMS
Believable
Blation
Unbelievable
Blation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<» Contrast1
Tension/ 1.3 4.3 1.0 -0.9 0.6 2.14 NS
anxietj
Depression 1.2 3.9 -3.4 -4.9 1.9 4.21 .004 fhi
Anger/ 0.2 2.3 0.9 -3.2 -1.0 2.17 NS
hostility
Vigor 4.3 3.1 -4.2 -4.4 -1.6 7.89 .0001 abdfhj
Fatigue 0.4 3.4 -1.7 -1.6 -0.4 2.75 .03 fh
Confusion 2.1 1.9 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 2.07 NS
IMS 9.3 18.9 -7.5 -14.8 -1.1 4.93 .001 bfh
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailywise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression ; e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation : f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral : j
significant between groups effect for the happy scale, F(4,92) = 2.77, 
p< .03 (see Table 14). Contrasts between the groups revealed that the 
believable elation and unbelievable depression groups were significantly 
different from the neutral group, t(92) = 2.53, 2.7 and p< .01, .008 
respectively.
Profile of Mood States (POMS). A one-way analysis of variance 
showed a significant main effect for the tension scale, F(4,92) = 2.72, 
p< .03 (see Table 15). Contrasts revealed the unbelievable depression 
group was significantly different from the believable depression and 
neutral groups, t(92) = 2.57, 2.99 and p< .01, .004 respectively.
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Motor speed. A one-way analysis of variance showed there were no
significant main effects for the writing numbers or digit symbol tests 
(see Table 16).
Table 13
Expedient 2 Pre-to Post-Induction Motor Speed Test Mean Change Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups 
Based on Original Ratings
Mood Induction Stateaent Valence
Motor Speed 
Tests
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<» Contrastk
Writing No. 3.2 5.1 1.3 3.2 2.2 1.08 NS
Digit Synbol -4.0 -3.4 -2.7 -8.3 -4.3 3.99 .005 behi
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailywise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression : e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral  ^i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral : j
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Table 14
Eiperiaent 2 Pre-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Hean Scores for the Five Erperiuental Groups Based on Subjects Ratings
Hood Induction Stateuent Valence
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<* Contrast1
Pleased 57.7 56.1 53.2 58.6 46.9 1.09 NS
Relazed 45.2 51.5 53.3 58.9 48.3 0.81 NS
Tense 51.1 44.2 50.9 35.1 51.0 1.29 NS
Irritated 24.3 27.6 30.7 21.9 31.8 0.47 NS
Lighthearted 52.9 49.0 40.9 47.8 45.1 0.55 NS
Frustrated 26.9 38.0 44.8 21.3 39.6 2.06 NS
Disappointed 28.7 28.8 29.9 17.0 28.7 0.84 NS
Excited 42.2 37.2 35.1 24.9 32.2 1.36 NS
Happy 65.0 56.3 50.4 66.3 46.1 2.77 .03 di
Discouraged 27.9 39.6 40.7 18.2 37.9 2.06 NS
VAPS 52.6 50.1 46.6 51.3 43.7 0.89 NS
VANS 68.2 64.4 60.6 77.3 62.2 1.90 NS
Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailyvise error
1 believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression : e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
61
Table 15
Experiment 2 Pre-Induction POHS Scale Mean Scores for the Five Experimental Groups Based on Subjects Own Ratings
Mood Induction Statement Valence
POHS
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<* Contrast1
Tension/
anxiety
11.0 9.6 12.0 6.5 12.8 2.72 .03 ei
Depression 9.3 9.1 13.6 6.9 13.5 1.47 NS
Anger/
hostility
6.2 7.5 6.4 4.4 7.4 0.52 NS
Vigor 14.1 13.3 11.7 14.6 13.2 0.39 NS
Fatigue 10.1 9.2 12.1 11.7 11.4 0.54 NS
Confusion 9.9 10.5 11.5 8.7 12.4 1.58 NS
TKS 32.4 32.5 43.8 23.6 44.3 1.24 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for familywise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i  ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
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Table 16
Experiment 2 Pre-Induction Motor Speed Test Hean Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups Based on Subjects Own Ratings
Mood Induction Stateient Valence
Motor Speed Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Tests Blation Elation Depression Depression Neutral F Ratio p<a Contrast* 1
Writing No. 52.4 53.6 52.1 52.2 54.5 0.32 NS
Digit Syabol 65.4 62.9 62.8 62.1 67.9 1.35 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts p( .02 to account for faailyvise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation  ^ c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
P r e -  t o  P o s t - I n d u c t i o n  M o o d  C h a n g e
M o o d  c h a n g e  s c o r e s  w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  i n  E x p e r i m e n t
1 .  T h e  b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  g r o u p ’ s  m o o d  c h a n g e  w a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  g r o u p  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  t o  b o t h  
t h e  b e l i e v a b l e  a n d  u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p s  a n d  t h e  n e u t r a l  g r o u p .  
T h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p  t e n d e d  t o  b e  a  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  m o o d  
i n d u c e r  t h a n  t h e  b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p s  a n d  t h e  n e u t r a l  g r o u p  w h i l e  i n  t h e  h y p o t h e s i z e d  
d i r e c t i o n ,  t e n d e d  n o t  t o  r e a c h  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  T h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  d e t a i l e d  
b e l o w  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  m o o d  m e a s u r e s .
V i s u a l  a n a l o g u e  s c a l e s .  A  o n e - w a y  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  r e v e a l e d  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  b e t w e e n  g r o u p s  e f f e c t  f o r  s i x  i n d i v i d u a l  s c a l e s  a n d  t h e  tw o  
c o m b i n e d  s c a l e s .  T h e s e  w e r e  t h e  p l e a s e d ,  r e l a x e d ,  d i s a p p o i n t e d ,  e x c i t e d ,
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happy, discouraged, VAPS and VANS scales, F(4,92) = 6.11, 4.72, 2.85, 
2.96, 5.96, 3.46, 6.82, 4.01 and p< .0002, .002, .03, .02, .0003, .01,
.0001, .005 respectively (see Table 17). Contrasts between the groups 
showed for the pleased scale the believable elation group was 
significantly different from the believable and unbelievable depression 
and neutral groups, t(92) = 4.19, 3.97, 2.37 and g< .001, .001, .02
respectively and the unbelievable elation group was significantly 
different from the believable and unbelievable depression groups, t(92) 
= 2.68, 2.46 and g< .009, .02 respectively. For the relaxed scale the
believable elation group was significantly different from the believable 
and unbelievable depression and neutral groups, t(92) = 3.09, 3.3, 3.97 
and p< .003, .001, .001 respectively. For the disappointed scale the
believable elation group was significantly different from the believable 
and unbelievable depression groups, t(92) = 2.85, 2.61 and p< .005, .01 
respectively. For the excited scale the believable depression group was 
significantly different from the believable and unbelievable elation 
groups, t(92) = 2.85, 2.75 and g< .005, .007 respectively. For the happy 
scale the believable depression group was significantly different from 
the believable and unbelievable elation groups, t(92) = 3.27, 2.68 and
g< .002, .009 respectively and the unbelievable depression group was
significantly different fron the believable and unbelievable elation and 
neutral groups, t(92) = 4.07, 3.49, 2.35 and g< .001, .001, .02
respectively. For the discouraged scale the unbelievable elation group 
was significantly different from the believable and unbelievable 
depression groups, t(92) = 2.97, 2.94 and g< .004, .004 respectively.
For the VAPS the believable elation group was significantly different 
from the believable and unbelievable depression and neutral groups, 
t(92) = 4.08, 4.2, 3.41 and g< .001, .001, .001 respectively and the
unbelievable elation group was significantly different from the
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b e l i e v a b l e  a n d  u n b e l i e v a b le  d e p r e s s i o n  g r o u p s ,  t ( 9 2 )  = 2 .7 1 ,  2 .8 4  a n d  p< 
.0 0 8 ,  .0 0 6  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  F o r  t h e  VANS t h e  b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  g ro u p  w as 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  fro m  t h e  b e l i e v a b l e  a n d  u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  
a n d  n e u t r a l  g r o u p s ,  t ( 9 2 )  = 2 .8 7 ,  3 .4 7 ,  2 .5 1  a n d  p (9 2 )  = .0 0 5 ,  .0 0 1 ,
.0 1  r e s p e c t i v e l y  a n d  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  e l a t i o n  g ro u p  w as s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  fro m  t h e  u n b e l i e v a b l e  d e p r e s s i o n  g ro u p ,  t ( 9 2 )  = 2 .3 8 ,  .0 2 .
Table 17
Experiment 2 Pre-to Post Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Change Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups 
Based on Subjects Own Ratings
Hood Induction Stateaent Valence
Visual Analogue 
Scales
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio P<J Contrast*
Pleased 14.7 2.9 -17.8 -16.1 -3.5 6.11 .0002 abdfh
Relaxed 17.6 1.9 -4.2 -5.7 -10.1 4.72 .002 abd
Tense 19.7 4.4 5.0 -2.2 0.1 2.26 NS
Irritated 9.3 -2.7 -9.0 -12.3 -9.4 1.78 NS
Lighthearted 1.1 7.8 -0.5 -7.8 -11.6 1.47 NS
Frustrated 11.4 5.7 0.3 -14.3 -1.9 2.14 NS
Disappointed 10.4 2.4 -14.7 -12.9 -6.3 2.85 .03 ab
Excited 15.4 14.5 -9.4 0.2 0.4 2.96 .03 af
Happy 10.7 6.3 -12.7 -18.5 -1.8 5.96 .0003 abfhi
Discouraged 7.4 14.7 -13.3 -13.4 -2.0 3.46 .01 fh
VAPS 11.9 4.7 -8.9 -9.6 -5.3 6.82 .0001 abdfh
VARS 11.6 4.9 -6.3 -10.1 -3.9 4.01 .005 abh
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailywise error
* believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
65
Profile of Mood States (POMS)» A one-way analysis of variance
revealed the change scores were significantly different for four of the 
scales. These were depression, vigor, fatigue, and TMS, F(4,92) = 4.98, 
8.51, 2.69, 6.08 and p< .001, .0001, .04, .0002 respectively (see Table
18). Contrasts between the groups indicated that for the depression 
scale the believable elation group was significantly different from the 
believable and unbelievable depression groups, t(92) = 3.32, 3.91 and p< 
.001, .001 respectively sind the unbelievable depression group was 
significantly different from the neutral group, t(92) = 2.69, p< .008. 
For the vigor scale the believable elation group was significantly 
different from the believable and unbelievable depression and neutral 
groups, t(92) = 4.68, 4.65, 3.39 and p< .001, .001 respectively and the 
unbelievable elation group was significantly different from the
believable and unbelievable depression groups, t(92) = 3.27, 3.24 and p< 
.002, .002 respectively. For the fatigue scale the believable elation 
group was significantly different from the believable and unbelievable 
depression groups, t(92) = 2.97, 2.57 and p< .004, .01 respectively. For 
the TMS scale the believable elation was significantly different from 
the believable and unbelievable depression, the unbelievable elation, 
and the neutral groups, t(92) = 3.77, 4.56, 2.31, 3.02 and p< .001, 
.001, .02, .003 respectively and the unbelievable depression group was
significantly different from the neutral group, t(92) = 2.3, .02.
Motor speed. A one-way analysis of variance showed a significant 
between groups difference for the change score of the writing speed 
test, F(4,92) = 2.45, p< .05 (see Table 19). Contrasts showed the
believable elation group was significantly different from the believable 
depression and unbelievable elation groups, t(92) = 2.86, 2.31 and p<
.005, .02 respectively. There was no between groups effect for the 
change scores of symbols tests.
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Table 18
Biperiient 2 Pre-to Post-Induction POMS Scale Mean Change Scores for the Five Bxperiiental Groups 
Based on Subjects Own Eatings
Hood Induction Stateient Valence
POMS
Believable
Elation
Unbelievable
Elation
Believable
Depression
Unbelievable
Depression Neutral F Ratio p<« Contrastk
Tension/ 4.4 1.2 1.1 -0.9 0.6 2.28 NS
anxiety
Depression 5.0 -3.4 -4.8 0.1 1.9 4.98 .001 abi
Anger/ 2.6 -0.2 0.8 -2.9 -1.0 2.26 NS
hostility
Vigor 5.2 -4.3 -4.3 2.3 -1.6 8.51 .0001 abdfh
Fatigue 3.3 0.5 -2.0 -1.3 -0.4 2.67 .04 ab
Confusion 3.2 0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.5 3.18 .02 abd
TMS 23.7 4.7 -7.7 -14.2 -1.1 6.08 .0002 abcdh
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for fanilywise error
k believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression : b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation : c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f  ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation = h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i  ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral : j
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Table 19
Expedient 2 Pre-to Post-Induction Kotor Speed Test Mean Change Scores for the Five Experiaental Groups 
Based on Subjects Own Eatings
Hood Induction Stateaent Valence
Motor Speed Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Tests Elation Blation Depression Depression Neutral F Ratio p<* Contrast* 1
Writing No. 6.3 2.0 0.8 3.5 2.2 2.45 .05 ac
Digit Symbol -3.1 -4.3 -4.7 -5.8 -4.3 0.73 NS
1 Confidence level for contrasts p< .02 to account for faailywise error
1 believable elation -v- believable depression = a ; believable elation -v- unbelievable depression = b ; believable 
elation -v- unbelievable elation = c ; believable elation -v- neutral = d ; believable depression -v- unbelievable 
depression = e ; believable depression -v- unbelievable elation = f ; believable depression -v- neutral = g ; 
unbelievable depression -v- unbelievable elation : h ; unbelievable depression -v- neutral = i ; unbelievable 
elation -v- neutral = j
3 . 2 . 3  D i s c u s s i o n
T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  m o o d  s t a t e s  c a n  b e  
m a n i p u l a t e d  b y  c o g n i t i v e  m e a n s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  s e l f  
r e f e r e n t  m o o d  i n d u c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  c a n  n o t  b e  t o t a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
e x p e r i m e n t a l  d e m a n d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  b e g i n s  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  p r e d i c t e d  b y  
c o g n i t i v e  l e a r n i n g  t h e o r i s t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  b e l i e v a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  m o o d  
i n d u c t i o n  s t i m u l i  a n d  m o o d  c h a n g e  ( B u c h w a ld  e t  a l ,  1 9 8 1 ;  L a z a r u s  e t  a l ,  
1 9 8 2 ) .  E l a t i o n  s u b j e c t s  w ho r a t e d  t h e  m o o d  i n d u c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t s  a s  m o r e  
h i g h l y  b e l i e v a b l e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e p o r t e d  a  g r e a t e r  p o s i t i v e  m o o d  c h a n g e  
t h a n  b o t h  t h e  e l a t i o n  s u b j e c t s  w ho f o u n d  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  l e s s  b e l i e v a b l e  
a n d  t h e  c o n t r o l  s u b j e c t s ,  T h e s e  r e s u l t s  w e r e  f o u n d  f o r  b o t h  t h e  
s u b j e c t i v e  s e l f  r e p o r t  m o o d  m e a s u r e s  a n d  t h e  m o r e  s e n s i t i v e  o f  t h e
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objective measures of psychomotor functioning.
The major inconsistency in the results was the opposite finding for 
the depression induction groups. Again the level of statement 
believability tended to distinguish between the groups in terms of mood 
change. However, the less believable depression group consistently 
reported greater negative mood changes than the more believable group. 
There would appear to be two possible explanations for this result. It 
is possible there was a problem with how subjects interpreted the 
statement rating task. They may have tended to equate unbelievable with 
most negative and, therefore, rated the most effective depression 
statements as unbelievable. On the other hand if subjects* believability 
ratings accurately represent the depression statements then one would 
have to consider the possibility that positive and negative emotions are 
mediated by different cognitive processes. This possibility has received 
recent support by research which claims to demonstrate the relative 
independence of positive and negative affect (Diener & Emmons, 1985). 
These authors do not offer an explanation of how these independent mood 
states are mediated. They suggest it is necessary for researchers to 
focus on the processes that underlie both positive and negative affect 
in order that these findings of independence may be understood. If 
positive and negative affect are independent it is possible that they 
are mediated by different processes. The following studies will examine 
more closely the specific kinds of cognitive processes associated with 
both positive and negative affect which will enable this issue to be 
pursued.
In spite of this inconsistency in the data it seemed that by using 
the Velten mood induction approach it had been possible to show that the 
believability of the self referent statements was important to subjects* 
emotional responses. Furthermore, the results make it clear that the
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believability of these stimuli are subject specific. Statements are not 
generally more or less believable but are more or less believable to 
each individual subject and their degree of believability determined 
their effectiveness as mood inducers. It is clear that it does not 
matter which statements are used as mood induction stimuli as long as 
the subject finds them believable.
The results from this experiment also demonstrate that this mood 
induction procedure does not produce discrete mood states. A range of 
positive and negative emotions were manipulated by the elation and 
depression induction procedures. These findings are consistent with a 
growing body of opinion which suggests moods tend to occur in clusters 
rather than as discrete states (Boyle, 1985; Polivy, 1981).
It can be concluded that the Velten mood induction strategy does 
demonstrate in a general way the involvement of cognitive processes in 
mediating emotion. The findings obtained in these studies cannot be 
adequately explained by experimental demand characteristics nor can the 
validity of the induced moods be dismissed. The demonstration by this 
study that the individual subject’s perception of the mood induction 
stimuli characterize their emotional responses is compelling evidence of 
the importance of cognitive mediation.
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CHAPTER 4
SPECIFIC COGNITIVE PROCESSES AS MEDIATORS OF EMOTION
The evidence from Experiment 2 supports the general view (Izard et 
al, 1984) that cognitions are a sufficient condition for generating an 
emotional response. Furthermore, it strengthens the view that the most 
basic assumption of the cognitive learning therapies, that cognitions 
can mediate emotions, is given general support by the findings from the 
self statement mood induction research. Specifically the current 
research demonstrated that what subjects believed about the mood 
induction stimuli made a substantial contribution to determining the 
nature of their emotional response. That is, how believable individual 
subjects found the mood induction statements characterized their 
effectiveness as mood inducers. However, the precise nature of what the 
concept of believability represents has so far not been addressed. It is 
the purpose of the current chapter to pursue the question of which 
specific cognitive processes may be expected to contribute to the 
generation of subjects beliefs about such stimulus events.
4.1 The Concept of Belief
So far in the literature the term "belief" has defied an 
unambiguous definition and this is unlikely to change. For instance, it 
will be argued here that the term has been used to describe two quite 
separate notions. First, belief has been used to describe what could be 
called a person’s symbolic representation of reality. That is, what is 
accepted as true or false and what is, therefore, known as real 
(Rachlin, 1977). Second, belief has been used to describe what could be 
called a person’s symbolic representation of information about that 
reality. That is, a person’s opinions, expectations and values that are
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used to interpret their symbolic representation of reality (Ellis, 1977; 
Mahoney, 1977c).
Various writers have referred to this kind of distinction and have 
used different labels to differentiate these two processes. Abelson 
(1963) spoke of "cold" cognition and "hot" cognition, whereas Lazarus 
(1982) refers to the distinction between "knowing" and "appraising". 
Wessler (1982) acknowledged Abelson’s contribution but preferred the 
terms "nonevaluative" and "evaluative" cognition. For the purposes of 
this discussion from now on the terms "nonevaluative belief" and 
"evaluative belief" will be used when referring to this distinction. For 
example, the belief "that object is a snake" is a nonevaluative belief 
while "snakes are dangerous ... I don’t like snakes ... snakes make my 
skin crawl" are examples of evaluative beliefs.
4.2 Cognitive Processes and Belief
The cognitions listed in Chapter 2 (thoughts, attitudes, belief 
systems, expectations, and assumptions) as the ones cognitive learning 
therapists have identified as being central to emotional responding are 
primarily examples of a person’s symbolic representation of information 
about their reality. As such they represent evaluative beliefs.
In his seminal work on cognitive learning theory Mahoney (1974) 
discussed a more comprehensive range of cognitive processes that were 
seen as making important contributions to the construction of reality. 
The processes specified by Mahoney could clearly be identified as being 
representative of both nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs. Although 
cognitive learning theory encompasses both adaptive and maladaptive 
mediation the examples used by Mahoney concentrated on the more 
clinically relevant dysfunctional mediation. Each of the different kinds 
of process identified by Mahoney (1974) will be summarized below.
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The first kind of cognitive processes discussed by Mahoney are 
essential mechanisms for establishing nonevaluative beliefs. Because of 
its physiological limitations as an information processor, the human 
organism receives far more sensory input than can be the subject of its 
focused attention. Therefore, it engages in a selection process to 
determine which sensory input is attended to. The basis of this 
selection is the level of innate or acquired adaptive importance of the 
stimuli. These selection processes can result in an inaccurate
construction of reality if the organism fails to attend to performance- 
relevant stimuli, attends to stimuli that are irrelevant or detrimental 
to performance, or inaccurately labels the stimuli that are attended to.
The second kind of cognitive activity identified by Mahoney 
principally relate to the mechanisms by which evaluative beliefs
influence responding. Having attended to a stimulus and encoded it the 
organism may engage in extensive processing of the stimulus. The 
possibility of mediational dysfunction is extended to these
transformations. Stimuli may be incorrectly classified such that
subsequent interpretation of their significance is inaccurate. They may 
be compared to prior experience or internal standards which may result 
in an unrealistic evaluation. The capacity of an organism to adaptively 
process attended to stimuli is also affected by memory capacity. 
Deficient or inadequate storage of information concerning a stimulus and 
its context, response options, and possible consequences can be 
responsible for maladaptive mediation. Humans also frequently draw 
conclusions that are inferred from rather than demonstrated by the raw 
data. They anticipate outcomes and consequences, and generate 
assumptions about alleged regularities in the world that guide
responding. To the extent that these processes reflect real-world
relationships they serve an adaptive function. However, when the
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perception of reality and reality itself are discrepant these 
mediational processes become dysfunctional.
Mahoney goes on to identify two further kinds of processes that are 
of less direct relevance to the current work. The first of these is what 
Mahoney calls "response repertoire features". At first reading this 
label has a distinct behavioural rather than cognitive connotation. 
However, the proposition is that responses are based on generalized 
strategies and that even if the selection and processing of stimuli is 
adequate, maladjustment can result if appropriate response strategies 
are not available. The second is the impact of experiential feedback. 
That is, the consequences of stimulus-response combinations provide a 
source of information that influences the manner in which sensory input 
is subsequently attended to, evaluated, and responded to both 
behaviourally and emotionally.
4.3 The Relationship Between Cognitive Processes and Emotional 
Response
These four classes of cognitive activity represent fundamental 
processes and mechanisms that select, transform, and interpret raw 
sensory input prior to response generation. Cognitive learning 
therapists maintain that the cognitive mediational theory of human 
responding includes emotional responses. The processes reviewed here 
should be considered to be a comprehensive but not exhaustive 
representation of the interaction of cognitions and emotions. It is 
entirely reasonable to assume that there would be variables which have 
not been specified in this analysis which could conceivably have an 
impact on emotional responses. For example, emotions are generated in 
response to internal events as well as raw sensory input. It is intended 
here to merely acknowledge that events stored in memory can precipitate
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emotional responses and to assert that a more detailed discussion of 
those mechanisms is beyond the scope of the current work. Furthermore, 
it must be remembered that cognitive theorists acknowledge that a 
human’s current emotional state can also influence the way in which 
stimuli are selected and processed. Notwithstanding this, it is 
suggested that the relationships discussed above are representative of 
the kind of events that determine the nature of emotional responses. 
These relationships are illustrated by the diagrammatic representation 
provided in Figure 1. This shows the sensory input or internal event 
being subject to a selection process which results in a constructed 
reality (nonevaluative belief) being generated. It is the interaction of 
this nonevaluative belief with associated evaluative beliefs that 
controls the emotional response.
4.4 The Current Research Problem
The current work will focus on the hypothesized relationships 
illustrated in Figure 1 at the level of nonevaluative and evaluative 
beliefs and will address two primary questions. As foreshadowed in the 
introductory chapters, the first question to be addressed is whether or 
not nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs are related in a causal way to 
emotional responses. The second question to be addressed, assuming a 
causal relationship is established between nonevaluative and evaluative 
beliefs and emotional responses, is whether or not this relationship 
constitutes merely a sufficient, or both a sufficient and necessary 
condition for emotions. These questions will be pursued sequentially in 
the subsequent chapters. The next series of studies empirically 
investigates the hypothesized meditational role of nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs for emotion.
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the hypothesized relationship 
between fundamental cognitive processes, nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs, and emotional responses.
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4.5 The Experimental Paradigm
The mood induction procedure used in Experiments 1 sind 2 is not a 
suitable paradigm for the investigation of the mediational role of 
beliefs for emotion. In the previous experiments the experimental 
procedure required subjects to act "as if" a stimulus situation existed. 
It was shown that under these conditions the believability of the 
stimuli varied considerably across individual subjects. Also it is well 
established that mood induction research is sensitive to experimental 
demand characteristics (Buchwald et al, 1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980). To 
remove these potential sources of experimental error it is necessary to 
adopt an experimental approach where the mood induction stimuli were 
actual rather than "as if" experiences and where the subjects are not 
aware of the experimenter’s intentions. Furthermore, the considerable 
range of statement content in the previous paradigm makes it impractical 
to assess subjects* nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs about the 
experimental stimuli. In order for the impact of nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs on emotional responding to be assessed the 
experimental approach has to also allow for these cognitive variables to 
be systematically controlled or monitored. The possibility of achieving 
this objective would be substantially improved if the experimental 
stimulus was restricted to a single event.
The finding of a suitable experimental paradigm to investigate the 
issue of effect of belief on emotion was the first problem that had to 
be addressed by this research. There was only one strategy reported in 
the literature that appeared to have the potential to meet the criteria 
required. In a study investigating affect and the accessibility of 
material in memory, success and failure at a computer game was used as 
an actual experience for generating positive and negative moods (Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp 1978). Subjects^perceptions of success and
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failure were manipulated by false feedback in order to generate the 
positive and negative moods respectively. Unfortunately, these 
experimenters did not actually measure mood but merely assumed that 
their manipulations of feedback generated the hypothesized mood states. 
However, false feedback has been used successfully as an experimental 
paradigm for generating negative mood in studies investigating the 
learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 
1978). Therefore, while the efficacy of computer games and false 
feedback as an experimental approach for inducing mood had not been 
clearly demonstrated there is sufficient evidence available to warrant 
optimism about the use of this as an experimental procedure.
Therefore, the strategy adopted was to have subjects play a 
computer game and to exercise control over their perception of their 
scores on the game by providing false feedback. In this way subjects’ 
nonevaluative beliefs about success and failure at the task would be 
under experimental control. Subjects’ evaluative beliefs about success 
and failure at the computer game could also be monitored. It was thought 
that these would be reflected by their value and expectation of success 
at computer games and that measures of these variables could be used to 
differentiate subjectsf level of evaluative belief. The use of this 
procedure to investigate the hypothesized relationship between cognitive 
processes and emotional response, presented diagramraatically in Figure 
1, will be described in the following experiment.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 3: NONEVALUATIVE AND EVALUATIVE 
BELIEFS AS MEDIATORS OF EMOTION
Cognitive learning therapy is characterized by the mediational role 
assigned to cognitions in the generation of emotional and behavioural 
responses (Mahoney, 1974; Mahoney & Amkoff, 1978). The empirical 
evidence available to support this assertion demonstrates an association 
between cognitively based activities and emotional responses (Cohen & 
Lazarus, 1973; Coyne & Lazarus, 1983; Hale & Strickland, 1976; Koriat et 
al, 1972; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus et al, 1962; 
Velten, 1968). These studies generally speaking do not monitor the 
specific cognitive processes identified by cognitive learning theorists
and discussed in the previous chapter as being critical for the
generation of emotions . Therefore, the available evidence does not
empirically demonstrate the hypothesized mediational role of these
specific cognitive processes for emotion.
It has been argued in the previous chapter that cognitive learning 
theory suggests that humans’ nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs about 
a stimulus characterize their emotional response to that stimulus. An 
experimental paradigm has been proposed to test that assertion. The 
methodology outlined in the previous chapter suggested that false 
feedback on a computer game task could be used as a mood induction 
procedure. The current work will utilize this strategy to evaluate 
whether subjects * nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs mediate their 
emotional response to playing a computer game. The nonevaluative belief 
which was thought to be important for this task was subjects’ belief of 
success or failure at the computer game and their evaluative beliefs 
which were thought to be important were their value and expectation of 
success at the game.
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It was hypothesized that subjects’ emotional reaction to the game 
would be characterized by their belief of success or failure at the task 
(nonevaluative belief) and by their value and expectation of success at 
computer games (evaluative belief).
5.1 Method
Subjects
The 60 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 200 first year 
psychology students at the Australian National University who had never 
played the computer game used in the experiment. There were 22 males and 
38 females. Their age range was from 18 to 47 years with a mean age of 
25.8 years. Subjects received course credit for participating in the 
experiment.
Design
The design was a two by three factorial design with two levels of 
evaluative belief (high and low value/expectation of success at computer 
games) and three levels of nonevaluative belief (positive feedback, 
negative feedback, and no feedback control).
Materials
Equipment. The computer game was played on a Conroodore Vic 20 
Colour Home Computer with a 14 inch Commodore video monitor (model 
1701).
The computer game used was a commercially available game called 
"Blitz". The object of the game was to clear a runway for a plane to 
land on by dropping "bombs" on the obstacles that were on the runway. 
Points were scored for the number of obstacles cleared and the game
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terminated with the plane crashing if the runway could not be cleared in 
time. The level of difficulty was such that first time players 
invariably failed to clear the runway and, therefore, crashed. The game 
was chosen because:
1. It was thought that since no one was expected to complete the 
task both the positive and negative feedback would be credible. That is, 
the subjects who received positive feedback would accept the game was a 
difficult one at which they had done well and the subjects who received 
negative feedback would consider the game was one at which other people 
were able to do better than they could.
2. The game only required subjects to press one key which 
controlled the release of bombs as the plane flew over the runway. The 
advantage of this was that the release of bombs was sensitive to the key 
press and there was less scope for subjects to attribute low scores to 
external factors like unresponsive equipment than if more sophisticated 
machine responses like left/right movement or joy stick control were 
required.
Mood assessment instruments. The three types of mood assessment 
used in Experiment 1 were used again here.3 That is, the pre-induction 
mood test was the writing numbers test, the digit symbol subtest from 
the WAIS, the eight visual analogue scales (relaxed, anxious, irritated, 
calm, frustrated, despondent, excited, and happy), and the POMS. The 
post-induction mood test was a repeat of these tests only with the 
letter symbol subtest from the NHAIS replacing the digit symbol subtest.
3 Although the less clinical scales used in Experiment 2 appeared to 
be superior for the self statement mood induction procedure there was no 
empirical reason to assume that this would apply to the new mood 
induction procedure being used here. Therefore the original scales used 
in Experiment 1 were used to provide an empirical test of their 
appropriateness for this new task.
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Cognitive assessment. In order to measure evaluative beliefs a
Task Evaluation Scale (TES) was developed to assess subjects' value and 
expectation of success at computer games. It consisted of eight items 
which subjects were asked to agree/disagree with using a seven point 
scale (see Appendix B-l).
To determine subjects’ nonevaluative belief a posttest 
questionnaire was used to measure subjects’ own assessment of their 
scores on the game. Subjects were asked to rate their scores on the 
Scores Rating Scale (see Appendix B-2). The Scores Rating Scale was a 
five point scale developed for this study on which subjects rated their 
scores from "much better than average" to "much worse than average". The 
scale was embedded in other questions about participating in the 
experiment.
Procedure
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three feedback 
conditions, positive (PosFbk), negative (NegFbk), and no feedback 
(NoFbk). The random assignment was restricted to ensure even numbers 
across feedback conditions. Again, a procedure of sampling without 
replacement (Keppel, 1982) was used.
Subjects were tested individually and had been given the following 
information about the experiment prior to attending.
The experiment is part of a research project looking at the
influence of mood on visuo motor skill acquisition. This
involves filling in some mood scales and playing a video game.
On attending the experimental session subjects assigned to the 
positive and negative feedback conditions were given the following 
instructions. All instructions which were typed on a sheet of A4 paper 
were given to the subjects to read before being read aloud by the 
experimenter.
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The purpose of the experiment is to check the impact of 
current mood on the visuo motor skill acquisition.
The skill being tested is the level of eye hand coordination 
required to play a video game called "Blitz".
The level of difficulty varies for each game and the computer 
automatically records your score. At the end of each game it 
provides a comparison between your score and the best score so 
far for that game.
The playing instructions will be provided on the screen before 
you begin playing the first game. However, before you commence 
playing I would like to check your current mood.
Subjects assigned to the no feedback control condition received the 
following instructions.
The purpose of the experiment is to check the impact of 
current mood on the visuo motor skill acquisition.
The skill being tested is the level of eye hand coordination 
required to play a video game called "Blitz".
The level of difficulty varies for each game and the computer 
automatically records your score. It then adjusts your score 
for the level of difficulty of that game to obtain an estimate 
of your rate of skill acquisition.
The playing instructions will be provided on the screen before 
you begin playing the first game. However, before you commence 
playing I would like to check your current mood.
After the reading of the instructions subjects completed the Task 
Evaluation Scale and their current mood was assessed (pre-induction mood 
test). Subjects then played 15 games of "Blitz". Subjects in the two 
experimental conditions received predetermined feedback about their 
scores at the end of each game. This was done by comparing their score 
for that game to the "Best Score" so far by any player on that game. The 
"Best Score" for the positive feedback group was actually the subject’s
score minus a random number between 0 and 20. This meant the subject
always obtained a score higher than the ''Best Score" so far. As the
majority of players score between 70 and 120 points per game and in
order to retain credibility there was a minimum "Best Score" of 53
points for the positive feedback group. The "Best Score" for the
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negative feedback group was the subject’s score plus a random number 
between 60 and 100. The no feedback control group were not given any 
indication of their scores or information about "Best Scores" at all.
Each game lasted for between 60 to 90 seconds making each playing 
session 15 to 20 minutes.
After completing the 15 games subjects’ mood was reassessed (post­
induction mood test) followed by the administration of the posttest 
questionnaire to assess subjects’ nonevaluative beliefs about the game.
Subjects were then debriefed and care was taken that subjects were 
not experiencing any lingering negative mood effects after they had 
finished the experiment.
5.2 Results
The cognitive and mood assessment data were analyzed by separate 
two-way analyses of variance. The results of these analyses are outlined 
below.
Cognitive Assessment
The cognitive assessment was in two parts. The first part assessed 
subjects* evaluative beliefs about their value and expectation of success 
at computer games. This was measured by the Task Evaluation Scale and 
used to define the high and low value/expectation groups. The second 
part assessed subjects’ nonevaluative beliefs about the scores feedback 
as measured by the Scores Rating Scale. The data from the Task 
Evaluation Scale and the Scores Rating Scale were analyzed separately 
and these data are presented below.
Evaluative belief: Value and expectation of success at computer 
games. Each feedback condition was divided into a high and low
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value/expectation group by way of a median split of the Task Evaluation 
Scale scores. As expected a two-way analysis of variance of the Task 
Evaluation Scale with two levels of value/expectation (high, low) and 
three levels of feedback (positive, negative and no feedback control) 
showed a significant between groups effect for value/expectation, 
F(l,54) = 92.27, p>.000 (see Table 20). Again as expected there was no 
main effect of feedback conditions on the Task Evaluation Scale ratings. 
These data indicate that the median split was a successful method of 
establishing groups with different levels of value/expectation of 
success at computer games.
Table 20
Experiment 3 Mean Task Evaluation Scale Scores for the Six Experimental 
Groups.
Value/
Expectation
Feedback Condition
TotalPositive Control Negative
High 3.09 3.09 2.39 2.85
Low 4.59 4.74 4.57 4.63
Total 3.84 3.45 3.91
Nonevaluative belief: Belief of feedback. A two-way analysis of 
variance of the Scores Rating Scale revealed a significant main effect 
for feedback conditions, F(2,54) = 21.29, p<.000. Subjects in the 
positive feedback condition rated their scores as being significantly 
higher than those in both the negative feedback and control conditions. 
Contrary to expectations there was no significant difference between the 
negative feedback and control groups (see Table 21). There was also a 
significant two-way interaction between feedback condition and
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value/expectation, F(2,54) = 3.79, p<.03 for scores rating. This 
interaction suggests that subjects who had low value/expectation of 
success on computer games rated their scores as higher than high 
value/expectation subjects when they received positive feedback and 
alternatively rated their scores as lower than high value/expectation 
subjects when they received negative feedback (see Table 21). These data 
suggest that the scores feedback was effective at encouraging subjects 
to believe that they had done better or worse than average. 
Interestingly, in the absence of feedback the control subjects believed 
they had done worse than average.
Table 21
Experiment 3 Mean Scores Rating Scale Scores for the Six Experimental 
Groups.
Value/
Expectation Positive
Feedback Condition 
Control Negative Total
High 2.50 3.20 3.30 3.00
Low 2.00 3.80 3.90 3.23
Total 2.25 3.50 3.60
Pre-Induction Mood Test
As with the previous experiments there were some minor pre- 
induction mood differences between the experimental groups. Given the 
number of individual mood scales reported (16) it is likely that some 
chance differences could occur. The procedure adopted here of using mood 
change scores as the main dependent variable should adequately account 
for these minor differences. The results of separate analyses for each 
of the mood measures are reported below.
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Visual analogue scales. A two-way analysis of variance of the
visual analogue scales showed no pre-induction mood test differences 
between the experimental groups (see Table 22).
Profile of Mood States (FOMS). A two-way analysis of variance 
indicated that there was a significant difference between the feedback 
conditions for the fatigue scale, F(2,54) = 3.61, p< .04, and between 
the value/expectation conditions for the confusion scale, F(l,54) =
7.90, p< .007. Contrasts showed the negative feedback subjects to be 
more fatigued than the positive feedback and control subjects and the 
low value/expectation subjects to be more confused than the high 
value/expectation subjects. There were no pre-induction mood test 
differences on any of the other POMS scales (see Table 23).
Motor speed. There were no pre-induction mood test differences on 
the two motor speed tests (see Table 24).
Pre- to Post-Induction Mood Change
Mood change scores were calculated in the same way as in Experiment 
1. Separate two-way analyses of variance were used to analyze the mood 
change data. Contrary to expectations significant mood change effects 
were restricted to the visual analogue summary scales VAPS and VANS. For 
these scales there was a significant effect of feedback on mood change. 
There were no significant effects on mood change of the value and 
expectation of success at computer games. The results for each of the 
mood measures are detailed below.
87
Table 22
Bxperiaent 3 Pre-Induction Mean Visual Analogue Scale Scores for the Six Bxperiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Visual Analogue 
Scales High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Relaxed 53.2 55.6 54.40 63.0 40.7 51.85 52.4 64.8 58.60 56.20 53.70
Anxious 27.6 27.2 27.40 34.2 47.2 40.70 33.9 32.0 32.95 31.90 35.47
Irritated 24.9 30.8 27.85 10.5 30.5 20.55 35.2 27.8 31.50 23.53 29.73
Cals 55.7 66.2 60.95 61.7 50.4 56.05 53.4 73.1 63.25 56.93 63.23
Frustrated 23.6 21.7 22.65 13.0 27.6 20.30 17.9 30.0 23.95 18.17 26.43
Despondent 22.2 31.8 27.00 19.7 27.0 23.35 21.7 32.2 26.95 21.20 30.33
Excited 29.2 30.3 29.75 37.2 40.6 38.90 41.7 28.1 34.90 36.03 33.00
Happy 62.4 55.0 58.70 66.3 63.3 64.80 61.9 53.9 57.90 63.53 57.40
VAPS 50.1 51.8 50.95 57.1 48.8 52.90 52.4 55.0 53.66 53.17 51.83
VANS 24.6 27.9 26.22 19.4 33.1 26.22 27.2 30.5 28.84 23.70 30.49
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Table 23
Experiaent 3 Pre-Induction Mean POMS Scores for the Sii Experiaental Groups.
Profile of Mood 
State (POMS)
Feedback Condition
Total
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition
High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Tension/Anxiety 6.3 7.7 7.30 9.7 10.0 9.85 8.8 7.0 7.90 8.47 8.23
Depression 5.4 5.1 5.25 2.1 4.1 3.10 2.9 9.4 6.15 3.47 6.20
Anger/Hostility 3.1 2.2 2.65 2.0 3.5 2.75 3.4 4.9 4.15 2.83 3.53
Vigor 17.5 15.7 16.60 17.6 13.8 15.70 13.4 10.4 11.90 16.17 13.30
Fatigue 5.8 8.9 7.35 7.8 7.2 7.50 12.8 13.0 12.90 8.80 9.70
Confusion 4.9 7.1 6.00 5.3 8.3 6.8 6.9 10.3 8.6 5.70 8.57
THS 8.6 15.3 11.95 9.3 19.3 14.30 21.4 34.2 27.80 13.10 22.93
Table 24
Bxperiaent 3 Pre-Induction Mean Motor Speed Test Scores for the Six Experiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Motor Speed 
Tests High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Digit Syabol 57.0 60.2 58.60 55.9 56.7 56.30 57.9 56.5 57.20 56.93 57.80
Writing Nuibers 72.5 67.1 69.80 64.5 65.7 65.10 64.7 64.7 64.7 67.23 65.83
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Visual analogue scales. A two-way analysis of variance revealed a
significant between groups effect for feedback conditions on the VAPS, 
F(2,52) = 3.25, p<.05, and VANS, F(2,52) = 3.12, p<.05, scales. 
Comparisons between the marginal means for VAPS showed the positive 
feedback group to have a significantly greater positive mood change than 
both the negative feedback, F(2,54) = 6.01, p<.01, and control, F(2,54)
= 3.36, p<.05, groups. A similar analysis of the group means for the 
VANS scale revealed the control group to have a significantly greater 
negative mood change than the positive feedback, F(2,54) = 5.72, p<.01, 
and the negative feedback, F(2,54) = 3.31, p<.05, groups (see Table 25). 
The differences between the groups’ mean mood change scores for the 
individual visual analogue scales did not reach significance (see Table 
25).
Profile of mood states (POMS). There were no significant 
differences between the groups on any of the POMS scales (see Table 26).
Motor Speed. A two-way analysis of variance showed a significant 
two-way interaction for change scores on both the writing numbers test, 
F(2,54) = 4.66, p< .02, and the symbols tests, F(2,54) = 3.40, p<.04. 
For the writing numbers test the subjects who were low on 
value/expectation and received negative feedback showed an increased 
motor speed and for the symbols tests subjects who were low on 
value/expectation and received positive feedback showed an increase in 
motor speed (see Table 27).
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Table 25
Bxperiaent 3 Pre- to Post-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Change Scores for the Sir Experiiental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Visual Analogue
Scales High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Relaxed 9.2 0.7 4.95 -20.5 -1.9 -11.2 -14.4 -6.6 -10.50 -8.57 -2.60
Anxious 11.1 6.0 8.55 -10.4 6.6 -1.90 0.7 0.2 0.45 0.47 4.27
Irritated -2.8 2.8 0.00 -17.2 -9.1 -13.15 8.1 -6.4 0.85 -3.97 -4.23
Cala 12.0 -13.6 -0.80 -9.2 1.7 -3.75 -6.0 -14.3 -10.15 -1.07 -8.73
Frustrated -3.5 -8.1 -5.80 -21.1 -24.4 -22.75 -20.0 2.5 -8.75 -14.87 -10.00
Despondent 0.2 12.8 6.50 -0.7 -4.0 -2.35 -2.4 12.1 4.85 -0.97 6.97
Bxcited 20.0 21.3 20.65 24.3 0.0 12.15 0.0 13.6 6.80 14.77 11.63
Happy 7.1 10.0 8.55 -0.3 -0.8 -0.55 -0.7 -3.1 -1.90 2.03 2.03
VAPS 12.1 4.6 8.34 -1.4 -0.3 -.84 -5.3 -2.6 -3.94 1.79 0.58
VANS 1.3 3.4 2.31 -12.4 -7.7 -10.04 -3.4 2.1 -0.65 -4.83 -0.75
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Table 26
Experiient 3 Pre-to Post-Induction POMS Mean Change Scores for the Six Experiiental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Profile of Mood 
State (POMS) High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Tension/Anxiety 2 . 0 1 . 8 1 . 9 0 - 0 . 3 1 . 4 0 . 5 5 - 1 . 1 - 1 . 3 - 1 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 6 3
Depression 2 . 5 2 . 1 2 . 3 0 . 8 1 . 9 1 . 3 5 - 0 . 3 3 . 2 1 . 4 5 1 . 0 0 2 . 4 0
Anger/Hostility 0 . 8 0 . 1 0 . 4 5 - 0 . 8 0 . 3 - 0 . 2 5 0 . 7 0 . 0 0 . 3 5 0 . 2 3 0 . 1 3
Vigor - 0 . 6 1 . 5 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 - 0 . 2 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 3 - 1 . 6 - 0 . 9 5 - 0 . 1 7 - 0 . 1 0
Fatigue 1 . 0 3 . 0 2 . 0 0 1 . 7 0 . 7 1 . 2 0 1 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 7 5 1 . 3 3 1 . 3 0
Confusion 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 . 1 5 0 . 4 2 . 5 1 . 4 5 0 . 1 0 . 4 0 . 2 5 0 . 5 3 1 . 3 7
m s 1 . 1 1 . 6 1 . 3 7 0 . 4 1 . 1 0 . 7 3 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 2 0 . 9 6
Table 27
Experiaent 3 Pre- to Post-Induction Mean Motor Speed Test Scores for the Six Bxperiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Kotor Speed
Tests High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Digit Syabol -8.3 - 1 . 2 -4.75 - 2 . 3 -5.1 -3.70 -4.7 -4.6 -4.65 -5.1 - 3 . 6 3
Writing Nuabers 3.0 0.8 1.90 2.7 0.3 1.50 1.2 4.9 3.05 2.30 2.00
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5.3 Discussion
The results of this experiment tentatively demonstrated that it was 
possible to discriminate between the groups of subjects in terms of 
their nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs about the experimental task 
and the resulting impact of that task on their mood. These findings 
along with their implications for cognitive learning theory, the current 
methodology and general issues relevant to mood induction research will 
be expanded below.
Hie use of false feedback was shown to be a potentially 
successfully method of manipulating subjects1 nonevaluative beliefs about 
their scores on a computer game. The subjects1 Scores Rating Scale 
results indicate that the false positive feedback was effective in 
convincing the positive feedback group that their scores were above 
average. The false negative feedback was also effective in convincing 
the negative feedback group that their scores were below average. The 
withholding of scores and feedback, however, did not have the desired 
effect for the control group. It is clear that when scores and feedback 
were withheld subjects used other criteria to judge their performance. 
Since the control group rated their scores as below average it seems 
most likely that not being able to complete the task convinced the 
control group (in the absence of any other criteria) that their scores 
must be below average. The fact that the level of difficulty of the game 
was intentionally set this way in order to ensure the negative feedback 
was credible was outlined in the previous section. In retrospect, while 
achieving that aim it would appear to have introduced an unforeseen 
confounding element by providing a source of uncontrolled negative 
feedback.
In debriefing subjects it became apparent that the method of
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providing feedback also introduced a methodological problem. The system 
of providing a game by game best score comparison based on the subject’s 
own score became transparent if the subject’s scores fluctuated 
substantially from game to game. While the effect of this problem was 
not sufficient to prevent the feedback groups mean rating of scores from 
being significantly different it was another uncontrolled source of 
experimental error.
This study also appeared to be able to successfully control for 
subjects’ evaluative beliefs about success at computer games. The 
analysis of subjects*TES scores (ratings of value and expectation of 
success at computer games) indicated that there was no difference on 
this variable across the three feedback conditions. The median split 
enabled the feedback groups to be divided into high and low 
value/expectation groups whose mean TES scores were significantly 
different. However, subjects* TES scores were skewed toward the high end 
such that the mean TES scores for the low value/expectation groups were 
between neutral and low rather than being genuinely low.
There was some evidence from this study that subjects’ nonevaluative 
beliefs were related to reported mood change. Both of the combined 
visual analogue scales showed significant differences between the 
feedback group>s. It was of some interest that these differences varied 
across the positive and negative scales. The positive feedback group 
showed the most change on the positive mood scales and the control group 
showed the most change on the negative mood scales. This is consistent 
with the view that the uncontrolled visual feedback from the game was 
negative and app>arently more effective than the controlled false 
negative feedback. It also suggests that the positive moods responded to 
the positive nonevaluative beliefs and negative moods to the negative 
nonevaluative beliefs. These results are consistent with the findings
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from Experiments 1 and 2 and support the notion that positive and 
negative moods are independent (Boyle, 1985). That is, an increase in 
positive mood is not automatically accompanied by a corresponding 
decrease in negative mood and vice versa. The results are also 
consistent with the proposition considered previously that positive and 
negative moods may involve separate cognitive processes. It would appear 
that positive nonevaluative beliefs were associated with changes in 
positive moods without having a great impact on negative moods and the 
reverse for negative nonevaluative beliefs.
There was no evidence from this study to show that the different 
levels of the evaluative beliefs most commonly cited by cognitive 
behaviour therapists were associated with differential mood change. 
There are four possible interpretations of this finding. The median 
split of the TES scores while producing groups that were statistically 
different may not have provided sufficient variation on this variable, 
particularly in view of the fact that the low groups* scores were not 
genuinely low. Alternatively, the TES scores may not accurately 
represent subjects*value/expectation of success at computer games. The 
scale has face validity but given the specificity of the scale there is 
no suitable existing scale that can provide a test of its concurrent 
validity. It is also possible that the evaluative beliefs measured here 
by the TES (value/expectation of computer games) may not have been the 
relevant ones to mediate emotional response to this experimental task. 
Finally, there is a fourth alternative that must be considered. Subjects 
in the high and low value and expectation of success at computer games 
groups did not show any differences in their emotional response to the 
experience of success or failure at computer games. If what subjects 
believe about success at computer games does not influence their 
emotional response to the experience of success or failure at computer
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games then it is possible that these kinds of beliefs are not an 
important determinant of emotions. Therefore, it may be necessary to 
reject the cognitive behaviour therapists position that evaluative 
beliefs are causally related to emotional responding.
On a more general level, as was found in Experiments 1 and 2 mood 
changes were reported for a range of moods rather than just one or two. 
The findings here continue to support the previous work cited earlier 
that suggests moods are most likely to occur in clusters (Boyle, 1985; 
Polivy, 1981). The significant mood changes were also confined to the 
visual analogue scales. These scales appear to be more suitable for 
monitoring nonclinical mood states than either the POMS or the tests of 
psychomotor functioning. It is suggested that the tests of psychomotor 
functioning are not appropriate for assessing mood changes in response 
to computer games. The results indicated that achieving low scores on a 
computer game was more likely to generate physiologically arousing 
negative moods like frustration, irritation and tension than a 
physiologically retarding mood such as depression. The failure of this 
measure to discriminate between the experimental groups was seen as a 
positive indication that these are the kinds of moods associated with 
this experimental paradigm.
In conclusion, the limited success of this experiment in generating 
the hypothesized mood changes was seen as being largely due to 
methodological difficulties. Firstly, the data suggests that the game 
chosen as the experimental task had the unforeseen disadvantage of 
providing uncontrolled negative feedback and thereby contaminating the 
feedback groups. Since there was no control or monitoring of this 
feedback there is no guarantee its effects were randomly distributed 
throughout the groups. Secondly, the method of providing feedback, by 
being less effective for some subjects than others, also introduced
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additional experimental error. Thirdly, there was no way of checking 
that the measure of evaluative belief used in this study (TES) was 
appropriate or valid and, therefore, the failure of this variable to 
predict mood change cannot be interpreted with any confidence.
However, the results were sufficiently encouraging to justify an 
attempt to overcome these methodological difficulties in the expectation 
that the experimental paradigm could provide a useful test of the 
theoretical concepts under consideration. This was undertaken in the 
next experiment which is outlined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 4: NONEVALUATIVE AND EVALUATIVE 
BELIEFS AS MEDIATORS OF EMOTION
The first problem that had to be addressed by the current work was 
to find a suitable experimental paradigm to assess the relationship 
between nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs and emotion. It has been 
argued in the previous chapter that the methodology used for Experiment 
3 was promising but required refinement. The areas identified as 
possible sources of experimental error were the nature of the computer 
game task, the method of providing feedback, and the validity of the 
Task Evaluation Scale as a measure of subjects* value and expectation of 
success at computer games.
The current study was designed to overcome these difficulties. The 
computer game, the method of providing feedback and the measurement 
instrument for assessing subjects’ value and expectation of success at 
computer games were revised. Also, additional scales were added to 
assess how the subjects qualitatively evaluated their computer game 
scores. It is suggested that subjects*level of satisfaction with their 
scores, in the light of experiences of success and failure, would 
reflect their value and expectation of success at computer games. 
Therefore, these scales were used as a validity check of the Task 
Evaluation Scale as a measure of subjects’value and expectation of 
success at computer games.
Again it was hypothesized that subjects* emotional response to the 
computer game task would be characterized by their belief of success or 
failure at the task (nonevaluative belief) and the level of their value 
and expectation of success at computer games (evaluative belief).
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6.1 Method
Subjects
The 60 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 180 first year 
psychology students at the Australian National University who had not 
had any prior contact with the experimental materials. The subjects age 
ranged from 17 to 45 years with a mean age of 21.9 years. There were 19 
males and 41 females. The subjects received course credit for
participating in the experiment.
Design
The design was the same as that used in Experiment 3.
Materials
Equipment. The computer hardware was the same as that used in 
Experiment 3. The computer game was changed to eliminate the possibility 
of the game providing visual feedback about subjects*performance. A game 
called "Shooting Gallery" was devised which had no logical end point 
that subjects were able to assume as a goal. The object of the game was 
to fire at an endless supply of moving targets, points were scored for 
"hits" and a time limit of 60 seconds was available to accumulate
points. The only objective criterion available by which to judge 
performance was that provided and controlled by the experimenter.
Mood measurement instruments. Mood was assessed by the revised 
visual analogue scales used in Experiment 2 and the POMS. The results 
from Experiment 3 suggest the revised visual analogue scales which 
provide greater coverage of the nonclinical mood states may be more 
appropriate to the nature of the experimental task. It was thought that 
the motor speed tests used in previous experiments were not an
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appropriate index of the kind of moods associated with success and 
failure experience on a computer game and so these were not included.
Cognitive assessment. The Task Evaluation Scale (TES) from
Experiment 3 was revised and expanded to incorporate separate seven item 
scales for TES (Value) and TES (Expectation) of success on computer 
games (see Appendix C-l).
The post test questionnaire was also revised and expanded to 
include a seven point, seven item scale to assess subjects1opinion of 
the quality of their scores on the game (Evaluative Beliefs Scale) (see 
Appendix C-2). The Scores Rating Scale, used as a measure of how well 
subjects thought they had done in relation to other people, was upgraded 
to a seven point scale. Also, two additional seven point scales were 
added. The first to assess how satisfied subjects were with their scores 
(Satisfaction with Scores Scale) and the second to measure how subjects’ 
scores compared to their expectations (Scores Expectation Scale). 
Subjects were also asked to give the main reasons for their ratings of 
their level of satisfaction with their scores (see Appendix C-3).
Pre-Induction Mood Test
The pre-induction mood test was a modified form of that used in 
Experiment 2. The two motor speed tests were deleted. Since the mood 
changes expected were not simply along the elation-depression continuum 
it was thought that these tests were no longer appropriate as mood 
measures. The ten visual analogue scales and the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS) were retained.
Post-Induction Mood Test
The post-induction mood test consisted of repeating the ten visual 
analogue scales and the POMS.
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Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 3 except for the following 
changes.
The experimental instructions were adapted to suit the new computer
game. Subjects in the positive and negative feedback conditions were
given the following experimental instructions.
The purpose of the experiment is to check the impact of
current mood on the visuo motor skill acquisition.
The skill being tested is the level of eye hand coordination 
required to play a video game called "Shooting Gallery".
The computer automatically records your score and at the end 
of each game it provides a comparison between your score and 
the usual range of scores obtained by first time players.
The playing instructions will be provided on the screen before 
you begin playing the first game. However, before you commence 
playing I would like to check your current mood.
Subjects in the no feedback control condition were given the
following experimental instructions.
The purpose of the experiment is to check the impact of
current mood on the visuo motor skill acquisition.
The skill being tested is the level of eye hand coordination 
required to play a video game called "Shooting Gallery".
The computer automatically records your score and calculates 
your rate of skill acquisition.
The playing instructions will be provided on the screen before 
you begin playing the first game. However, before you commence 
playing I would like to check your current mood.
The number of games was reduced from 15 to 10 because some subjects 
in Experiment 3 found it difficult to maintain concentration for 15
games and became bored. The method of providing controlled feedback was 
also changed. It was found in Experiment 3 that subjects * scores 
fluctuated considerably from game to game and the "Best Score" method at 
times seemed inconsistent to subjects. Therefore, at the end of each 
game subjects were given their score for that game and a rating for 
their score on a range from "very good" to "very poor" (see Appendix C-
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4). The range of scores associated with each rating was preset within 
feedback conditions so that subjects in the positive feedback condition 
always rated "above average", "good" or "very good" and those in the 
negative feedback condition always rated "below average", "poor" or 
"very poor". Subjects in the no feedback condition received their score 
without any rating or comparison information. Each game was for 60 
seconds making each playing session 10 to 15 minutes. Finally, even 
though subjects were randomly assigned to experimental groups their 
actual game scores were recorded to test if there was a difference in 
playing standards across the experimental groups.
Subjects were again debriefed and care was taken to ensure subjects 
did not leave the experiment while still experiencing any lingering 
negative mood effects.
6.2 Results
The Task Evaluation Scale was again used to split the feedback 
conditions into high and low value/expectation groups. Separate two-way 
analyses of variance were then used to analyse the subjects actual 
scores on the computer game, each of the cognitive variables, and the 
mood data. The results of these analyses are presented below.
Computer Game Scores
A two-way analysis of variance of subjects* average score on the 
computer game revealed that there was no significant between group 
difference on subjects*actual scores (see Table 28). These data indicate 
that there was no difference between subjects*average scores on the 
computer game regardless of their feedback or value/expectation 
condition.
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Table 28
Experiment 4 Mean Computer Game Scores for the Six Experimental Groups.
Value/
Expectation
Feedback Condition
TotalPositive Control Negative
High 63.3 71.8 72.3 69.1
Low 67.7 63.6 71.2 66.0
Total 65.5 67.7 71.8
Cognitive Assessment
Evaluative beliefs: Value and expectation of success at computer 
games. A correlational analysis indicated TES (Value) and TES 
(Expectation) scales to be significantly positively correlated r = .810, 
p<.001. The TES (Value) scores were used to divide each feedback 
condition into a high and low value/expectation group by way of a median 
split. However, since it was not possible to distinguish between the TES 
(Value) and TES (expectation) variables the evaluative belief condition 
will still be referred to as value/expectation. A two-way analysis of 
variance of the TES scales showed a significant between groups effect of 
value/expectation for TES (Value), F(2,54) = 118.79, p>.001 and for TES 
(Expectation), F(2,54) = 48.63, p< .001 (see Tables 29 and 30). As
expected the high value/expectation groups had a significantly greater 
value and expectation of success at computer games than the low 
value/expectation groups. These data indicate that the median split was 
a successful way of establishing the high and low value/expectation 
groups.
Unfortunately, there was also a significant main effect across 
feedback conditions for both the TES (Value), F(2,54) = 3.37, p<.04 and
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Table 29
Experiment 4 Mean TES (Value) Scores for the Six Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Value/
Expectation Positive Control Negative Total
High 3.26 2.89 2.84 3.00
Low 5.46 4.67 5.09 5.07
Total 4.36 3.76 3.99
Table 30
Experiment 4 Mean 
Groups.
TES (Expectation) Scores for the Six Experimental
Feedback Condition
Value/
Expectation Positive Control Negative Total
High 3.49 2.41 2.84 2.91
Low 4.86 4.21 4.33 4.47
Total 4.17 3.53 3.37
TES (Expectation) , F(2,54) = 4.83, p<.01, scores (see Table 29 and 30).
Comparisons between the marginal means indicated the positive feedback 
group had lower value/expectation of success than the negative feedback 
and control groups.
Nonevaluative belief: Belief of feedback. A two-way analysis of 
variance of the Scores Rating Scale revealed a significant main effect 
for feedback conditions, F(2,54) = 16.60, p<.001 (see Table 31). Each of 
the feedback conditions was significantly different to the other two. 
That is, subjects in the positive feedback condition rated their scores
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as being significantly higher than those in the negative feedback and 
control conditions. The control group ratings were between those of the 
positive and negative feedback groups and were significantly higher than 
the negative feedback group.
Table 31
Experiment 4 Mean Scores Rating Scale Scores for the Six Experimental 
Groups.
Value/
Expectation
Feedback Condition
TotalPositive Control Negative
High 3.3 4.0 5.3 4.2
Low 3.7 4.5 5.9 4.7
Total 3.5 4.3 5.6
Qualitative rating of scores. A two-way analysis of variance
showed a significant main effect for feedback conditions on the 
Evaluative Belief Scale, F(2,54) = 9.88, p<.001. The positive feedback 
and control groups rated their scores as qualitatively better than the 
negative feedback group, t (59) = 4.33, p<.001 and t (59) = 3.0, p<.01 
respectively and the positive feedback group tended to rate their 
scores as qualitatively better than the control group, t (59) = 1.33, 
p<.l. There was a significant main effect for value/expectation on the 
Evaluative Belief Scale, F(2,54) = 5.17, p<.03. The low 
value/expectation subjects rated their scores as better than the high 
value/expectation subjects (see Table 32). These data tend to confirm 
that the experimental groupings based on TES (Value) scores identified 
subjects who have a higher and lower value and expectation of success at 
computer games.
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Table 32
Experiment 4 Mean Evaluative Belief Scale Scores for the Six 
Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Value/
Expectation Positive Control Negative Total
High 3.19 3.79 4.94 3.97
Low 3.94 3.19 3.99 3.37
Total 3.06 3.49 4.46
There was a significant main effect of feedback conditions on the 
Satisfaction with Scores Scale, F(2,54) = 4.38, p<.02. The positive
feedback subjects were more satisfied than the controls and negative 
feedback subjects and the controls were more satisfied than the negative 
feedback subjects. The positive feedback and control groups were 
significantly more satisfied than the negative feedback group, t (59) = 
2.79, p<.005 and t (59) = 2.25, p<.02 respectively (see Table 33).
Table 33
Experiment 4 Mean Satisfaction with Scores Scale Scores for the Six 
Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Value/
Expectation Positive Control Negative Total
High 2.9 3.2 4.9 3.67
Low 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.27
Total 2.95 3.20 4.25
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There was a significant main effect for both feedback conditions
and value/expectation conditions for the Scores Expectation Scale, 
F(2,54) = 8.51, p<.001 and F(2,54) = 4.38, p<.04 respectively. The 
positive feedback subjects rated their scores as being better than they 
expected, the control subjects rated their scores as neither better nor 
worse than expected and the negative feedback subjects rated their 
scores as being worse than they expected. The positive feedback and 
control groups were significantly different to the negative feedback 
group , t (59) = 4.1, pC.001 and t (59) = 2.44, p<.01 respectively. The 
high value/expectation subjects rated their scores as worse than 
expected and the low value/expectation subjects as better than expected 
(see Table 34).
Table 34
Experiment 4 Mean Scores Expectation Scale Scores for the Six 
Experimental Groups.
Value/
Expectation Positive
Feedback Condition 
Control Negative Total
High 3.2 4.2 5.3 4.23
Low 3.1 3.4 4.2 3.57
Total 3.15 3.80 4.75
Pre-Induction Mood Test
Once again there were some random pre—induction between group mood 
differences. These are detailed below.
Visual analogue scales. A two-way analysis of variance of the 
visual analogue scales showed a significant main effect for
value/expectation on the pleased, F(l,54) = 5.29, p< .03 and happy,
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F(l,54) = 9.68, p<.003, scales. An inspection of means indicated for 
both scales the high value/expectation subjects mood was significantly 
more positive than the low value/expectation subjects (see Table 35).
Table 35
Expedient 4 Pre-Induction Mean Visual Analogue Scale Scores for the Six Experiaental Groups,
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Visual Analogue 
Scales High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Relaxed 58.4 43.0 50.70 68.8 49.8 59.30 62.8 60.7 61.75 63.33 51.17
Anxious 57.9 59.9 58.90 62.8 42.4 52.60 65.3 69.6 67.45 62.00 57.30
Irritated 36.3 44.8 40.55 43.6 52.3 47.95 43.1 28.8 35.95 41.00 41.97
Cali 20.4 22.7 21.55 16.8 19.5 18.15 24.1 21.5 22.80 20.43 21.23
Frustrated 62.4 41.3 51.85 52.6 31.9 42.25 51.3 62.6 56.95 55.43 45.27
Despondent 26.4 32.3 29.35 17.3 34.4 25.85 30.3 22.8 26.55 24.67 29.83
Excited 24.9 33.3 29.10 12.4 31.8 22.10 27.6 23.9 25.75 21.63 29.67
Happy 34.5 35.6 35.05 46.7 22.3 34.50 45.0 37.2 41.10 42.07 31.70
VAPS 65.4 50.6 58.00 69.0 45.4 57.20 70.7 66.0 68.35 68.37 54.00
VANS 28.6 38.7 33.65 19.6 35.7 27.65 17.6 19.8 18.70 21.93 31.40
Profile of mood states (POMS). A two-way analysis of variance 
indicated that there was a significant difference between the 
value/expectation conditions for the depression, F(l,54) = 3.92, p< .05, 
and confusion, F(l,54) = 9.14, p< .004, scales. The low 
value/expectation group was significantly more depressed and confused
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than the high value/expectation group. There was also a trend toward a 
significant main effect for value/expectation on the IMS, F(l,54) =
3.63, p<.06. The low value/expectation subjects tended to have a more
negative mood than the high value/expectation subjects. There was also a 
significant two-way interaction for the IMS scale, F(2,54) = 5.19,
p<.009. The interaction doesn’t appear to have any meaningful 
interpretation and is probably a random effect (see Table 36).
Table 36
Experiment 4 Pre-Induction Mean POMS Scores for the Six Experiuental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Profile of Hood 
State (POMS) High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Tension/Anxiety 6.7 5.5 6.10 5.5 8.9 7.20 9.1 5.1 7.10 7.10 6.50
Depression 3.4 8.3 5.85 2.4 12.2 7.30 6.2 3.0 4.60 4.00 7.83
Anger/Hostility 1.3 6.3 3.80 0.9 5.1 3.00 5.0 2.6 3.80 2.40 4.67
Vigor 9.7 9.3 9.50 16.2 8.7 12.45 11.9 13.5 12.70 12.60 10.50
Fatigue 8.3 11.5 9.90 7.4 11.1 9.25 14.2 9.6 11.90 9.97 10.73
Confusion 7.8 11.5 9.65 8.1 12.5 10.30 8.5 10.0 9.25 8.13 11.33
ms 17.8 33.8 25.80 8.1 41.1 23.95 31.1 16.8 24.60 19.00 30.57
Pre- to Post-Induction Mood Change
Mood change scores were calculated in the same way as in Experiment 
1. While there were some significant mood change differences on both the 
visual analogue scales and the POMS across both of the experimental
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conditions, the less clinical visual analogue scales again proved to be 
the more sensitive index of mood change for the computer game task. The 
most revealing feature of the mood change data was demonstrated by 
comparing the groups7 mean mood change score for each of the mood 
measures to zero to determine which of the groups were consistently 
experiencing a significant amount of mood change. This method of 
analyzing the data showed that the high value/expectation groups were 
more sensitive to negative feedback and that the low value/expectation 
groups were more sensitive to positive feedback. The mood change data 
for each of the mood measures is detailed below.
Visual analogue scales. A two-way analysis of variance of the 
visual analogue scales revealed a significant main effect for feedback 
conditions on the pleased, F(2,54) = 11.37, p< .001, discouraged, 
F(2,54) = 6.04, p<.004, VAPS, F(2,54) = 6.14, p< .004, and VANS scales, 
F(2,54) = 3.40, p<.04. There was also a trend towards a significant main 
effect for feedback conditions on the excited scale, F(2,54) = 2.78, 
p<.07.
Comparisons between the marginal means indicated for the pleased 
scale that the positive feedback group was significantly different to 
the negative feedback group, t (59) = 4.71, p<.001, and both the 
positive and negative feedback groups were significantly different from 
the control group, t (59) = 1.70, 3.01 and p<.05, .001 respectively. For 
the discouraged, VAPS, and VANS scales the positive feedback group was 
significantly different from the negative feedback group, t (59) = 2.7, 
3.1, and 2.09, and p<.005, .001, and .03 respectively and the negative 
feedback group was significantly different to the control group t (59) = 
3.24, 2.96, and 2.4, and p<.001, .005, and .01 respectively. For the 
excited scale there was a trend for the positive feedback group to be 
significantly different to the negative feedback group, t (59) = 1.6,
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p<.06 and the negative feedback group was significantly different to the 
control group, t (59) = 2.3, p<.02.
There was a significant main effect of the value/expectation 
condition on the relaxed, F(l,54) = 4.46, p<.04 and VAPS, F(l,54) =
6.17, p<.02, scales. There was also a trend toward a significant main
effect for the value/expectation conditions on the happy, F(l,54) =
3.38, p<.07, discouraged, F(l,54) = 3.52, p<.07, and VANS, F(l,54) =
3.16, p<.08, scales.
Since the major dependent variable was a mood change score the 
experimental group means were compared with zero to determine which 
groups tended to exhibit the most change. The negative feedback high 
value/expectation, the positive feedback low value/expectation and the 
no feedback control low value/expectation groups were the only groups to 
consistently demonstrate mood changes significantly greater than zero, 
across a range of the visual analogue scales.
The mean mood change for the negative feedback high
value/expectation group was negative and significantly greater than zero 
for all 6 negative and 3 of the positive visual analogue scales. These 
were pleased, relaxed, tense, irritated, frustrated, disappointed, 
discouraged, VAPS and VANS, t (59) = 4.18, 3.36, 2.41, 3.01, 3.08, 3.21, 
3.9, 2.82 and 4.71, and p<.001, .001, .01, .001, .001, .001, .001, .005, 
and .001 respectively.
The mean mood change for the positive feedback low
value/expectation group was positive and significantly greater than zero 
for 4 of the positive and one of the negative visual analogue scales. 
These were pleased, irritated, lighthearted, excited, happy and VAPS, t 
(59) = 1.82, 1.97, 1.82, 2.17, 1.68 and 2.06, and p<.05 , .03, .05, .02, 
.05, and .02 respectively.
The mean mood change for the no feedback control low
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value/expectation group was positive and significantly greater than zero 
for 3 of the positive and one of the negative visual analogue scales. 
These were irritated, lighthearted, excited, and VAPS, t (59) = 1.65, 
1.72, 3.87, and 2.48, and p<.05, .05, .001, and .01 respectively (see
Table 37).
Table 37
Experiment 4 Pre- to Post-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Mean Change Scores for the Sir Experiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Erpectation Condition Total
Visual Analogue 
Scales High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Pleased 7.5 13.5 10.50 -6.6 2.3 -2.15 -31.1 -17.9 -24.50 -10.07 -0.70
Relaxed 3.0 -8.9 -2.95 -15.0 4.9 -5.05 -26.8 6.5 -10.15 -12.93 0.83
Tense -4.4 -10.0 -7.20 5.1 5.5 5.30 -15.9 -0.1 -8.00 -5.07 -1.53
Irritated -12.6 -17.1 -14.85 -7.8 -14.3 -11.05 -26.1 -7.0 -16.55 -15.50 -12.80
Lighthearted -5.9 15.4 4.75 8.5 14.5 11.50 -3.3 -6.2 -4.75 -0.23 7.90
Frustrated -6.3 -2.0 -4.15 -19.7 -10.8 -15.25 -30.2 -14.2 -22.20 -18.73 -9.00
Disappointed -9.2 -0.9 -5.05 -14.0 2.4 -5.80 -27.5 -15.4 -21.45 -16.90 -4.63
Excited 14.1 17.8 15.95 11.5 31.7 21.60 4.4 1.2 2.80 10.00 16.90
Happy -3.3 10.1 3.40 0.3 4.4 2.35 -8.8 0.8 -4.00 -3.93 5.10
Discouraged 2.6 3.9 3.25 3.1 11.4 7.25 -28.7 -4.5 -16.60 -7.67 3.60
VAPS 15.4 47.9 31.65 -1.3 57.8 28.25 -65.6 -15.6 -40.6 -17.17 30.03
VANS -29.9 -26.1 -28.00 -33.3 -5.8 -19.55 -128.4 -41.2 -84.8 -63.87 -24.37
Profile of mood states (POMS). A two-way analysis of variance
revealed a significant main effect for value/expectation on the 
confusion scale, F(l,54) = 8.0, p< .007. An inspection of means showed 
the low value/expectation subjects were less confused than the high 
value/expectation subjects (see Table 38).
Table 38
Experiaent 4 Pre- to Post-Induction Mean POMS Scores for the Six Experiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Control Negative
Value/Expectation Condition Total
Profile of Hood 
State (POMS) High Low Total High Low Total High Low Total High Low
Tension/Anxiety -0.1 -3.2 -1.65 -1.5 -0.2 -0.85 -1.4 0.4 -0.50 1.00 1.00
Depression 1.8 1.9 1.85 0.1 3.1 1.6 -1.3 -1.0 -1.15 0.20 1.33
Anger/Hostility -0.7 -0.7 -0.70 -0.9 0.2 -0.35 -1.6 -1.1 -1.35 -1.07 -0.53
Vigor -0.1 2.2 1.05 1.1 0.9 1.00 -0.9 -1.5 -1.20 0.03 0.53
Fatigue 0.8 -0.2 0.30 1.6 2.7 2.15 -0.2 2.6 1.20 0.73 1.70
Confusion 1.0 3.0 2.00 0.9 2.7 1.80 -0.5 2.2 0.85 0.47 2.63
m 2.7 3.0 2.85 1.3 9.4 5.35 -5.9 -1.6 -2.15 -0.63 4.67
6.3 Discussion
The results from this experiment support the experimental 
hypothesis that subjects’ emotional response to the computer game is 
characterized by their nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs about the 
game. The assessment of nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs clearly 
demonstrated that the experimental groups wex~e differentiated on these
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variables. The mood change data show clear differences between the 
experimental groups which demonstrate that both these cognitive 
variables are associated with emotional responding. Also, the results 
from this study again supported the proposition that positive and 
negative moods are independent (Boyle, 1985; Diener & Emmons, 1985) and 
that moods tend to occur in clusters rather than els discrete responses 
(Boyle, 1985; Polivy, 1981). Here the discussion will focus first on the 
evidence supporting the assertion that the experimental groups were 
differentiated on the cognitive variables, second on the evidence which 
demonstrates their association with emotional responding and finally, on 
the implications of these findings for cognitive learning theory and 
therapy.
Subjects*nonevaluative beliefs were represented by their estimation 
of the relative level (above or below average) of their computer games 
scores. There was no difference between the feedback conditions in terms 
of the subjects’actual scores (see Table 28). However, in spite of there 
being no actual difference in subjects*scores, the positive feedback 
group believed their scores were above average and the negative feedback 
group believed their scores were below average. The no feedback control 
group believed their scores to be neither above nor below average. It 
would appear that changing the computer game and the method of providing 
feedback removed the uncontrolled visual feedback from the previous 
experiment that provided the control group with negative feedback. It 
must be acknowledged, however, that the control groups* scores on the 
Scores Rating Scale were not significantly different to the positive 
feedback group. Therefore, it must be expected that their emotional 
responses will be similar to the positive feedback group. It can also be 
seen from Table 31 that the negative feedback groups * scores were more 
extreme than the positive feedback group, suggesting their emotional
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responses may also be more extreme. It was concluded that the provision 
of false feedback was a successful method of controlling subjects’ 
nonevaluative beliefs about their scores on the computer game.
Subjectsy evaluative beliefs were represented by an estimation of 
how important it was for them to score highly and how successful they 
expected to be at computer games. The median split of the feedback 
groups into high and low TES (Value) groups again clearly demonstrated a 
differentiation between groups in terms of this evaluative belief about 
success at computer games. The highly significant positive correlation
between TES (Value) and TES (Expectation) made it impossible to
distinguish between these two concepts. Therefore, as was done in
Experiment 3, the two variables were referred to jointly as
value/expectation.
A series of post-induction qualitative ratings of subjects* scores 
were also included in this study as a validity check of the TES scales. 
The significant main effects for feedback conditions on the Evaluative 
Beliefs Scale, Satisfaction with Scores Scale, and Scores Expectation 
Scale indicated the positive feedback group believed their scores were 
qualitatively better than the negative feedback group and tended to 
believe their scores were qualitatively better than the control group. 
There was also evidence from these scales that the low value/expectation 
subjects rated their scores as qualitatively better than the high 
value/expectation subjects. These data indicate that the subjects 
qualitatively rated their computer game scores in the predicted manner. 
Therefore, these results tend to validate the subject groupings provided 
by the TES (Value) scale median split procedure.
The evidence presented so far confirmed that the current 
methodology successfully established experimental groups that were 
differentiated by their nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs about the
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experimental task. This made it possible to evaluate the major 
experimental hypothesis that groups with these characteristics would 
also be differentiated by their emotional response to the experimental 
task.
There was clear evidence from this study that both nonevaluative 
and evaluative beliefs are associated with mood change. Both the 
positive and negative visual analogue summary scales (VAPS and VANS) 
differentiated between the positive and negative feedback groups. The 
control group was significantly different to the negative but not the 
positive feedback group. This is entirely consistent with the 
nonevaluative and evaluative belief measures outlined above.
The VAPS also differentiated the high and low value/expectation 
groups and there was a trend for the VANS to do so as well. The 
differences between the experimental groups for the individual visual 
analogue scales and the POMS mostly reflected these distinctions with 
some but not all reaching significance. Given the nature of the 
experimental task, the more clinical orientation of the POMS scales may 
explain the modest mood changes reflected by this measure.
The most revealing data from the present study, however, came from 
assessing which of the experimental group» experienced the greatest mood 
changes. Those subjects who believed their scores were better than 
average and who had low value/expectation of success at computer games 
(positive feedback low value/expectation group) showed the greatest 
positive emotional response, mainly on the positive visual analogue 
scales and those subjects who believed their scores were worse than 
average and had high value/expectations of success at computer games 
(negative feedback high value/expectation group) showed the greatest 
negative emotional response, mainly on the negative visual analogue 
scales. This group also tended to show a stronger emotional response
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than all the other groups on the visual analogue scales, which is 
consistent with the finding that it was more extreme in terms of the 
nonevaluative and evaluative belief measures. The low value/expectation 
control group tended to be similar but not as extreme as the low 
value/expectation positive feedback group in terms of mood change scores 
and this is again consistent with the nonevaluative and evaluative 
belief data.
Therefore, the groups which showed the most positive mood change 
were those that had low value/expectations and who believed their scores 
were high. Alternatively, the most negative mood change was shown by the 
group that had high value/expectations and who believed their scores 
were low. When it is remembered that there was no actual difference in 
the mean scores across the groups, it strongly suggests that these 
distinctive mood responses are associated with the subjects * non 
evaluative and evaluative beliefs about their scores.
It has been shown in this experiment that subjects' beliefs and 
expectations characterized their emotional responses to the experimental 
task. Therefore, the results of this study supported the proposition 
that the cognitive processes identified by the cognitive theorists and 
therapists are associated with generating mood (Bandura, 1977; Ellis, 
1962; Lazarus, 1982, 1984; Mahoney, 1974).
The dependence of emotional response on nonevaluative beliefs, 
established in this experiment by the experimental manipulation of 
subjects' nonevaluative belief about their scores clearly demonstrated 
that subjects’ perception of reality was causally linked to emotional 
response. However, while it has been shown that evaluative beliefs are 
associated with emotional response, because they were measured and 
controlled for but not experimentally manipulated, it would be premature 
to claim a causal role for evaluative beliefs in mediating emotion.
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Furthermore, it was not possible to independently evaluate the 
relationship between value or expectation with emotional response 
because the measures of these variables correlated so highly in this 
study.
The case for arguing a causal role for evaluative beliefs would be 
considerably strengthened by empirical evidence which demonstrated that 
a change in evaluative beliefs was accompanied by a corresponding change 
in emotional response. The distinctive contributions of value and 
expectation could be appraised by an experimental manipulation that 
differentially affected these variables. These issues were addressed by 
further research.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 5: NONEVALUATIVE AND EVALUATIVE 
BELIEFS AS MEDIATORS OF EMOTION
The previous study provided evidence of a causal relationship 
between nonevaluative beliefs and emotional response and demonstrated an 
association between evaluative beliefs and emotional response. These 
findings are consistent with the basic assumptions that underlie 
cognitive behaviour therapy (see Chapter 1). However, the previous study 
fell short of providing evidence of a causal relationship between the 
evaluative beliefs and emotional response. In order to establish such a 
causal relationship it is necessary to demonstrate that experimentally 
induced change in evaluative beliefs produces corresponding changes in 
emotional response.
There has been no previous research that has established a 
methodology for generating change in values and expectations of success 
at computer games. However, there is a considerable literature on 
attitude and value change (see Cialdine, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1981; 
Fishbein & AJzen, 1975; Rokeach, 1968). There are two approaches to the 
problem that are particularly pertinent here. From a theoretical point 
of view, the predominant position amongst cognitive behaviour therapists 
was articulated by Bandura (1978) who argued that cognitive events are 
induced or altered far more readily by "experiences of mastery arising 
from successful performance" than by verbal persuasion (Bandura, 1977, 
p. 78). It can be assumed that Bandura would also consider that 
experiences of failure arising from unsuccessful performance may have 
similar but negative effects.
This experiential approach to changing cognitions is given 
empirical support from research that manipulated expectations of 
external control in order to study the learned helplessness model of
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depression (Cole & Coyne, 1977; Roth & Kubal, 1975). These workers used 
preexperimental training exercises to experimentally manipulate 
expectancies. They administered contingent and noncontingent 
reinforcement for performance on problem solving tasks in order to 
generate expectancies of either internal or external control over the 
test situation. They found that providing prior experience of success or 
failure successfully manipulated subjects’expectancies.
The current study adopted a similar strategy in an effort to 
manipulate expectancies of success and failure at computer games. 
Subjects were given the training task of playing a computer game. False 
feedback was used to generate a belief of either above or below average 
scores on the training game in order to influence expectations of high 
or low scores on the subsequent test game. There was no direct attempt 
made to change the subjects*value of success at computer games.
It was hypothesized that the positive and negative feedback on the 
training game would raise and lower subjects’ expectations about the 
quantitative value of their scores on the test game without affecting 
the value they placed on succeeding at computer games. It was further 
hypothesized that the positive and negative feedback on the test game 
would produce positive and negative mood changes. It also appeared from 
the previous study that subjects* moods change most when their 
experience does not match their expectations and values. Therefore, it 
was also hypothesized that the two groups whose feedback on the training 
game was reversed for the test game would experience the largest mood 
changes.
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7.1 Method
Subjects
The 40 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 120 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education who had not had any prior contact with the experimental 
material. Their ages ranged from 17 years to 48 years with a mean age of 
26.25 years. There were 13 males and 27 females. The subjects received 
course credit for taking part in the experiment.
Design
The design was a two by two factorial design with two levels of 
training (positive and negative) and two levels of feedback (positive 
and negative). Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions.
Materials
Equipment. The computer hardware and software were the same as for 
Experiment 4. An additional game called "Sharp Shooter” was used for 
training which was a modified version of "Shooting Gallery". The 
direction of firing, the shape of the targets, the background and the 
scoring system was changed to give it a different appearance. The 
scoring system was actually the same as "Shooting Gallery" with a 
constant added to all scores in order to disguise their similarity. Each 
game of "Sharp Shooter" lasted for 70 rather than 60 seconds so subjects 
absolute number of hits would also be higher in case those subjects that 
subsequently received negative feedback made this mental comparison.
Mood assessment instruments. The mood assessment scales were the 
same as those used in Experiment 4. These were the five positive and 
five negative visual analogue scales, YAPS, VANS, and the POMS.
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Cognitive assessment. The cognitive assessment scales were the
same as those used in Experiment 4. These were the TES (Value) and TES 
(Expectation) scales, the Scores Rating Scale, Evaluative Beliefs Scale, 
Satisfaction with Scores Scale, and the Scores Expectation Scale.
Pre- and Post-Induction Mood Tests
The pre- and post-induction mood tests were the same as those used 
in Experiment 4.
Procedure
The procedure was divided into three phases. These were the pre­
induction, induction, and post-induction phase.
Pre-induction phase. Subjects were given the same experimental 
instructions to read as in Experiment 4. These were also read aloud by 
the experimenter. The subjects were given the following additional 
instructions verbally by the experimenter:
However, before we get started I have a practice game for you 
to play. This is to give you some idea of what the game will 
involve and to let you get used to using the equipment.
Subjects were then given five games of "Sharp Shooter" to play and
received positive or negative feedback at the end of each game in the
same manner as with 'Shooting Gallery’ in Experiment 4.
Oi completing the practice games subjects were given the TES and
the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones, 1969). The IBT takes
approximately 15 minutes to complete. It served as a distractor task to
allow any mood effects from playing the training game to dissipate
before the pre-induction mood test.
After subjects finished completing the TES and IBT scales their
mood was assessed (Pre-Induction Mood Test).
Treatment phase. Subjects then played 10 games of "Shooting
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Gallery". Positive or negative feedback was provided at the end of each 
game in the same way as was done in Experiment 4.
Post treatment phase. At the completion of the 10 games subjects’ 
mood was reassessed (Post-Induct ion Mood Test) and the Post Test 
Questionnaire was completed.
Subjects were then debriefed with the experimenter again taking 
care to ensure subjects did not leave the experiment while experiencing 
any negative mood effects.
7.2 Results
Again the actual scores, cognitive variables, and mood data were 
analyzed by separate two-way analyses of variance.
Computer Game Scores
Unlike the previous experiment, there was a significant main effect 
of both training and feedback on subjects'actual average score on the 
computer game, F(l,36) = 9.84, 7.56 and p<.003, .009, respectively. An
inspection of the group means showed that the negative feedback and the 
positive training groups achieved significantly higher scores than the 
positive feedback and negative training groups (see Table 39). While 
th©£© results were unexpected, since the highest scores were obtained by 
the group expected to show the most negative mood change and the lowest 
score by the group that was expected to show the most positive mood 
change any differential effect subjects'actual scores are likely to have 
on mood should work against the experimental hypothesis.
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Table 39
Experiment 5 Mean Computer Game Scores for the Four Experimental Groups.
Training
Feedback
Positive
Condition
Negative Total
Positive 74.47 90.13 82.30
Negative 63.72 72.73 68.22
Total 69.09 81.43
Cognitive Assessment
Evaluative beliefs: Value and expectation of success at computer 
games. Training was successful in altering subjects’ expectation of 
success at computer games. Unfortunately, contrary to prediction it also 
altered subjects’value of success at computer games. A two-way analysis 
of variance of TES (Value) and TES (Expectation) scores revealed a 
significant between groups effect for both scales, F(l,36) = 32.3, 20.0 
and p<.001, .001 respectively. The positive training group had a higher 
value and expectation of success than the negative training group. As 
would be expected, there was no effect of training on TES (Value) and 
TES (Expectation) across the feedback conditions (see Table 40 and 41).
Nonevaluative belief: Belief of feedback. The Scores Rating Scale 
was used as a measure of subjects’level of acceptance of the feedback. A 
two-way analysis of variance on the Scores Rating Scale revealed a 
significant main effect for feedback, F(l,36) = 20.84, p<.001. The
positive feedback subjects rated their scores as above average and the 
negative feedback subjects rated their scores as below average. There
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was no between groups effect for training which suggests that the 
training game did not affect subjects’perception of their scores on the 
test game (see Table 42).
Table 40
Experiment 5 Mean TES (Value) Scores for the Four Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Training Positive Negative Total
Positive 3.67 3.39 3.53
Negative 5.26 4.99 5.12
Total 4.46 4.19
Table 41
Experiment 5 Mean 
Groups.
TES (Expectation) Scores for the Four Experimental
Feedback Condition
Training Positive Negative Total
Positive 3.77 3.03 3.40
Negative 4.59 4.93 4.76
Total 4.18 3.98
Qualitative rating of scores. As a check on subjects’ cognitive
reaction to their scores, three post test scales were administered to
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Table 42
Experiment 5 Mean Scores Rating Scale Scores for the Four Experimental 
Groups.
Training
Feedback
Positive
Condition
Negative Total
Positive 3.60 4.70 4.15
Negative 3.00 5.40 4.20
Total 3.30 5.05
assess what subjects thought generally about the quality of their 
scores, how satisfied they were with them and how their scores compared 
to their expectations.
As predicted the re was a clear distinction between the feedback 
conditions for the Evaluative Beliefs Scale, F(l,36) = 23.16, p<.001,
the Satisfaction with Scores Scale, F(l,36) = 19.81, p<.001, and the
Scores Expectation Scale, F(l,36) = 25.4, p<.001. Contrary to
predictions there was no significant difference on these three scales 
for the training conditions. However, there was a trend for the 
Evaluative Beliefs Scale to be significantly different for the training 
conditions (see Tables 43, 44, and 45).
Pre-Induction Mood Test
As has been found previously there was a minor pre-induction mood 
difference between the experimental groups.
Visual analogue scales. A two-way analysis of variance of the 
visual analogue scales detected a significant between groups effect for 
the relaxed scale for both the feedback, F(l,36) = 4.82, p<.035 and the 
training, F(l,36) = 5.48, p<.025, conditions. An inspection of group
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Table 43
Experiment 5 Mean Evaluative Beliefs Scale Scores for the 
Four Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Training Positive Negative Total
Positive 3.54 4.81 4.18
Negative 3.24 4.23 3.74
Total 3.39 4.52
Table 44
Experiment 5 Mean Satisfaction with Scores Scale 
Four Experimental Groups.
Scores for the
Feedback Condition
Training Positive Negative Total
Positive 2.70 4.50 3.60
Negative 2.50 4.50 3.50
Total 2.60 4.50
Table 45
Experiment 5 Mean Scores Expectation Scale Scores 
Four Experimental Groups.
for the
Feedback Condition
Training Positive Negative Total
Positive 3.10 5.00 4.05
Negative 2.30 4.80 3.55
Total 2.70 4.90
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means indicated the positive training and negative feedback groups were 
significantly different to the negative training and positive feedback 
groups respectively. This was the only scale out of the 10 individual 
and two summery visual analogue scales to show a between groups 
difference. Since there was only a difference on this one scale and that 
difference was in a direction that would work against the experimental 
hypothesis it is suggested that the visual analogue scales indicate 
there were effectively no pre-induction mood differences between the 
experimental groups (see Table 46).
Profile of mood states (POMS). There were no pre-induction mood 
differences for any of the POMS scales (see Table 47).
Pre- to Post-Induction Mood Change
The change scores were again calculated in the same manner as was
• a,n<%lo3ue
done in Experiment 1. Both the visual^and POMS scales showed significant 
between group mood differences across the feedback conditions. While 
there were no main effects for training on either mood measure the 
groups which showed mood changes significantly greater than zero 
reflected the influence of training. The results for each of the mood 
measures are presented below.
Visual analogue scales. Subjects’ mood change scores showed a 
modest effect for feedback conditions. Again contrary to predictions, 
but consistent with the failure to find significant differences on the 
post-induction qualitative rating of scores for the training conditions, 
there were no significant mood change effects for training.
The two-way analysis of variance showed a significant main effect 
for feedback conditions on three of the 10 individual visual analogue 
scales and on one of the summary scales. These were the pleased, F(l,36) 
= 15.9, p<.001, irritated, F(l,36) = 4.2, p<.05, disappointed, F(l,36) = 
17.59, p<.001, and VANS, F(l,36) - 6.15, p<.02, scales. The relaxed
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Table 46
Experiment 5 Mean Pre-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Scores for the Four Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Negative
Training Condition Total
Visual Analogue 
Scales Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total To* ^3
Pleased 56.6 64.8 60.70 62.9 66.4 64.65 59.75 65.60
Relaxed 70.6 75.1 72.85 41.0 71.7 56.35 55.80 73.40
Tense 33.5 24.7 29.10 56.6 35.4 46.00 45.05 30.05
Irritated 29.8 17.6 23.70 16.5 22.0 19.25 23.15 19.80
Lighthearted 39.1 57.3 48.20 43.9 53.9 48.90 41.50 55.60
Frustrated 26.2 20.4 23.30 34.9 24.1 29.50 30.55 22.25
Disappointed 30.7 16.5 23.60 26.3 19.0 22.65 28.50 17.75
Excited 37.7 44.6 41.15 40.6 30.3 35.45 39.15 37.45
Happy 56.9 71.5 64.20 59.5 68.3 63.90 58.20 69.90
Discouraged 31.3 25.8 28.55 24.7 30.3 27.50 28.00 28.05
VAPS 52.2 62.7 57.42 49.6 58.3 53.85 50.88 60.39
VANS 69.7 79.0 74.35 68.2 73.8 71.02 68.95 76.42
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Table 47
Bxperiaent 5 Hean Pre-Induction POMS Scale Scores for the Four Experinental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Negative
Training Condition Total
POMS Scales Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Pos h!e$
Tension/Anxiety 4.1 6.4 5.25 13.1 4.2 8.65 8.60 5.30
Depression 4.2 4.8 4.50 8.8 4.2 6.50 6.50 4.50
Anger/Hostility 2.2 1.8 2.00 5.5 1.5 3.50 3.85 1.65
Vigor 8.8 15.3 12.05 11.5 14.2 12.85 10.15 14.75
Fatigue 13.6 9.2 11.40 12.5 9.8 11.15 13.05 9.50
Confusion 8.7 9.0 8.85 9.7 6.4 8.05 9.20 7.70
TMS 24.0 15.9 19.95 38.1 11.9 25.00 31.05 13.90
s c a l e  showed a  t r e n d  to w a rd s  b e in g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  a c r o s s  
fe e d b a c k  c o n d i t io n s ,  F ( l , 3 6 )  = 3 . 7 5 ,  p < . 0 6 .  The p o s i t i v e  fe e d b a c k  
s u b je c t s *  mood ch an g e  was m ore p o s i t i v e  a n d /o r  l e s s  n e g a t iv e  th a n  th e  
n e g a t iv e  fe e d b a c k  s u b j e c t s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  d e te rm in e  w h ich  o f  t h e  e x p e r im e n ta l  g ro u p s  e x p e r ie n c e d  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  am ount o f  mood c h a n g e , t h e  g r o u p s ’ mean mood ch an g e  s c o r e s  
w ere  com pared  to  z e r o .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  no s i g n i f i c a n t  m ain  
e f f e c t s  f o r  th e  t r a i n i n g  c o n d i t io n s  t h e  n e g a t iv e  t r a i n i n g / p o s i t i v e  
fe e d b a c k  g ro u p  was t h e  o n ly  g ro u p  w hose mood ch an g e  was c o n s i s t e n t l y  
g r e a t e r  th a n  z e ro  on t h e  p o s i t i v e  mood s c a l e s .  T h is  g ro u p ’s  mood ch an g e  
was p o s i t i v e  an d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  g r e a t e r  th a n  z e ro  on t h e  e x c i t e d  s c a l e  
an d  show ed a  t r e n d  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  on t h r e e  o t h e r  s c a l e s ,  p l e a s e d ,
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relaxed and VAPS , t (39) = 3.19, 1.55, 1.4, 1.56 and £><.001, *08, .09,
.08 respectively. The positive training/negative feedback group was the 
only group to consistently show a mood change greater than zero on the 
negative mood scales. This groups mood change was negative and 
significantly greater than zero on four scales. These were the tense, 
irritated, frustrated and VANS scales, t (39) = 2.79, 2.63, 4.37, 3.1
and p<.005, .006, .000, .001 respectively (see Table 48).
Table 48
Expedient 4 Mean Pre-to Post-Induction Visual Analogue Scale Change Scores for 
the Four Rxperiaental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Negative
Training Condition Total
Visual Analogue
Scales Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Pos
Pleased 6.3 12.1 9.20 -29.9 -13.9 -21.90 -11.80 -0.90
Eelaxed -21.9 -8.7 -15.30 0.5 -7.0 -3.25 -10.70 -7.85
Tense 3.2 -3.3 -3.35 -2.1 -8.4 -5.25 0.55 -9.15
Irritated 0.3 0.8 0.55 -30.4 -13.00 -21.70 -15.05 -6.10
Lighthearted 9.6 10.9 10.25 16.7 -0.8 7.95 13.15 5.05
Frustrated -7.6 1.4 -3.10 -25.3 -4.9 -15.10 -16.45 -1.75
Disappointed 9.4 5.8 7.60 -31.7 -14.0 -22.85 -11.15 -4.10
E x c ited 9.9 25.5 17.70 9.4 6.8 8.10 9.65 16.15
Hap p y -0.4 3.3 1.45 -6.9 -11.9 -9.40 -3.65 -4.30
D i s c o u r a g e d 3.5 10.0 6.75 -10.5 -3.8 -7.15 -3.50 3.10
VAPS 3.5 43.1 23.30 -10.2 -26.8 -18.50 -3.35 8.15
VANS 8.8 8.1 8.45 -100.0 -44.1 -72.05 -45.60 -18.00
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Profile of mood states (POMS). There weis a substantial between
groups effect for subjects’mood change scores as measured by the POMS. 
Again, contrary to predictions there was no effect for the training 
conditions.
A two-way analysis of variance indicated that five of the six 
individual scales and the total scale showed significant differences 
between the feedback groups. These were the depression, F(l,36) = 6.35, 
p<.02, vigor, F(l,36) = 4.65, p<.04, fatigue, F(l,36) = 5.35, p<.03, 
confusion, F(l,36) = p<.002 and TMS, F(l,36) = 8.68, p<.006, scales. 
There was also a trend towards a significant difference on the anger 
scale, F(l,36) = 3.83, p<.06. Contrasts consistently showed that the 
positive feedback groups* mean mood change was positive and the negative 
feedback groups’mean mood change was negative.
Again in spite of there being no significant between group mood 
change effects for the training conditions, an analysis of the groups' 
mean mood chsinges to determine which groups Eichieved a mood change 
significantly greater than zero revealed that the negative 
training/positive feedback group was the only group to consistently show 
significEint levels of mood change. This groups level of mood change was 
significantly greater thsm zero for three of the six individual scales 
and the total POMS scale. There was also a trend for one other scale to 
show a significant difference. These were the depression, vigor, 
confusion sind TT4S scales with the fatigue scale showing the trend, t(39) 
= 2.36, 1.61, 2.93, 2.2, 1.42, and pC.Ol, .05, .001, .02, .08 
respectively.
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Table 49
Experiment 4 Mean Pre- to Post-Induction POMS Scale Scores for the Four Experimental Groups.
Feedback Condition
Positive Negative
Training Condition Total
POMS Scales Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total PöS Heß
Tension/Anxiety -0.8 -0.1 -0.45 1.6 0.2 0.90 0.40 0.05
Depression 1.3 3.0 2.15 -0.7 -1.4 -1.05 0.30 0.80
Anger/Hostility 1.0 0.3 0.65 -2.8 -0.4 -1.60 -0.9 -0.05
Vigor 0.6 2.8 1.70 -2.0 -2.1 -2.05 -0.7 0.35
Fatigue 2.3 1.9 2.10 -0.3 -1.7 -1.00 1.00 0.10
Confusion 0.9 2.3 1.60 -1.0 -1.1 -1.05 -0.05 0.60
TH3 5.3 10.2 7.75 -5.2 -6.5 -5.85 0.05 1.35
7 . 3  D i s c u s s i o n
T h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h i s  s t u d y  l a r g e l y  s u p p o r t  a l l  t h e  m a j o r  
e x p e r i m e n t a l  h y p o t h e s e s .  T h e  t r a i n i n g  g a m e  d i d  r a i s e  a n d  l o w e r  s u b j e c t s '  
expectations o f  s u c c e s s  a t  c o m p u t e r  g a m e s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i t  a l s o  r a i s e d  
and l o w e r e d  s u b j e c t s ' v a l u e  o f  s u c c e s s  a t  c o m p u t e r  g a m e s  a s  w e l l ,  a g a i n  
making i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  a s s e s s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  t h e s e  c o g n i t i v e  v a r i a b l e s  t o  m o o d  c h a n g e .  T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  n e g a t i v e  
feedback was a g a i n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p o s i t i v e  a n d  n e g a t i v e  m o o d  c h a n g e  a n d  
t h e  tw o  g r o u p s  w h o s e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  w e r e  n o t  m a t c h e d  b y  f e e d b a c k  s h o w e d  
t h e  greatest a m o u n t s  o f  m o o d  c h a n g e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  a s  i n  
th@  t w o  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s ,  d e m o n s t r a t e d  a  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n
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nonevaluative beliefs sind emotional response. The results from this 
study also provide tentative support for the hypothesis that evaluative 
beliefs also have a causal relationship with emotional response. These 
results, therefore, provide empirical support for the basic theoretical 
assumptions of the cognitive learning therapies (see Chapter 1). The 
following discussion will consider the evidence generated in this study 
of a causal relationship between nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs, 
and emotional response. It will also consider the implications of these 
findings for the theoretical assumptions of the cognitive learning 
therapies.
As was shown in the two previous studies, there was a significant 
difference between the feedback conditions on the Scores Rating Scale 
indicating that the feedback conditions generated differential beliefs 
about the size of the subjects’scores. As expected the positive feedback 
group believed their scores were higher than the negative feedback group 
even though the difference between their actual scores was in the 
opposite direction. Again there was a consistent significant difference 
between the feedback conditions for their mood change scores (see Table
4 1).
Unlike the two previous experiments in the current study an attempt 
was made to manipulate subjects’ expectations of success at computer 
games by providing prior experience of either success or failure at 
computer games. The resulting value/expectation of success was again 
assessed by the TES (Value) and TES (Expectation) scales. Contrary to 
predictions, the training influenced value as well as expectation of 
success at computer games. Therefore, once again it was not possible to 
differentiate the independent effects of these variables. There was a 
significant difference between the positive and negative training groups 
for both TES (Value) and TES (Expectation). There was no difference on
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these scales for the experimental feedback conditions. Since subjects 
were randomly assigned to the training groups there is no reason to 
assume that there was a systematic value/expectation difference for 
these groups prior to training. It is reasonable to assume that subjects' 
experience on the training game generated a shift in both their value 
and expectation of success at computer games.
Again, the impact of the experimental treatments on subjects' 
cognitive state was assessed by the post-induction qualitative rating of 
scores scales. There was a strong difference between the feedback 
conditions but there was no difference for the training conditions on 
the Evaluative Beliefs Scale, the Satisfaction with Scores Scale or the 
Scores Expectation Scale. These results tend to suggest that while 
training produced a difference in value/expectation of success these 
differences were not large enough to influence the post-induction 
qualitative rating of scores.
Having successfully manipulated subjects’ value/expectation of 
success at computer games with the training game made it possible to 
assess the nature of the association shown in the previous study between 
value/expectation and emotional response. The mood change data for the 
training groups is consistent with a causal relationship between 
value/expectation of success at computer games and emotional response.
There was no significant between groups effect for the training 
conditions on the mood change scores. However, by investigating the 
magnitude of the mood changes across the experimental groups, that is 
comparing the groups' mean mood changes to zero, it was found that the 
mood changes in this experiment tended to support the experimental 
hypothesis. As in the previous study the negative training/positive 
feedback and the positive training/negative feedback groups were the 
only groups to consistently produce mood changes significantly greater
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than zero. In other words subjects who had had their value/expectation 
of success lowered and then were told they had achieved above average 
scores consistently achieved a positive mood change consistently greater 
than zero. Subjects who had had their value/expectations of success 
raised and who were then told they had scored below average consistently 
achieved a negative mood change significantly greater than zero. The 
other groups, those that had their value/expectation lowered followed by 
being told that they had achieved below average scores and those that 
had their value/expectation raised and who were then told that they had 
achieved above average scores did not consistently experience mood 
change significantly greater than zero.
In summary, subjects whose feedback matched their training 
experience were less affected emotionally by the test game than subjects 
whose feedback did not match their training experience. Subjects were 
given a distractor task between the training and test phases which 
allowed any mood changes that occurred during the training to dissipate. 
This ensured there was no post-training pre-induction mood difference 
between the experimental groups. Therefore, the mood changes outlined 
above can not be attributed in anyway to the direct influence of the 
training feedback on subjects’ pre-induction mood states. Since in this 
experiment subjects’ expectations and value of success at computer games 
were experimentally manipulated and their emotional responses reflected 
those changes a causal relationship has been demonstrated between these 
variables. This finding demonstrates empirically that values and 
expectations are causally related to emotional responses. Therefore, the 
kinds of cognitions which are frequently the focus of clinical 
interventions by cognitive learning therapists have been demonstrated to 
be causally related to emotional responding.
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CHAPTER 8
THE MERE EXPOSURE RESEARCH
The preceeding chapters have dealt with the first question
identified in Chapter 4 concerning cognitions being a sufficient
condition for emotional response. The results from the previous
experiments provided evidence of a causal relationship between the
specific cognitive processes identified by the cognitive learning
therapists and emotions. This work extends to these specific processes
the widely accepted view that cognitions are a sufficient condition for
generating emotional response. The current chapter will consider the
second question from Chapter 4, of whether cognitive processes are also
a necessary condition for emotional responding.
While there is agreement that cognitions are a sufficient cause of
emotions there is some considerable disagreement as to whether they are
a necessary precursor of emotions (Kagan et al, 1985). As has been
outlined above the cognitive learning therapists cognitive mediational
approach to emotion is consistent with the view that cognitions are a
necessary precursor of emotion. The strongest challenge to the
generality of the cognitive mediational position adopted by cognitive
learning therapists has come recently from a social psychologist. In an
intentionally provocative paper Zajonc (1980) has asserted that the
cognitive theorists of emotion (including the cognitive learning
therapists) have overlooked some of the evidence which suggests affect
is not always post-cognitive. Before discussing the propositions
contained in Zajonc’s paper it is perhaps worthwhile to recognize the
spirit in which they were written:
The language of my paper has been stronger than can be 
justified by the logic of my argument or the weight of the 
evidence, I hasten to affirm that one of my purposes was to 
convince you that affect should not be treated as unalterably 
last and invariably post cognitive. (Zajonc, 1980, p. 172)
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Zajonc’s language is indeed strong as he states that his
interpretation of the evidence suggests: "affective judgments may be
fairly independent of, and precede in time the sorts of perceptual and 
cognitive operations commonly assumed to be the basis of these affective 
judgments .... [emotions are] the first reaction of the organism .... 
[they] can occur without extensive perceptual and cognitive encoding 
.... [they] are made with greater confidence than cognitive judgments
and can be made sooner .... [Zajonc concludes] affect and cognition are 
under the control of separate and partially independent systems that can 
influence each other in a variety of ways and that both constituted 
independent sources of effects in information processing" (Zajonc, 1980, 
p. 151). In addition to those qualities of affective responses described 
by Zajonc in his summary, he has also defined emotions as having all of 
the following qualities. They are dominant, basic, primary, automatic, 
instantaneous, effortless, inescapable, irrevocable, holistic, more 
difficult to verbalize, yet easy to communicate and understand, pre- 
cognitive, and partially independent of cognition (p. 151).
It is the purpose of this review to seriously consider some of the 
issues raised by Zajonc and their implications for the cognitive 
learning therapies, review some of the constructive comments his paper 
has attracted and consider how some of the notions generated by the 
debate can be empirically evaluated. The first task will be to consider 
the implications of Zajonc’s position for the cognitive learning 
therapies.
8.1 The Implications of Affective Primacy for the Cognitive 
Learning Therapies
The proposition that cognitions and emotions are controlled by 
partially independent systems is pertinent to the assessment of abnormal
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psychological experience. If this were found to be the case then it would 
follow that abnormality in one system would not automatically mean 
abnormality in the other, change in one system would not necessarily 
mean accompanying change in the other or substantial time lags may at 
least be expected and it would probably prove ineffective to attempt to 
elicit change in either system by working through the other system. 
Therefore, it would become imperative for cognitive learning therapists 
to be able to differentially identify system breakdown and devise 
interventions to directly access each system independently (Rachman, 
1981).
The position outlined above could have particular relevance in view 
of the limited success of the semantic or rational psychotherapies. 
These approaches which are prominent examples of the cognitive learning 
therapies, depend on two assumptions refuted by Zajonc. The first that 
affect is post-cognitive rather than pre-cognitive and the second that 
cognition and affect either operate within the same system or that there 
is ready interchange between the systems. Therefore, if Zajonc’s 
interpretation of the evidence proved to be correct, the semantic 
therapist’s model would be difficult to sustain. Acceptance of Zajonc’s 
interpretation, therefore, would discourage further attempts by 
cognitive learning therapists to discover more precise cognitive 
explanations for affective reactions (Rachman, 1981). Since the 
ramifications, for the cognitive learning therapies, of accepting 
Zajonc*s approach are so drastic, the evidence on which they are based 
warrants consideration.
8.2 The Empirical Evidence For Affective Primacy
It is appropriate at this point to consider the evidence Zajonc has 
marshalled to support his position and evaluate it in the light of some
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of the comment it has attracted in the literature. Central to Zajonc’s 
position on cognition and affect is his approach to unconscious mental 
events. He argues that there are at least two different forms of 
unconscious process. One emerges "where behaviour, such as that 
occurring in discrimination among stimuli, is entirely under the 
influence of affective factors" (Zajonc, 1980, p. 171). Here he includes 
such phenomena as perceptual defense, subliminal perception and state 
dependent recall. The other "is implicated in highly overlearned, and 
thus automated, sequences of information processing; this form includes 
cognitive acts but has collapsed them into larger molar chunks that may 
conceal their original component links" (p. 171). The empirical evidence 
that Zajonc cites to support the proposition that affect can be pre- 
cognitive depends on accepting the first category of unconscious 
processes outlined above. The critical piece of evidence for Zajonc’s 
position is the finding that the mere exposure effect for preferences 
(Hamid, 1972; Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, 1968) occurs even when recognition 
of the visual stimuli is kept at chance levels (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 
1980; Zajonc, 1980). Mere exposure refers to a body of research which 
has identified and investigated the finding that the repeated exposure 
of an individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the 
enhancement of his attitude toward that stimulus. Zajonc (1980, 1984) 
argues that the finding that frequent exposure of stimuli enhances 
preference even in the absence of subsequent stimulus recognition, is 
evidence of emotional response in the absence of cognition. In general 
terms, Zajonc is arguing for the separation of affect and cognition and 
the dominance and primacy of affective reactions because stimuli whose 
ordinary perceptual recognition has been kept at chance level, may 
generate an emotional response.
Critical reaction to Zajonc’s position has suggested his arguments
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depend on definitions of cognition and cognitive processing that (a) are 
narrow, (b) assume cognitive processes are synonymous with rationality, 
and (c) assume stimulus recognition or awareness is essential for 
cognitive processing to occur (Lazarus, 1982, 1984; O ’Malley, 1981;
Rachman, 1981). Each of these views will be examined in more detail 
below.
First Zajonc’s critics suggest the contention that affect and
cognition are partially independent systems and that affect is primary
depends in part on a particularly narrow view of cognitive processing
that stems from the conception of mind as an analogue to a computer. In
this formulation, human cognition, like the operations of a computer
proceeds by serially receiving, registering, reading, storing for the
short or long run and retrieving meaningless bits, followed by
transformation to meaning that is called information processing
(Lazarus, 1982). It is reasonable to argue that such a lengthy process
does not account for the very rapid emotional responses humans
experience. However, there is an alternative to concluding that affect
must, therefore, be primary and independent of cognition. It has been
argued (Folkman, Schaefer & Lazarus, 1979; Lazarus, 1982, 1984; Wrubel,
Benner & Lazarus, 1981) that humans are sensitive to meaning and
evaluate events in terms of their impact for the individual and react
emotionally to some of these evaluations. Lazarus (1982) explains:
We do not always have to await revelation from information 
processing to unravel the environmental code. As was argued in 
the new look movement in perception, personal factors such as 
beliefs, expectations, and motives or commitments influence 
attention and appraisal at the very outset of any encounter. 
Concern with individual differences leads eventually to
concern with personal meanings and to the factors that shape 
such meanings. We actively select and shape experience and in 
some degree mould it to our own requirements. Information 
processing as an exclusive model of cognition is
insufficiently concerned with the person sis a source of 
meaning, (p. 1020)
Lazarus later argues "we can react to incomplete information, which
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in fact we do in most transactions. The meaning derived from incomplete 
information can, of cause, be vague; we need to allow for this type of 
meaning as well as for clearly articulated and thoroughly processed 
meaning" (Lazarus, 1982, p. 1021). Lazarus’s position is based on the 
work he and his colleagues have done on the role of cognitive mediation 
in emotional experience and coping processes (Cohen & Lazarus, 1973; 
Coyne & Lazarus, 1983; Koriat et al, 1972; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & 
Alfert, 1964; Lazarus et al, 1962; Speisman et al, 1962). These authors 
argue the results of their studies support the notion that cognitive 
processes have a causal influence on emotion. Their position does not 
preclude emotion having a causal influence on cognition, in fact, they 
see the relations between cognition and emotion as "complex two way 
streets" (Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980, p. 191). They believe an 
adequate model would have to focus on the oh going interplay of emotions 
and cognitions. Not withstanding this, they claim it is "cognitive 
processes which shape the quality and intensity of a given emotional 
response and not the other way around" (Lazarus et al, 1980, p. 191). To 
clarify their position it would seem that Lazarus and his colleagues are 
saying; cognitions are a necessary and sufficient condition of emotion, 
the quality and intensity of emotional responses can only be determined 
by cognitive processes and it is possible, indeed likely, that there is 
a feedback loop whereby emotional responses influence cognitive 
processes and thereby (through cognitions) influence subsequent 
emotional experiences. This presents a much broader view to Zajonc’s of 
the nature of cognition and the cognitive processes which generate 
emotion.
The second issue which has attracted criticism is Zajonc’s argument 
that the independence of the two systems is further illustrated by the 
clinical experience that irrational fears are resistant to modification
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by rational logical argument as exemplified by the semantic therapies. 
However, this interpretation of the evidence has been questioned on two 
separate grounds. Firstly, what the Zajonc model does not account for is 
whether or not rational, logical argument does in fact have an impact on 
the cognitive basis of irrational fears. This distinction between the 
role of cognitive processes in mediating emotions and the capacity of 
verbal therapies to influence these cognitive processes has long been 
recognized (Bandura, 1977). Bandura (1977) argues that cognitive events 
are induced and altered far more readily by "experiences of mastery 
arising from successful performance" (p. 78) than by means of verbal
persuasion. Zajonc does not address this issue but merely assumes that 
the ineffectiveness of verbal therapies is evidence for the primacy of 
affect and the independence of the cognitive and affective systems. 
However, if Bandura’s alternative explanation of the lack of success of 
verbal therapies is accepted then it would be worthwhile pursuing 
rational approaches and considering the adoption of more active 
intervention techniques. Secondly, other workers dispute what they see 
as an assumption by Zajonc that cognitions are synonymous with 
rationality. They point out that the cognitive processes that shape our 
emotional reactions can distort reality as well as reflect it 
realistically (Lazarus, 1982). This view is consistent with that 
expressed by Dember (1974) in relation to the influence of ideation on 
motivation. During the forties, events considered motivational in nature 
were tied directly to conditions of physiological imbalance (Hull, 
1943). Over the next three decades it was realized that the motivational 
state of both human beings and animals is also influenced by the 
informational properties of stimuli (Dember, 1965). Dember argued in a 
later paper (Dember, 1974) that even the most cognitive of theories to 
date didn’t adequately account for "the motivational potency of
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ideation" (p. 165). His paper presents Ein array of evidence to support
this assertion and his final comments are addressed to the issue of the
kinds of assumptions commonly associated with rationality:
More generally, I would call into question the easy assumption 
that the dominance of behaviour by rational "cognitive" 
processes will necessarily assume personally and socially 
desirable outcomes. On the contrary, there may be as much to 
fear from unbridled ideation (especially in its extreme form 
ideology) as there is from unconscious fantasies and impulses 
or unrestrained emotion. (Dember, 1974, p. 167)
Both Lazarus and Dember have recognized that events dependent on 
cognitive processes are not necessarily linked to rational outcomes.
Finally, Zajonc’s critics assert that the concept of cognition and 
cognitive processes influencing emotional responses does not imply 
awareness is necessary of the cognitive factors which determine 
emotional reactions (Lazarus, 1966, 1982, 1984). It is this issue of 
awareness which Rachman (1981) also identifies as critical to Zajonc’s 
position:
Probably the most challenging aspect of this part of Zajonc’s 
argument is the claim, based on some interesting but sparse 
evidence that affective changes occur after repeated stimulus 
exposure, even in the absence of [stimulus] recognition. It is 
this last clause that is potentially the most fascinating and 
one that would bear investigation, (p. 283)
The critics of Zajonc’s position collectively represent an 
alternative view of the relationship between cognition and emotion that 
may be summarized as follows. Emotional reactions occur in response to 
what we believe the situation to be, our belief does not have to be 
accurate or rational, it can be based on a variety of processes 
including thoughts, beliefs, expectations and past experiences, it can 
and does occur before detailed information processing is completed, and 
we do not need to be aware of the cognitive processes involved. These 
critics doubt that Zajonc’s contention that emotion is independent of 
cognition, will be sustained when a broader view of cognition, such as 
that used above, is adopted.
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8.3 The Current Research Problem
Although Zajonc has been criticized for the narrowness of his 
definition of cognition and the assumption that cognition does not occur 
without stimulus recognition, it has yet to be demonstrated that 
cognitive processes, however broadly defined, can influence emotional 
responses to stimuli in the absence of recognition. Should it be 
possible to demonstrate that cognitions can influence emotional 
responses to nonrecognizable stimuli it would be more difficult to 
refute the necessity of cognitive mediation for emotional response. The 
following studies were undertaken to investigate this issue.
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CHAPTER 9
THE MERE EXPOSURE RESEARCH: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND EXPERIMENTS 6, 7, AND 8
The mere exposure effect was used by Zajonc (1980) to illustrate 
notions about the relationship between affect and cognition. The nature 
of his theorizing and the reactions of other authors have been reviewed 
above and some ideas which warrant closer scrutiny have been identified.
Like Zajonc it is proposed to utilize the mere exposure phenomena in 
order to do this. Therefore, before proceeding to outline that work, the 
experimental findings which characterize the mere exposure effect are 
reviewed below.
9.1 The Mere Exposure Effect
The mere exposure effect as presented by Zajonc (1968) has the 
following features.
1. The repeated exposure of an individual to a stimulus is a 
sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude toward that 
stimulus.
2. The mathematical representation which best fits the 
relationship between positive affect and stimulus repetition is a 
positive decelerating curve, with enhanced affect a function of the 
logarithm of the exposure frequency.
3. Exposure is not seen as the only basis for liking and it is 
possible enhanced affect from stimulus repetition can be at least 
partially offset by other factors.
4. There is no such thing as "over exposure" and each successive 
exposure leads to successively smaller increments in positive affect. It 
is argued a studies u'A kU* sL u)that stimuli eventually lose their appeal
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after high levels of stimulus repetition reflect variables other than 
exposure itself.
Other researchers have suggested that the relationship between 
familiarity and liking is more complex than that proposed by the mere 
exposure model. The most common alternative suggested is an inverted-U 
relationship between exposure sind liking where stimuli of intermediate 
familiarity are the best liked (Berlyne, 1967, 1971, 1973, 1974).
It is not the purpose of this study to enter into a debate 
concerning the ultimate parameters of the effect. There is a wealth of 
research which enables us to predict the occurrence of the mere exposure 
effect under specified conditions. This evidence will be summarized 
below.
The range of empirical evidence which has accumulated in support of 
the phenomenon is substantial. Increased positive affect as a function of 
frequency of exposure has been found with Chinese characters (Suedfeld, 
Epstein, Buchanan, & Landon, 1971; Zajonc, 1968), turkish words (Zajonc, 
1968; Zajonc & Rajecki, 1969), nonsense syllables (Becknell, Wilson, & 
Baird, 1963; Johnson, Thompson, & Frincke, 1960), music (Lieberman & 
Walters, 1968), photographs of mens' faces (Zajonc, 1968) phobic objects 
(Litvak, 1969), and random geometric shapes (Hamid, 1972; Kunst-Wilson & 
Zajonc, 1980). The research into the conditions under which these 
effects have occurred will be considered next.
1. Stimulus variables
(i). Initial familiarity
The mere exposure hypothesis suggests the relationship between 
affect and exposure frequency is a positive decelerating curve and, 
therefore, accommodates the finding that repetition of an already 
familiar stimulus has little effect on attitude (Harrison, 1977).
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(ii) . Initial meaning
The mere exposure effect has been found for stimuli with a variety 
of initial affective ratings (Harrison, 1977). It has been shown, 
however, that novel stimuli of low association value show greater 
increases in positive affect than similar stimuli of high association 
value (Hamid, 1972).
(iii) . Complexity
Reduced stimulus complexity lowers the likelihood of an exposure 
effect. Complex stimuli have consistently shown more powerful exposure 
effects than simple stimuli (Berlyne, 1970; Fryrear & Cottrell, 1976, 
cited in Harrison, 1977; Saegert & Jellison, 1970; Skaife, 1966, cited 
in Berlyne, 1971; Smith & Dorfman, 1975). A study which investigated a 
range of stimulus complexity (Hamid, 1972) found optimal increases in 
liking with medium level complexity geometrical shapes.
(iv) . Recognizability
There is a growing body of evidence which suggests stimulus 
recognition is not necessary for the exposure affect to occur (Kunst- 
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Moreland, 1975; Moreland & Zajonc, 1977; Seamon, 
Brody, & Kauff, 1983a, 1983b; Wilson, 1975; Zajonc, 1980). This evidence 
will be reviewed in more detail in a later section.
2. Presentation variables 
(i). Context
It has been suggested that the affective reactions elicited by the 
situation or context in which the exposure occurs will become 
increasingly associated with the exposure stimuli as exposure progresses 
(Burgess & Sales, 1971; Perlman & Oakamp, 1971; Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 
1973). Two different kinds of context variables have been investigated 
and their impact on the exposure effect can be differentiated.
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Initially, .it was thought that the background or surround of the 
stimuli may transfer it’s affective valance to the stimuli via 
incidental learning (Burgess & Sale, 1971). The weight of evidence does 
not support this proposition (Johnson, 1973; Saegert et al, 1973). 
Subsequently, the proposition that the exposure effect would be 
influenced by the emotional properties of another stimulus which became 
associated with the exposure stimulus by means of paired associate 
learning or other direct procedures, has accumulated more empirical 
support (Burgess & Sales, 1971; Perlman & Oskamp, 1971; Swap, 1976, 
cited in Harrison, 1977). The evidence suggests that these two effects, 
exposure and associative learning, are independent and additive (Zajonc, 
Markus, & Wilson, 1974b). Therefore, exposure in a negative context may 
act to reduce liking but the exposure effect will serve to increase 
liking and the resultant emotional response will be the balance between 
the two effects (Harrison, 1977).
(ii). Presentation sequence
An exposure effect is more likely to occur when stimuli are 
presented as a heterogeneous sequence, that is, interspersed among other 
stimuli, than when presented in a homogeneous or interrupted sequence 
(Berlyne, 1970). The frequency of presentation, rather than the exposure 
duration, is the critical variable for the mere exposure effect. When 
duration of exposure was compared to exposure frequency an inverted-U 
shaped function was found for the relationship between duration and 
affect (Hamid, 1972).
3. Measurement variables 
(i). Scales
The most common affective rating scales which have been used in 
mere exposure research are Good-Bad and Like-Dislike scales. These
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scales are easily contaminated by variables not representative of 
positive affect, for example, curiosity, and require careful 
interpretation (Zajonc, Crandall, Kail, & Swap, 1974a).
(ii). Immediate and delayed ratings
The general trend in the literature is that mere exposure effects 
are more likely to occur if the exposure and rating phases are separated 
in time (Harrison, 1977). One group of studies suggests delayed ratings 
in terms of minutes produces greater increases in liking than immediate 
ratings (Harrison & Crandall, 1972; Stang, 1974) and another group shows 
rating delay in terms of days also produces improved ratings (Crandall, 
Harrison, & Zajonc, 1976, cited in Harrison, 1977; Johnson & Watkins, 
1971; Stang, 1976, cited in Harrison, 1977; Stang & O ’Connell, 1974; 
Wilson & Miller, 1968).
9.2 Experiment 6
The interesting but sparse evidence referred to by Rachman (1981) 
(see Chapter fc) consists of four studies carried out by Zajonc and his 
colleagues. Two of these (Moreland, 1975; Moreland & Zajonc, 1977) used 
multiple regression analysis to determine the relative merits of 
exposure frequency and recognition as predictors of liking. They found 
that exposure frequency was, and that recognition variables were not 
significant predictors of affect. However, there is some doubt about the 
appropriateness of multiple regression and partial correlation analysis 
for testing the null hypothesis that stimulus recognition mediates the 
exposure effect on liking (Birnbaum & Meilers, 1979; Moreland & Zajonc, 
1979).
Far more compelling evidence has been reported in two subsequent 
studies which attempted to assess this issue using direct
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^perimentation. One study has shown that the attractiveness of auditory 
stimuli was enhanced by repeated exposure when recognition was impaired 
by a dichotic listening task (Wilson, 1979). The other used very rapid 
presentation of visual stimuli such that post exposure stimulus 
recognition was kept at chance level. The results suggest that affect 
was enhanced by exposure (the mere exposure effect) in the absence of 
stimulus recognition (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). These results, 
together with the assumption that stimulus recognition is necessary for 
cognitive mediation to occur, form the basis of Zajonc’s contention that 
cognition is not a necessary precursor of emotion.
Attempts to replicate these findings have met with mixed success. 
Zajonc (1984) reported that Mandler had been unable to replicate the 
Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) study. Another series of studies that 
investigated the effects of shadowing, masking, cerebral laterality, and 
test latency on the mere exposure effect in the absence of stimulus 
recognition were only able to consistently replicate Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980) with the help of shadowing or by presenting the stimuli to 
the right visual field (Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983a). These studies
are difficult to interpret since recognition was also frequently above 
chance in some of the experimental conditions investigated. In spite of 
this, these findings tend to suggest affective judgments are superior 
for identifying target slides when training is restricted to the left 
hemisphere but not when training is restricted to the right hemisphere 
and when training was shadowed by a verbal task. That is, affective 
judgments were superior for subjects who listened to and repeated a list 
of words while they were being shown the training slides. These findings 
raise complex questions concerning the lateralization of cognitive 
functions within the brain. They would seem to support the contention 
(O’Malley, 1981) that recognition judgments more so than preference
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judgments are in some part influenced by verbal labeling or language (a 
left hemisphere function). Seamon et al (1983a) concluded that their 
findings were best interpreted as evidence of how different retrieval 
processes are activated by requests for either recognition or preference 
judgments and how these different retrieval processes can access 
different levels of stimulus representation from memory. They suggest 
that recognition decisions can be made on the basis of familiarity or on 
the basis of a search for the relevant item representation in memory. 
They contend that frequent exposure can generate stimulus familiarity 
even when there has been insufficient time for a full representation of 
the stimulus to be encoded. Therefore, they argue that target selection 
by affect judgement may be recognition based on a retrieval process that 
accesses the familiarity produced by repeated exposure. Furthermore, 
they contend that in the case of affective judgments, subjects need not 
be aware that this stored information has been accessed. They summarize 
their position by stating "strictly speaking, a repeated stimulus may be 
liked, not because it is familiar, but because the subject may be 
familiar with processing it." (p. 554)
Since the concept of cognition adopted here is broader than that 
which would limit the involvement of cognitive processes to the level of 
conscious awareness and verbal labeling, it was decided to take a 
different approach to evaluating the import of Zajone’s argument.
It has been shown in the previous experiments here, and in the 
laboratory and real life studies that investigated the role of 
cognitions in mediating emotional reactions (Cohen & Lazarus, 1973; 
Coyne & Lazarus, 1983; Koriat et al, 1972; Lazarus & Alfert, 1974; 
Lazerus et al, 1962; Speisman et al, 1964), that emotional responses can 
be generated by experimentally manipulating cognitive processes which 
have been classified in Chapter 4 as evaluative and nonevaluative
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beliefs.
It is possible that the preferences generated by the mere exposure 
effect can be manipulated in the same way. In his 1968 formulation of 
the mere exposure hypothesis Zajonc acknowledged that enhanced affect 
from stimulus repetition could be at least partially offset by other 
factors (see previous section for review). One factor which has been 
empirically investigated is when stimuli are presented in such a way 
that the perceiver is encouraged to make attributions about them. The 
findings suggest that the subjects emotional response to the stimuli nay 
be influenced by stimulus attributions (Burgess & Sales, 1971; Perlman & 
Oskamp, 1971; Swap, 1976, cited in Harrison, 1977).
It has been shown in another context that first year psychology 
students value intelligence and creativity as socially desirable 
attributes and instructions which link these qualities to an 
experimental task can significantly influence responses on that task 
(Ashton & White, 1975). It is hypothesized that subjects who value 
intelligence and creativity (evaluative belief) and who believe 
experimental instructions linking intelligence and creativity to a 
preference for either familiar or unfamiliar stimuli (nonevaluative 
belief) would respectively increase and decrease their affective rating 
of the trained (familiar) stimuli.
9.2.1 Method
Subjects
The 48 subjects were volunteers from a group of 200 first year 
psychology students at the Australian National University who had not 
had any prior contact with any of the experimental materials. Their age 
ranged from 18 years to 47 years with a mean of 23.85 years. There were
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15 males and 33 females. Subjects were given course credit for 
participating.
Design
The experimental design was a two by two by two by three factorial 
design (see Table 50). The factors were stimulus sets (A,B), order of 
judgments (recognition/preference, preference/recognition), stimulus 
recognition (recognition, nonrecognition), and instructions (increase, 
decrease, control). The dependent variables were belief of instructions, 
attitude to intelligence and creativity, recognition judgments, and 
preference judgments.
Table 50
Experiment 6 Experimental Design
Stimulus Set
A B
Order of Judgement
Group R/P P/R R/P P/R
Recognition
Increase
Decrease
Neutral
Nonrecognition
Increase
Decrease
Neutral
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Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were two sets (A,B) of 20 stimulus slides4 of 
randomly generated 10 point shapes (solid black on white), standardized 
for association value, preference rating and recognizability (see 
Appendix D-l, D-2).
Equipment. The slides were projected on to a 17 by 23 centimeter 
rear projection screen mounted at the end of a 1 meter viewing tunnel, 
by a Kodak Carousal S-RA projector using a 150 watt bulb. The slide 
exposure time was controlled by a Uniblitz mechanical shutter model 
number 225LOAOT5-24928 manufactured by A.W.Vincent Assoc., Inc. New 
York. The projection distance for all slide presentations was 400mm. The 
training stimuli were shown through a No. 70 red and a No. 59 green 
Kodak Wratten gelatin filter catalogue numbers 149 5936 and 149 5878
respectively. They appeared black on a reddish background. During 
training diffuse room lighting was provided by a 240 volts, 50hz, 15
watt fluorescent desk lamp placed under the table supporting the viewing 
tunnel. In the training position the uninterrupted projector light 
intensity at the center of the screen was 2500 foot candles. The test 
stimuli were projected at an angle of 15 degrees. During testing normal 
room lighting was used. In the test position the uninterrupted projector 
light intensity at the center of each projection area was 1250 foot 
candles.
Recognition and preference judgments. Subjects’ recognition and 
preference judgments were made on a data sheet by placing a circle 
around either "left" or "right" to indicate which of the slides they
4 Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) used two sets of 10 stimulus slides. 
A pilot study to compare 6, 10, and 20 slide stimulus sets found no 
significant difference between the 10 and 20 slide sets for the 
percentage of target slides selected by either recognition or preference 
judgments (see Appendix D-3).
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recognized or preferred respectively. Subjects also indicated on a five 
point scale how sure they were about each judgement (see Appendix D-4).
Cognitive assessment. The importance for subjects of intelligence 
and creativity as a personal attribute was assessed using the Attitude 
to Intelligence and Creativity Questionnaire (see Appendix D-5). A post 
test questionnaire was designed to assess whether subjects remembered 
the information from the experimental instructions and whether they 
found it credible (believable). To assess if they understood and 
remembered the instructions subjects were asked to indicate whether 
intelligent and creative people preferred familiar or unfamiliar 
material. How credible these experimental instructions were was measured 
by a five point scale on which subjects rated how likely they thought it 
was that intelligent and creative people would prefer 
familiar/unfamiliar material. To ensure that the significance of these 
measures were not over emphasized they were embedded in some general 
questions about taking part in the experiment (see Appendix D-6).
Procedure
Subjects who volunteered for the study were randomly assigned to 
one of the six experimental conditions: recognition - increase, 
decrease, and control; nonrecognition - increase, decrease, and control. 
The random assignment was restricted to ensure even numbers across 
experimental conditions. This was done by a procedure of sampling 
without replacement (Keppel, 1982), that is, as a subject was assigned 
to a condition that condition was not available for assignment until all 
the other conditions had also been assigned a subject. Subjects were 
then given the following instructions. All instructions were handed to 
subjects typed on an A4 sheet of paper and read aloud by the 
experimenter.
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I am investigating the rationale behind techniques used in 
advertising. Initially, I need some people to help me evaluate 
the stimuli I am going to use in my research. This will 
involve looking at some slides and filling in some rating 
scales. Because of the nature of my research I need to know 
how people with different opinions on several issues will rate 
the slides. Therefore, before you rate these slides I would 
like to check your opinion on these issues.
Subjects then completed the Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity
Questionnaire. On completing this scale subjects were given the
appropriate experimental instructions.
Increase Group. The rationale I’m investigating relates to 
some recently published research that purported to show that 
intelligent, creative people form stronger preferences for 
familiar material than for unfamiliar material and conversely 
that dull, uncreative people form stronger preferences for 
unfamiliar material than for familiar material. In order to 
check these findings I need to establish standard ratings for 
my stimuli. To do this I am going to briefly show you some 
slides and then ask you to rate both these familiar slides and 
some you haven’t seen before. You won’t be able to remember 
all the slides but your degree of preference for the familiar 
slides should correlate with your intelligence and creativity.
Decrease Group. Hie rationale I’m investigating relates to 
some recently published research that purported to show that 
intelligent, creative people form stronger preferences for 
unfamiliar material than for familiar material and conversely 
that dull, uncreative people form stronger preferences for 
familiar material than for unfamiliar material. In order to 
check these findings I need to establish standard ratings for 
my stimuli. To do this I am going to briefly show you some 
slides and then ask you to rate both these familiar slides and 
some you haven’t seen before. You won’t be able to remember 
all the slides but your degree of preference for the 
unfamiliar slides should correlate with your intelligence and 
creativity.
Subjects in the two control groups did not receive any experimental 
instructions. All subjects were then given the following pretraining 
instructions.
Pretraining Instructions. I’m going to show you some slides 
now. Your task is to merely attend to these slides for the 
moment. Later you will be asked to make some judgments about 
them. Each slide will be presented on the screen for only a 
brief time. Therefore, I want you to fix your gaze on the 
center of the screen and even if you only see a flash of light 
concentrate on whatever comes up on the screen. I will give 
you the signal "ready" just before each slide is shown so that 
you will know when it is coming. You cannot ask questions 
during the series so do you have any questions now.
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If a subject had any questions the instructions were read again but 
no explanations were provided.
The experiment then consisted of two phases, training and test. 
During the training phase, subjects were shown one set of stimulus 
slides a total of five times. The subjects within each experimental 
condition were divided into two subgroups, with subjects randomly 
assigned to subgroups. The stimulus sets used for training were 
counterbalanced across these subgroups. That is, half of the subjects in 
each experimental condition were shown set A and half set B. During 
training a separate random order was used for each of the five 
presentations of the stimulus set. The exposure time for the recognition 
conditions weis 1 second and for the nonrecognition conditions was 1 
millisecond.
During the test phase each of the training slides were presented in 
a paired compsLrison with slides from the nontraining set and forced 
choice judgments of recognition, preference, and rating confidence were 
recorded. Since the experimental instructions confound recognition and 
preference judgments these ratings could not be made about the same 
stimuli. Therefore, each stimulus set weis divided into two subsets 
(A1,A2 & B1,B2). Subjects then made recognition judgments about subsets 
A1 or B1 and preference judgments about subsets A2 or B2 (depending on 
their experimental condition subgroup). Subsets Al Eind A2, and subsets 
B1 and B2 h£id been previously standardized for recognizability. That is, 
when A1 is at chEmce recognition level so is A2, and when B1 is at 
chEince recognition level so is B2 (see appendix C-2).
All subjects were given the following pretest instructions.
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Pretest Instructions
1. Recognition test
I’m now going to show you two slides at a time, you will have 
adequate time to see them and I would like you to make the 
following judgments about each of the pairs of slides.
(a) Which slide have you seen before
(b) How sure you are of your judgment
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU MAKE BOTH JUDGMENTS 
(a) AND (b) ABOUT EACH PAIR OF SLIDES 
2. Preference test
I’m now going to show you two slides at a time, you will have 
adequate time to see them and I would like you to make the 
following judgments about each of the pairs of slides.
(a) Which slide do you prefer
(b) How sure you are of your judgment
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU MAKE BOTH JUDGMENTS 
(a) AND (b) ABOUT EACH PAIR OF SLIDES
The order in which subjects made the recognition and preference 
judgments was counterbalanced within experimental condition subgroups. 
Subjects were not told they would be required to make a second set of 
judgments until after they had completed the first sequence of 
comparisons.
Finally, subjects completed the post test questionnaire.
9 . 2.2 Results
A complete four-way analysis of variance was performed on the data.
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The results of that analysis are outlined below.
Slide Sets
There was no significant differences between slide sets A and B for 
either recognition or preference ratings. The percentage of trained 
slides selected for set A and B by recognition judgments was 57.5 and 
64.2 per cent respectively and by preference judgments 50.8 and 57.1 per 
cent respectively. These data indicate that the slide sets A and B were 
equivalent stimuli and that the data from these sets can be pooled when 
analyzing the other factors.
Order of Judgments
The were no significant main effects or interactions for the order 
of making the recognition and preference judgments. The percentage of 
trained stimuli selected by subjects who made recognition judgments 
first was 59.2 per cent for recognition and 55.0 per cent for 
preference judgments. For subjects who made preference judgments first 
the results were 62.5 per cent for recognition and 52.9 per cent for 
preference judgments. Again these results indicate that the order of 
making judgments can be ignored when considering the other factors.
Effect of Training
As would be expected, there was a significant main effect of 
training on recognition judgments, F (2,35) = 22.75, p<.0001. The 1 
second training group recognized significantly more target slides, 71.7 
per cent, than the 1 millisecond training group, 50.0 per cent. The 1 
second group’s level of recognition was significantly above chance, t 
(19) = 3.89, p<.0001, whereas the 1 millisecond training group’s was not 
significantly different to chance. There was no main effect of
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training on preference judgments. These were 53.8 per cent and 54.2 per 
cent for the 1 second and the 1 millisecond training groups 
respectively (see Table 51). There was also a significant main effect 
for value of intelligence and creativity, F (1,41) = 5.31, p<.05. An 
inspection of means showed that the mean value of intelligence and 
creativity of 2.96 for the 1 millisecond training group was 
significantly higher than the mean value of 3.06 for the 1 second 
training group. Since this measure was taken prior to the group 
assignment this must be a chance finding.
Table 51
Percentage of Trained Stiauli Selected by Recognition and Preference Judgaents for the 
Two Levels of Training and the Three Levels of Instruction.
Instructions
Judgaent
Preference Recognition
Non
Recognition Recognition
Non
Recognition Recognition
Increase 53.8 53.8 55.0 75.0
Decrease 53.8 45.0 56.2 66.2
Control 53.8 63.7 38.8 73.7
Effect of Instructions
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect or 
interaction of experimental instructions for either recognition or 
preference judgments. However, there was a main effect for belief of 
instructions across the three instruction conditions, F (1,31) = 7.42, 
p<.05. It can be seen from the mean rating of 2.06 that the decrease
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instructions were believed whereas the rating of 3.06 for the increase 
instructions indicates they were somewhat disbelieved. The neutral 
subjects did not receive experimental instructions. Therefore, the 
ratings indicated subjects in the experimental conditions accepted that 
intelligent, creative people preferred unfamiliar material but found it 
more difficult to believe that intelligent, creative people would 
prefer familiar material. This meant that only the decrease instructions 
had been effective. Therefore, it was decided to use t tests to 
individually compare the instruction conditions to chance and with their 
control groups.
For recognition judgments there was no significant difference 
between the instruction conditions, nor was there any significant 
difference to chance at the 1 millisecond training level. At the 1 
second training level, subjects from all three instruction conditions, 
increase, decrease and control, achieved above chance levels of stimulus 
recognition, t (19) = 3.16, 2.03, 3.04 and p<.001, .02, .005
respectively. There ojere no significant differences between the groups 
themselves (see Table 50).
For preference judgments at the 1 millisecond training level the
instruction groups were not significantly different to chance or each
■prefa**e*ct r'a'Ungs
other. At the 1 second training level the control group’s/ wer© 
significantly greater than chance level -foP trained slides, t
(19) = 1.75, p<.05. The increase and decrease groups were not
significantly different to chance. The decrease groups preference for 
the trained slides was significantly less than the control group, t (19)
= 2.38, p<.02. The increase group was not significantly different to
either the decrease or control groups. These results indicate that when 
subjects could recognize the training slides and the instructions were 
believed, subjects* preference for the trained slides was influenced by
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the instructions (see Table 51).
Effect of Evaluative and Non Evaluative Beliefs on Recognition 
and Preference Judgments
Because of the relatively small number of subjects used in this 
exploratory study the median split method of investigating the impact of 
evaluative beliefs used in the previous studies was not appropriate 
here.
Therefore, in order to identify those subjects who both believed 
the instructions and valued intelligence and creativity a new variable 
"meaning" was computed by adding subjects’ Belief of Instructions and 
Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity scores.
A correlational analysis was used to investigate the relationship 
between meaning, and recognition and preference judgments. There was no 
significant correlation between'and preference for any of the individual 
experimental groups. There was a significant positive correlation 
between meaning and preference judgments for both the increase and 
decrease conditions, r = .5, p< .03 and r = .46, p< .05 respectively. 
There was no correlation between these variables for the control groups. 
While these results for the increase groups are contrary to initial 
predictions they are consistent with the failure of the increase groups 
to accept the instruction that intelligent and creative people prefer 
familiar material. Therefore, the correlation between meaning and 
preference was also calculated for the increase and decrease groups 
combined. There was a significant positive correlation between meaning 
and preference at both the 1 millisecond and 1 second training levels, r 
= .58, p<.01 and r = .76, p<.001 respectively. Since the direction of 
the relationship between meaning and preference was predicted the levels 
of significance quoted above are for one-tailed tests.
The above finding was further investigated by a multiple regression 
analysis which detected a linear relationship between meaning and
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preference judgments. The contribution of meaning to this linear 
dependence was significantly greater than any of the other experimental 
variables, t (31) = 2.28, p<.05. There is no difference in the 
relationship across training or instruction conditions. The relationship 
indicates that subjects who valued intelligence and creativity, and 
believed the instructions linking intelligence and creativity to 
preference, were less likely to prefer the target slides.
9.2.3 Discussion
The findings from this study are revealing in two ways. First they 
raise the possibility that subjects’ preference judgments of stimuli 
whose ordinary perceptual recognition has been kept at chance level may 
be influenced by nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs, and second they 
form the basis for constructing a methodology to thoroughly assess that 
possibility.
The major finding from this study was the significant positive 
correlation between meaning and preference ratings for the decrease 
instruction conditions. The fact that there was a positive rather than 
the expected negative correlation for the increase condition is perhaps 
due to the fact that the decrease instructions were believed but the 
increase instructions were not. It is, therefore, possible that these 
groups had similar beliefs about intelligent and creative peoples’ 
preferences for familiar verses novel material. As meaning is a 
combination of nonevaluative and evaluative belief this finding tends to 
support the experimental hypothesis that these processes can influence 
subjects’preference judgments of trained stimuli. There were two further 
findings that were of interest. First the significant positive 
correlation found for the 1 millisecond training condition and second
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th© regression analysis which confirmed there was a similar linear 
relationship between meaning and preference across both the increase and 
decrease groups at both training levels. Taken together these results 
suggest meaning may influence the mere exposure effect even when 
ordinary perceptual recognition of the trained stimuli has been kept at 
chance level. Furthermore, when the current results are considered in 
conjunction with the interpretation put forward by Seamon et al (1983a), 
that preferences for nonrecognized stimuli are based on a familiarity 
with the stimuli that the subject may not be aware of, they suggest that 
cognitions can interact with processes that are not available to 
awareness.
It was somewhat surprising to fail to replicate Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc’s (1980) finding of a mere exposure effect in the nonrecognition 
control group. Since there was a mere exposure effect for the 
recognition control group it would seem that the failure to replicate 
can only be attributed to the shorter training exposure. It must be 
acknowledged that this was an exploratory study and that the number of 
subjects was not overly large. However, a cell size of eight should be 
adequate to test a robust effect.
From a methodological perspective the current study was only a 
limited success. The exposure times chosen produced the desired 
recognition rates for the nonrecognition and recognition training 
levels, 50 per cent and 71.7 per cent respectively. However, it is clear 
that the subjects only accepted the experimental instructions linking 
intelligence and creativity to novel or unfamiliar material. This meant 
that the methodology was only effective in generating the hypothesized 
nonevaluative belief for the decrease groups. It is possible that since 
the increase groups did not believe that intelligence and creativity was 
associated with a preference for familiar material, they may have had
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similar nonevaluative beliefs as the decrease groups. While the increase 
groups results are consistent with this interpretation it is not 
possible to determine if this was actually the case. Therefore, it was 
only possible to draw tenative conclusions on the basis of the decrease 
and control group’s results.
It also became apparent from the subjects1 postexperimental 
debriefing that the training set of 20 slides was to large. Subjects 
reported that they became bored with the 100 training exposures and that 
their concentration and attention wandered. In fact one subject asked if 
the experiment was an endurance test to see how long it would take 
subjects to ask to stop.
If these tenative results withstand thorough investigation then 
Zajonc’s interpretation of the evidence will have been shown to be 
inaccurate. That is, showing cognitions can influence preference 
judgments in the absence of stimulus recognition would cast serious 
doubt on the assumption that these judgments are made without cognitive 
involvement. Indeed, if the position of Searoon et al (1983a, 1983b) is 
further supported then the finding Zajonc’s position depends on (Kunst- 
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) may be shown to be due to a memory function which 
is generally accepted as a cognitive process. Such findings would 
strongly support the alternate position outlined above which sees 
cognition as a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for 
generating emotion.
The results from this preliminary investigation are encouraging 
enough to warrant further investigation to determine (a) if preferences 
for stimuli trained below the threshold for ordinary perceptual 
recognition reflect an increased liking or a response bias due to the 
kind of memory retrieval process activated, and (b) if nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs can account for the preference ratings of stimuli
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whose repeated exposure was such that ordinary perceptual recognition 
was kept at chance level. The following two studies were undertaken to 
investigate these two issues.
9.3 Experiment 7
The first issue identified in the previous study for further 
investigation was whether the mere exposure effect for stimuli trained 
below perceptual threshold is an expression of increased liking for the 
trained stimuli (Zajonc, 1980) or an artifact of memory retrieval 
processes (Seamon et al, 1983a).
The theoretical explanation provided by Seamon et al (1983a) for 
their position was outlined above. To reiterate, these authors argued 
that repeated presentation of stimuli at a level below perceptual 
threshold generates a familiarity in memory referred to elsewhere as 
perceptual fluency (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). They also contended that 
this occurs even when there is not sufficient information for a full 
item representation to be encoded in memory. They suggested that 
judgments based on affective criteria activate a memory retrieval 
process that accesses the stimulus familiarity information whereas 
judgments based on recognition criteria activate a memory retrieval 
process that searches for and fails to find a full item representation. 
Therefore, affective judgments are superior for identifying trained 
stimuli not because subjects * liking for the trained stimuli has 
increased but because they are more familiar.
If this position is accurate it would follow that the trained 
stimuli should be nominated regardless of the valence of the affect 
judgment subjects are asked to make. That is, if there is a response 
bias towards choosing the trained stimuli because it is familiar and not
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because there has been an increased liking for it over the comparison 
(nontrained) stimuli, then the trained stimuli should be chosen whether 
the subject is asked to choose the stimuli they like or the stimuli they 
dislike. However, if the repeated exposure generates an increased liking 
for the stimuli then the trained stimuli should be chosen when subjects 
are asked to choose the stimuli they like and the comparison stimuli 
when they are asked to choose the slide they dislike.
The difficulty with this approach is that to ask for a response or 
the opposite to that response is essentially asking the same question in 
both cases. That is, there is a strong possibility that when subjects 
are asked to choose which stimuli they dislike, they would first choose 
which stimuli they like and then nominate the other stimuli as the one 
they dislike. In order to reduce the risk of subjects basing their 
responses on the same judgment for both questions, response categories 
were chosen that were as discrete as possible. Therefore, the response 
categories used in this study were "which slide do you feel more 
positive about" and "which slide do you feel more negative about".
The empirical investigations of the mere exposure effect where 
training has been done under conditions adequate for subsequent stimulus 
recognition suggest that trained stimuli actually acquire an increased 
liking (see above review). Therefore, it was hypothesized that when 
subjects could recognize the trained stimuli they would discriminate 
affectively between the trained and comparison stimuli and that when 
subjects could not recognize the trained stimuli they would not 
discriminate affectively between the trained and comparison stimuli. 
That is, when training was conducted under adequate viewing conditions 
subjects would tend to choose the trained stimuli as the ones they feel 
positive about and the comparison stimuli as the ones they feel negative 
about and when training was conducted at below perceptual threshold
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subjects would tend to choose the trained stimuli in both cases.
9.3.1 Method
Subjects
The subjects were 80 volunteers from pool of 400 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education who had not had any prior contact with the experimental 
materials. Their age ranged from 17 to 48 years with a mean age of 22.8 
years. There were 33 males and 47 females. Students who volunteered for 
the study received course credit for participating.
Design
The experimental design was a two by two factorial design. The 
factors were type of affective judgment (positive, negative) and 
training (recognition, nonrecognition). The dependent variables were 
recognition judgments, and preference judgments.
Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were two sets (A,B) of 10 randomly generated 
10 point shapes. The sets A and B were the same slides as the sets A1 
and B1 used in Experiment 6.
Equipment. The projection and viewing equipment was the same as
that used in Experiment 6.
Recognition and preference judgments. These judgments were made on 
the same type of answering sheet as was used in Experiment 6.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions as in the previous experiments. Subjects were then given the
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following instructions. As in previous experiments all instructions were
handed to subjects typed on A4 paper and read aloud by the experimenter.
I am investigating the rationale behind techniques used in 
advertising. Initially, I need some people to help me evaluate 
the stimuli I am going to use in my research. This will 
involve looking at some slides and filling in some rating 
scales. I’m going to show you some slides now. Your task is to 
merely attend to these slides for the moment. Later you will 
be asked to make some judgments about them. Each slide will be 
presented on the screen for only a brief time. Therefore, I 
want you to fix your gaze on the center of the screen and even 
if you only see a flash of light concentrate on whatever comes 
up on the screen. I will give you the signal ’’ready" just 
before each slide is shown so that you will know when it is 
coming. You cannot ask questions during the series so do you 
have any questions now.
If a subject had any questions the instructions were read again but 
no explanations were provided.
As in Experiment 6, the experiment then consisted of a training 
phase and a test phase. The procedure had the following alterations.
In the training phase the exposure time was 1 millisecond for all 
the training conditions. In the nonrecognition condition the No. 70 red 
and No. 59 green gelatin filters were used to ensure that the training 
exposures were below perceptual threshold. The light filters were not 
used for the recognition condition.
In the test phase, because in this study subjects were not given 
experimental instructions confounding the recognition and preference 
judgments these judgments were made about the same slides. Therefore, 
the training set was reduced from 20 to 10 slides. The order of making 
recognition and preference judgments was counterbalanced within the 
experimental conditions.
Since cognitive variables were not being monitored in this study 
subjects did not complete the post test questionnaire.
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9.3.2 Results
A complete two-way analysis of variance was performed on the data 
and the results of this analysis are outlined below.
Effect of Training
As expected there was a significant main effect of training on 
recognition judgments, F (1,76) = 7.85, p<.007. Subjects in the
recognition training condition recognized significantly more trained 
slides than subjects in the nonrecognition training condition, 68 per 
cent and 57.3 per cent respectively (see Table 52). There was also a 
trend for there to be a significant main effect of training on 
preference judgments, F (1,76) = 3.15, p<.08. Inspection of the marginal 
means showed the nonrecognition groups tended to nominate more trained 
slides than the recognition groups, 57 per cent and 51 percent 
respectively (see Table 52). This mainly reflects a tendency by subjects 
in the negative judgment recognition group to nomimate the comparison 
slide as the one they felt negative about.
Effect of Type of Judgment
As would be expected there was no effect of type of affective 
judgment on recognition judgments. There was a significant main effect 
for type of affective judgment on preference judgments, F (1,76) =
11.59, p<.001. An inspection of marginal means indicated that the
positive judgment groups nominated significantly more trained slides 
than the negative judgment groups, 59.8 per cent and 48.3 per cent 
respectively (see Table 52). However, while the positive judgment 
condition was significantly different to chance, t (38) = 2.88, p<.005, 
the negative judgment condition was not. This indicates that overall the
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Table 52
Percentage of Trained Stiauli Selected by Recognition and Preference Judgments for the 
Two Levels of Training and the Two Levels of Type of Affective Judgaent
Judgaent
Preference Recognition
Affective
Judgaent
Non
Recognition Recognition Total
Non
Recognition Recognition Total
Positive 60.0 59.5 59.8 58.0 69.0 63.5
Negative 54.0 42.5 48.3 56.5 67.0 61.8
Total 57.0 51.0 57.3 68.0
negative judgment was not as successful at identifying the comparison 
slide as the positive judgment was for identifying the trained slide.
Interactions
There was no significant interaction for recognition judgments. 
Inspection of individual group means showed that for the recognition 
condition both the positive and negative affective judgment groups level 
of stimulus recognition was above chance, t (19) = 3.5 and 3.13, pC.001 
and .001 respectively. For the nonrecognition condition both the 
positive and negative judgment groups level of recognition were higher 
than expected but neither were greater than chance.
For preference judgments, there was a trend for there to be a 
significant interaction for training and type of affective judgments, F 
(1,76) = 2.65, p<.l. Contrasts between the individual group means 
revealed a significant difference for the negative affective judgments 
between the recognition and nonrecognition groups, t (38) = 2.4, pC.01.
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There was no significant difference for the positive affective judgments 
between these two groups. This tends to indicate that when subjects 
could recognize the stimuli they discriminated affectively and when they 
could not recognize the stimuli they could not discriminate affectively 
and tended to nominate the trained stimuli for both affective judgments.
9.3.3 Discussion
The findings from this study tend to support the experimental 
hypothesis. They provide substantial evidence that subjects do not 
affectively discriminate between trained and comparison stimuli when 
training is carried out at below the perceptual threshold. This evidence 
will be outlined below.
When subjects could recognize the trained stimuli they nominated 
the trained stimuli significantly more often than chance as the stimuli 
they felt more positive about and the comparison stimuli significantly 
more often than chance as the stimuli they felt more negative about. 
However, when subjects could not recognize the trained stimuli at above 
chance level, they still nominated the trained stimuli significantly 
more often than chance as the stimuli they felt more positive about but 
they did not nominate the comparison stimuli significantly more often 
than chance as the stimuli they felt more negative about. Furthermore, 
the frequency with which they selected the trained stimuli as the ones 
they felt more negative about was significantly greater when they could 
not recognize the stimuli than when they could recognize the stimuli. 
These results suggest that when stimulus training was above the 
perceptual threshold subjects actual liking for the trained stimuli 
increased above that which they had for the comparison stimuli and when 
training was carried out at below the perceptual threshold the trained
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Stimuli did not acquire an increased, liking over the comparison stimuli. 
However, in spite of this there was still a tendency for subjects to 
choose the below threshold trained stimuli significantly more often than 
chance as the stimuli they felt more positive about. The failure of 
subjects to also nominate the below threshold trained stimuli 
significantly more often than chance as the one they felt more negative 
about may well be attributed to this being the more difficult category 
to discretely identify. That is, a proportion of subjects in this 
category may have first chosen the stimuli they felt more positive about 
(liked) and then nominated the other as the one they felt more negative 
about (disliked). The critical finding here was that subjects did 
nominate the below threshold trained stimuli as the one they felt more 
negative about significantly more often than they did when the stimuli 
were recognizable.
These findings strongly support the proposition of Seamon et al 
(1983a) that the mere exposure effect reported by Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980) is due to different memory retrieval processes activated 
by requests for recognition and preference judgments. The failure of 
subjects in this study to select the comparison stimuli as the ones they 
felt more negative about when training was conducted at a level below 
the perceptual threshold, as they had done for stimuli trained at above 
the perceptual threshold, casts serious doubt on Zajone’s (1980) view 
that the preference judgments reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) 
constitute an affective response. The results obtained by Kunst-Wilson 
and Zajonc (1980) may well be due to cognitive (memory) processes. It, 
therefore, follows that those findings are questionable as evidence for 
affective responses in the absence of cognition. This interpretation 
must, however, also be treated with caution. Although the recognition 
levels for the nonrecognition conditions were in the chance range they
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were in the upper portion of that range and there were no significant 
differences between the recognition and preference judgments as 
predictors of the trained slides. It is possible that the preference 
judgments in the nonrecognition condition were chance responses and that 
there is no impact of training on preferences when training is conducted 
below the perceptual threshold.
In spite of the doubt cast by this study on Zajonc’s (1980) 
interpretation of the evidence it remains of interest to establish if 
the effect described by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) can be 
manipulated by the kinds of cognitive processes (nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs) investigated in the earlier part of this work. This 
issue was investigated in the following study.
9.4 Experiment 8
The second issue identified in Expperiment 6 for further 
investigation was whether nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs could 
influence the preference ratings of stimuli whose repeated exposure 
during training was such that ordinary perceptual recognition remained 
at chance level.
One of the critical assumptions of Zajonc’s (1980) argument for 
affective primacy is that the influence of repeated exposure on 
affective responses must be devoid of cognitive involvement if 
subsequent stimulus recognition is at chance level. The purpose of the 
current study is to test if this assumption holds for the cognitive 
processes shown here to be important determinants of emotional 
responses.
The methodology used is a refinement of that used in Experiments C> 
and 7. In earlier studies experimental instructions had been shown to be
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an effective methodology for generating particular nonevaluative beliefs 
(see Chapter 4). In Experiment 6 it was found that instructions linking 
intelligence and creativity to preference for unfamiliar material were 
effective but that those linking these attributes to familiar material 
were not effective. Therefore, in this study only the effective 
instructions linking preference for unfamiliar material to intelligence 
and creativity were used. The use of a single instruction was combined 
with the positive and negative affective judgments used in Experiment 7 
in an attempt to bias subjects’preference responses in favour of the 
trained or comparison stimuli. That is, since the instructions suggest 
intelligent and creative people should prefer the comparison stimuli, 
subjects who are asked which stimuli they feel more positive about 
should tend to nominate the comparison stimuli and those who are asked 
which stimuli they feel more negative about should tend to nominate the 
trained stimuli.
It was also shown in Chapter 4 that the effectiveness of 
instructions is determined by subjects’ evaluative beliefs about the 
attribute in question. Therefore, subjects’ evaluative beliefs were 
assessed and used to differentiate experimental groups on the basis of 
their value of intelligence and creativity as an attribute.
A no instruction control group was also included to test that 
recognition was at chance level, if instructions influenced recognition 
judgments, and as a replication of the nonrecognition condition from the 
previous study where it was not clear if there was a tendency for 
subjects in both affective judgment groups to nominate the trained 
stimuli or whether their responses were random.
The following three experimental hypothesizes were tested. First, 
that the instructions, high value of intelligence and creativity, and 
positive affective judgment group would select significantly less
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trained stimuli than the other groups. Second, that in the control 
condition there would be no significant difference between the number of 
trained stimuli selected by the positive and negative judgment affective 
groups when making their preference judgments. Third, that in the 
control condition the number of trained stimuli selected by both the 
positive and negative judgment groups would be significantly greater 
than chance.
9.4.1 Method
Subjects
The subjects were 80 volunteers from pool of 400 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education. Their age ranged from 17 to 51 years with a mean age of 23.6 
years. There were 34 males and 46 females. None of the subjects who took 
part had participated in any of the previous mere exposure experiments. 
Students who volunteered for the study received course credit for 
participating.
Design
The experimental design was a two by two by two factorial design. 
The factors were experimental instructions (instructions, no instruction 
control), value of intelligence and creativity (high, low), and type of 
affective judgment (positive, negative). The dependent variables were 
belief of instructions, recognition judgments, and preference judgments.
Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same two sets (A,B) used in 
Experiment 7.
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Equipment. The projection and viewing equipment was the same as
that used in Experiments 6 and 7. However, because in Experiment 7 the 
recognition levels for the nonrecognition condition were higher than 
expected, in the current experiment a .4 neutral density gelatin filter 
was added during the training phase to ensure recognition was at chance 
level.
Recognition and preference judgments. These judgments were made on 
the same type of answering sheet as was used in Experiments 6 and 7.
Cognitive assessment. The Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity 
and Post Test Questionnaires from Experiment 6 were used to assess value 
of intelligence and creativity and belief of instructions respectively.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental
conditions as in the previous experiments. Subjects were then given the
following instructions. As in previous experiments all instructions were
handed to subjects typed on A4 paper and read aloud by the experimenter.
I am investigating the rationale behind techniques used in 
advertising. Initially, I need some people to help me evaluate 
the stimuli I am going to use in my research. This will 
involve looking at some slides and filling in some rating 
scales. Because of the nature of my research I need to know 
how people with different opinions on several issues will rate 
the slides. Therefore, before you rate these slides I would 
like to check your opinion on these issues.
Hie subjects then completed the Attitude to Intelligence and 
Creativity Questionnaire. On completing this scale the subjects in the 
experimental instruction condition were then given the following 
instructions.
I am investigating the rationale behind tectniques used in 
advertising. I am particularly interested in the established 
phenomenon that intelligent, creative people tend to form 
stronger preferences for unfamiliar material and conversely 
that dull, uncreative people tend to form stronger preferences 
for familiar material.
The purpose of this research is to see if there is also a
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relationship between intelligence and creativity and the 
capacity to recognise perceptually difficult material.
The experimental task involves briefly showing you some slides 
and then later gettting you to make some judgments about them.
The details of the task will be explained as you go.
The first stage is to show you some slides. Your task is to 
merely attend to these slides for the moment. Each slide will 
be presented on the screen for only a brief time. Therefore, I 
want you to fix your gaze on the center of the screen and even 
if you only see a flash of light concentrate on whatever comes 
up on the screen. I will give you the signal "ready" just 
before each slide is shown so that you will know when it is 
coming. You cannot ask questions during the series so do you 
have any questions now.
Subjects in the no instruction control condition were given the 
following instructions.
I’m going to show you some slides now. Your task is to merely 
attend to these slides for the moment. Later you will be asked 
to malte some judgments about them. Each slide will be 
presented on the screen for only a brief time. Therefore, I 
want you to fix your gaze on the center of the screen and even 
if you only see a flash of light concentrate on whatever comes 
up on the screen. I will give you the signal *ready’ just 
before each slide is shown so that you will know when it is 
coming. You cannot ask questions during the series so do you 
have any questions now.
If a subject had any questions the instructions were read again but 
no explanations were provided.
As in Experiment 6 and 7, the experiment then consisted of a 
training phase and a test phase. The procedure had the following 
alterations.
In the training phase the exposure time was 1 millisecond for all 
the training conditions. For all subjects a .4 neutral density gelatin 
filter was used with the No. 70 red and No. 59 green gelatin filters to 
ensure that the training exposures were below perceptual threshold.
Prior to training, half the subjects were given experimental 
instructions confounding the recognition and preference judgments. Since 
these judgments were made about the same stimuli, the order of making 
recognition and preference judgments for those subjects who received
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experimental instructions was not counterbalanced. As the dependent 
variable of major interest was subjects preference judgments these were 
made before recognition judgments by all subjects in the experimental 
instruction condition.
Since cognitive variables were being monitored in this study 
subjects also completed the post test questionnaire (see Appendix D-6).
9.4.2 Results
A complete three-way analysis of variance was performed on the data 
and the results of this analysis are outlined below.
Effect of Instructions
Contrary to predictions there was no significant main effect or 
interaction for instructions on either recognition or preference 
judgments (see Table 53).
Effect of Value of Intelligence and Creativity
Again contrary to predictions there was no significant main effect 
or interaction of value for intelligence and creativity on either 
recognition or preference judgments (see Table 53).
Effect of Type of Affective Judgment
As predicted there was no significant main effect or interaction 
for type of affective judgment on either recognition or preference 
judgments (see Table 53).
Comparison of Individual Experimental Group*s Mean Recognition and 
Preference Judgments with Chance
There was no significant difference between individual experimental
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groups mean r e c o g n i t i o n  a n d  p r e f e r e n c e  j u d g m e n t s  a n d  c h a n c e  ( s e e  T a b l e  
5 3 ) .
Table 53
Percentage of Trained Stiauli Selected by Recognition and Preference Judgaents for the Two Levels 
of Instructions, Type of Affective Judgaent, and Value of Intelligence and Creativity.
Judgaent
Preference Recognition
Instructions
Instruction Control Instruction Control
Value of Intelligence and Creativity
Affective
Judgaent High Low High Low High Low High Low
Positive 51.0 50.0 52.0 57.0 55.0 61.0 56.0 55.0
Negative 45.0 47.0 44.0 45.0 53.0 57.0 49.0 54.0
Total 48.0 48.5 48.0 51.0 54.0 59.0 52.5 55.0
9 . 4 . 3  D i s c u s s i o n
T h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h i s  s t u d y  o n l y  p r o v i d e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  o n e  o f  t h e  
t h r e e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  h y p o t h e s i z e s  i t  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e .  T h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  h y p o t h e s i z e s  
w i l l  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t u r n .
I t  h a d  b e e n  h y p o t h e s i z e d  t h a t  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  h i g h  v a l u e  o f  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  a n d  c r e a t i v i t y ,  a n d  p o s i t i v e  a f f e c t i v e  j u d g m e n t  g r o u p  w h e n  
m a k in g  a  p r e f e r e n c e  j u d g m e n t  w o u ld  c h o o s e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  t r a i n e d
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Stimuli than the other groups. This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the instructions, if believed and valued, would bias the 
subjects toward reporting a preference for the comparison stimuli. 
Therefore, if choosing the stimuli they felt more positive about 
subjects would tend to choose the comparison rather than the trained 
stimuli. Conversely, it was assumed that if they were choosing the 
stimuli they felt more negative about subjects would tend to choose the 
trained rather than the comparison stimuli. Furthermore, it was felt 
that if subjects did not believe the instructions or did not value being 
seen as intelligent and creative they would tend to choose the more 
familiar trained stimuli for both judgments. The results from this study 
fail to provide any evidence to support these assumptions. Therefore, 
this study failed to demonstrate that nonevaluative and evaluative 
beliefs could influence preference judgments for stimuli whose repeated 
exposure was below the perceptual threshold.
The results did support the second hypothesis that when making 
preference judgments, there would be no significant difference between 
the number of trained stimuli selected in the control condition by the 
positive and negative affective judgment groups. There was no 
significant difference between these groups. This finding is consistent 
with the evidence from Experiment 7 which indicated that subjects could 
not discriminate affectively between stimuli when repeated exposure had 
been conducted below the perceptual threshold. These findings will be 
considered further in conjunction with the evidence for the third 
hypothesis.
The third hypothesis, that for the control condition both the 
positive and negative affective judgment groups would choose the trained 
stimuli significantly more often than chance as the stimuli they felt 
more positive and more negative about respectively, weis not supported by
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th© data. The trained stimuli was not chosen significantly more often
than chance by either group. The failure of either group to select the
trained stimuli in preference to the comparison stimuli and the fact
that there was no significant difference between the groups for the
number of trained stimuli selected, suggest that subjects forced choice
preference judgments about stimuli that have been repeatedly exposed
prior to testing at a level below the perceptual threshold, are random
/
responses. There is no substantial evidence of a mere exposure effect 
for stimuli that can not be recognised.
Again these data fail to replicate Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). 
In fact the only reports of similar findings are the Seamon et al 
(1983a, 1983b) studies which incorporated other features and frequently
failed to achieve the clear seperation of recognition and preference 
judgments reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). In the previous 
study here (Experiment 7) when the positive affective judgment group 
showed an above chance preference for the trained slides there was not a 
clear seperation of recognition and preference judgments even though 
stimulus recognition was at chance level. It would appear to be 
difficult to demonstrate that affective judgments are superior for 
identifying stimuli whose prior repeated exposure was clearly below the 
perceptual threshold. The reasons for this difficulty must be 
speculative. In their report Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) gave minimal 
information about their procedures. For example, the precise wording of 
their instructions were not included. It is possible that some feature 
of their procedure acted as a demand characteristic in favour of their 
hypothesis.
In summary, the current work tends to suggest that the kinds of 
cognitive processes that are of interest to cognitive learning 
therapists can not access visual stimuli that have been presented below
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the perceptual threshold. Therefore, the current study failed to 
demonstrate that cognitive processes have a capacity to influence mental 
processes that are not available to awareness. The findings also pose 
considerable difficulty for those researchers who interpreted previous 
findings (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) as evidence of affective 
responses in the abscence of cognition. There was no clear evidence that 
the mere exposure effect for preferences occurred when the repeated 
stimulus exposure was conducted below the perceptual threshold. 
Furthermore, there was evidence that the affective responses made to 
stimuli previously exposed in this manner did not represent a discrete 
emotional response.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
The studies reported in this thesis had three aims. The first was 
to clarify the existing evidence providing empirical support for the 
cognitive learning therapy approach to emotion. The second was to extend 
that evidence to include an assessment of the specific cognitive 
processes thought by cognitive learning therapists to mediate emotion. 
The third was to investigate the issue of whether cognitive processes 
are merely sufficient or both sufficient and necessary conditions for 
emotional response. The specific question addressed was to determine if 
stimuli needed to be available to conscious awareness for cognitive 
processes to mediate emotions.
The empirical work conducted by the author and reported in this 
thesis has achieved two of these three aims. The two initial experiments 
successfully demonstrated that cognitions were related to emotional 
responding. This finding established that there was a basis for the 
cognitive mediational model of emotion. Therefore, further research to 
define the nature of this relationship and the kinds of cognitive 
processes involved was warranted.
The subsequent investigations established the computer game mood 
induction paradigm as a successful methodology for work in this area. 
The empirical demonstration of nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs as 
mediators of emotion is seen as the most significant contribution of the 
current work. These studies showed that the specific kinds of cognitive 
processes cognitive learning therapists suggested were pertinent for 
emotions were indeed mediators of emotional responses.
Although the third area of research did not achieve its aim of 
establishing if cognitive processes could possibly be both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for emotional response, it has raised important
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questions about the validity of the mere exposure paradigm’s capacity to 
make a useful contribution to the on going debate about affective 
primacy.
The results of the investigations conducted, in each if these three 
areas will be summarized below.
10.1 Self Statement Mood Induction Studies
The self statement mood induction research had recently been 
criticized as being prone to influence from experimental demand 
characteristics (Buchwald et al, 1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980); for being 
unreliable as a mood inducer (Sutherland et al, 1982), and as being an 
inappropriate paradigm for evaluating the role of cognitions as 
mediators of emotion (Lazarus et al, 1982). The first two studies 
reported here were conducted to clarify these criticisms.
In the first study, two sets of elation and two sets of depression 
mood induction statements that had been previously assessed as either 
believable or unbelievable were used as mood induction stimuli in a 
laboratory self statement mood induction experiment. Based on the 
cognitive mediational model of emotion it was expected that the 
believable mood statements would be the more effective mood inducers. 
Since experimental demand characteristics applied equally to the 
believable and unbelievable statement induction groups it was suggested 
that experimental demand characteristies could not adequately account 
for any differences that may occur between these two groups. It was 
found that both the believable and unbelievable elation statements 
generated a significantly more positive mood than both the believable 
and unbelievable depression statements. However, the believable elation 
statements were no more effective as mood inducers than the unbelievable
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©lation statements nor were the believable depression statements more 
effective mood inducers than the unbelievable depression statements. 
Since the rationale for the self statement mood induction procedure 
suggests it is the content of the statements that is responsible for 
generating mood, the failure of this study to show the believability of 
the statements influenced their effectiveness as mood inducers tends to 
lend support to the view that the mood changes reported may reflect the 
influence of experimental demand characteristics. An alternative 
explanation was that the believability of the statements was 
idiosyncratic to subjects and, therefore, the prior statement ratings 
did not reflect the statements believability for the subjects in this 
study. This possibility was assessed in the second experiment.
The second experiment confirmed that the statement believability 
ratings were idiosyncratic to individual subjects. That is, what was a 
believable statement to one subject may be less convincing for another 
subject. When subjects were assigned to believable and unbelievable 
groups on the basis of their own ratings of the statements the 
believability of the statements tended to characterize their 
effectiveness as mood inducers.
Collectively, these two studies suggested that believability was a 
factor in determining the effectiveness of mood induction statements. 
However, because of the potential for subjects to find the statements 
unbelievable, self statements could tend to prove unreliable as a mood 
induction procedure. These results were taken to indicate that 
experimental demand characteristics were not wholly responsible for the 
mood changes reported in these studies. Therefore, it was concluded that 
these experiments provide general support for those theories that 
suggested cognitive processes are mediators of emotional response. A 
second series of studies were carried out to investigate the nature of
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these cognitive processes and the results of that work are summarized in 
the next section.
10.2 Computer Game Mood Induction Studies
The mediational role for emotion of the specific cognitive 
processes identified by cognitive learning therapists had not been 
directly assessed. The lack of direct evidence for this basic tenet of 
cognitive learning therapy was seen as being an important omission from 
the empirical support for this therapeutic approach. It was the 
objective of the current work to empirically evaluate the validity of 
this theoretical assumption. The cognitive processes seen as being 
pertinent to the mediation of emotion were classified as being either 
nonevaluative or evaluative beliefs. In Experiments 3, 4, and 5 the 
capacity of nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs as mediators of emotion 
was assessed.
The self statement mood induction methodology from the previous 
experiments was not a suitable paradigm for carrying out these 
investigations. Its weaknesses have been summarized in the previous 
section. A new methodology was needed to replace it. The strategy 
adopted utilized a computer game as a mood induction task. False 
positive and false negative feedback about subjects’ scores on the game 
was used to induce positive and negative moods respectively. There were 
three advantages to adopting this new experimental approach. First it 
was a single event which made it practical for subjects’ cognitive 
responses to be manipulated or monitored. Second it was a real rather 
than an "as if" experience which increased the probability that it would 
be seen as a believable task and, thereby, prove to be a more reliable 
mood induction procedure. Third there was less likelihood of subjects 
being aware of the experimenters intentions which reduced the risk of
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subjects* responses being a function of experimental demand 
characteristics.
In Experiment 3 subjects* belief of success or failure on the 
computer game was successfully controlled by the false feedback. This 
nonevaluative belief proved to be a limited success as a predictor of 
mood change. On the other hand, subjects*value and expectation of 
success at computer games as an evaluative belief about the experimental 
task failed to predict mood change. There were several methodological 
problems identified with this study which made it difficult to interpret 
these findings. The data from the control group suggested that there was 
an uncontrolled source of negative feedback associated with the game. 
Also, the actual method of providing feedback was thought to be 
inconsistent and the validity of the Task Evaluation Scale as a measure 
of subjects* value and expectation of success at computer games could not 
be guaranteed. Therefore, comments on the theoretical implications of 
the limited predictive capacity of nonevaluative beliefs, and the 
failure of evaluative beliefs to predict mood change were withheld until 
these possible methodological difficulties with the computer game mood 
induction procedure were clarified in the next experiment.
In Experiment 4 the methodology was revised to account for the 
problems outlined above. The computer game was changed to eliminate the 
uncontrolled negative feedback; the method of providing feedback was 
altered to improve its consistency; the Task Evaluation Scale was 
revised to monitor values and expectations separately, and additional 
scales were added to provide a validity check of the revised Task 
Evaluation Scales.
With these methodological refinements in place the computer game 
mood induction paradigm proved to be a highly successful method of 
assessing the mediational role of nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs.
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The data, from the Scores Rating Scale indicated that subjects’ 
nonevaluative beliefs had been controlled by the experimental feedback. 
That is, in spite of there being no difference between the subjects’ 
actual scores those subjects who received positive feedback believed 
that their scores were above average and those subjects who received 
negative feedback believed that their scores were below average. The 
data from the Evaluative Beliefs Scale, the Satisfaction with Scores 
Scale, and the Scores Expectation Scale tended to validate the Task 
Evaluation Scale as a measure of subjects’ value and expectation of 
success at computer games. That is, subjects in the low 
value/expectation groups tended to rate their scores as qualitatively 
better than subjects in the high value expectation groups. These results 
were taken to indicate that the current methodology had been a 
successful method of differentiating experimental groups on the basis of 
their nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs.
These cognitive variables then proved to be good predictors of 
mood. That is, what subjects believed about their scores and what they 
believed about doing well at computer games influenced their emotional 
response to playing the game. This experimental demonstration of 
cognitive variables influencing mood provided strong evidence in support 
of the cognitive raediational approach to emotion. The direct evidence of 
a mediational role was at this stage restricted to nonevaluative 
beliefs. Since evaluative beliefs had been measured but not 
experimentally manipulated the current methodology only allowed for an 
association between evaluative beliefs and emotional response to be 
established. An additional experiment was needed to determine if this 
association involved a causal relationship or only reflected a common 
involvement with a "third" factor. This issue was pursued in the next 
experiment.
190
In Experiment 5 both nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs were 
experimentally manipulated. False feedback of success or failure on a 
computer game was again employed to control nonevaluative beliefs. 
Evaluative beliefs were manipulated by also using false feedback to 
provide subjects with prior experiences of success or failure on a 
training game. The Task Evaluation Scale, Scores Rating Scale, 
Evaluative Belief Scale, Satisfaction with Scores Scale, and Scores 
Expectation Scale were again used to monitor nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs. The data from these measures confirmed that the 
experimental groups were differentiated in terms of the/r nonevaluative 
and evaluative beliefs. These variables again proved to be significant 
predictors of subjects’ emotional responses to the experimental task. 
These results provided a replication of the finding from the previous 
experiment that nonevaluative beliefs directly influenced mood. They 
also provided for the first time an empirical demonstration of 
evaluative beliefs having a direct influence on emotional response. 
These data constitute an experimental demonstration of the cognitive 
processes central to the cognitive learning therapists cognitive 
mediational model of emotion as mediators of emotion.
Having established nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs can mediate 
emotional response the question of whether these processes are merely a 
sufficient or both a sufficient and necessary condition for emotion 
remained. This question was pursued in the final series of studies.
10.3 The Mere Exposure Studies
There has been recent debate in the literature as to whether 
cognitions or emotions are the primary system (Lazarus, 1982, 1984; 
Zajonc, 1980, 1984). It has been argued in this thesis that it is an 
issue that has some theoretical relevance for the basic tenets of
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cognitive learning therapy. Arguments for the independence of affect and 
cognition or for a primary affective system are inconsistent with the 
assumptions of those therapies which attempt to modify emotional 
dysfunction by manipulating cognitive processes (Rachman, 1981).
It has been suggested that studies which claim to demonstrate that 
subjects’ can respond emotionally to stimuli that can not be recognized 
constitute evidence of emotional responses occurring in the absence of 
cognition (Zajonc, 1980, 1984). This interpretation of the evidence 
assumes that cognitive processes can not access stimuli that are not 
recognized. A series of studies were conducted to test this assumption.
In Experiment 6 the mere exposure paradigm was used in conjunction 
with experimental instructions in an attempt to manipulate subjects’ 
preferences for stimuli that were not recognized. The impact of 
instructions (nonevaluative belief) and the importance for the subject 
of the attribute being linked by the instructions to emotional 
responding (evaluative belief) were monitored. Surprisingly, the data 
failed to replicate the finding reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 
(1980) of a mere exposure effect for nonrecognized stimuli. However, the 
results indicated that when the hypothesized cognitive parameters were 
established it appeared that instructions could influence subjects’ 
emotional response to stimuli that were not recognized. This was a 
tentative conclusion because the experimental instructions used in 
Experiment 6 were only partially effective in generating the necessary 
cognitive parameters. Therefore, the results obtained here were used as 
the basis for refining the experimental instructions and the question of 
cognitions influencing emotional response to nonrecognized stimuli was 
carried forward to Experiment 8.
Before pursuing the question of the effectiveness of nonevaluative 
and evaluative beliefs as mediators of emotional response to stimuli
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that can not be recognized an attempt was made to clarify the nature of 
the effect reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). A recent report 
had suggested that the mere exposure effect which had been reported for 
stimuli that could not be recognized may be an artifact of memory 
retrieval processes (Seamon et al, 1983a). These authors suggested that 
recognition and preference judgments activated different retrieval 
processes. They further claimed that the retrieval process associated 
with preference judgments could access stimuli that had not been fully 
encoded, whereas the retrieval processes associated with recognition 
judgments could only access stimuli that had been more fully encoded. 
They concluded that the mere exposure effect for stimuli that could not 
be recognized was based on familiarity and was not a genuine affective 
judgment.
In Experiment 7 rather than nominating the stimuli they preferred 
subjects were asked to identify either the stimuli that they felt more 
positive about or the stimuli that they felt more negative about. The 
rationale was that if the mere exposure effect for stimuli that could 
not be recognized was not actually an expression of a preference but was 
merely a response bias based on familiarity, subjects should not 
discriminate between the valence of the affective judgments and nominate 
the familiar slide in both cases. The results from this study supported 
the proposition that the finding reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 
(1980) could be based on a memory retrieval process and reflect stimulus 
familiarity. Once again the results failed to replicate the finding of a 
mere exposure effect reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). While 
the current series of studies had failed to demonstrate a mere exposure 
effect for stimuli that could not be recognized there remained the 
possibility that emotional responses to such stimuli could be influenced 
by cognitive processes. This possibility was addressed in the next
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study.
In Experiment 8 the methodologies from Experiment 6 and 7 were 
combined to test the cognitive mediations!, capacity of nonevaluative and 
evaluative beliefs for stimuli that could not be recognized. The results 
from this study failed to confirm the tentative findings from Experiment 
6 of nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs influencing emotional response 
to nonrecognized stimuli. Once again there was no evidence of a mere 
exposure effect as reported by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980). The only 
experimenters to successfully replicate this effect (Seamon et al, 
1983a, 1983b) were only able to do so when the stimulus training was 
restricted to the right visual field or when stimulus shadowing was 
used.
These results were taken to indicate that the mere exposure effect 
for nonrecognized stimuli is a complex perceptual task which is 
insufficiently understood for it to be a useful basis for 
generalizations about the relationship between cognitions and emotions. 
The failure of the current work to clearly show a relationship between 
nonevaluative and evaluative beliefs and emotional response to stimuli 
that are not recognized must also be viewed within the context of the 
uncertainty about the mere exposure paradigm. Until this phenomenon is 
better understood its appropriateness as a means of assessing the 
possibility of cognitive processes influencing emotional response to 
nonrecognized stimuli will remain unclear.
The results from the mere exposure experiments conducted here must 
be seen as failing to provide evidence for either Zajonc’s (1980, 1984) 
argument of affect in the absence of cognition or of cognitions 
mediating emotional response to stimuli that are not recognized. 
Therefore, these data do not contribute to an enhanced understanding of 
the question of affective versus cognitive primacy.
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10.4 Contribution of the Current Work
During the last 20 years behaviour therapists have shown an 
increasing interest in cognitive processes. Those workers who recognized 
cognitions as a necessary element for understanding behaviour have 
contributed to the new field of cognitive behaviour therapy. Within 
cognitive behaviour therapy the different approaches have been 
classified by the different theoretical status afforded cognitions 
(Mahoney & Arakoff, 1978). One of the more promising approaches which 
postulates that cognitive processes play a mediational role in 
determining emotional and behavioural responses was identified by 
Mahoney (1974) as "cognitive learning therapy".
Cognitive learning therapy has its origins in the clinical work of 
such therapists as Beck, Ellis, Goldfried, Meichenbaum, and Mahoney. As 
a consequence of this the major thrust of the empirical work in this 
area has been on developing more effective therapeutic procedures with a 
consequent emphasis on clinical outcome research (Mahoney, 1977b). At 
the same time as cognitive learning therapy was being developed 
independent work was being carried out in the laboratory on the nature 
of the relationship between cognitions and emotions. This was in two 
parts. The first approach was an attempt to induce mood by manipulating 
cognitive variables (Alderman, 1972; Coleman, 1975; Hale & Strickland, 
1976; Velten, 1968). The second approach used cognitive methods to 
manipulate emotional response to stressful stimuli (Koriat et al, 1972; 
Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Lazarus et al, 1962; Speisman et 
al, 1964). These studies appeared to provide evidence that was generally 
supportive of the basic assumption of cognitive learning therapy that 
cognitions mediate emotion.
While there were the studies mentioned above that provided general 
support for the principle of cognitions as mediators of emotion,
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investigations to date had not focused on the specific cognitive 
processes identified by cognitive learning therapists as pertinent for 
emotion. Furthermore, recent evidence had begun to question the validity 
of the findings from the laboratory mood induction studies. In addition 
to this criticism of existing research new evidence was reported that 
questioned the generality of the cognitive mediational model (Kunst- 
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). The experiment by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) 
provided evidence of subjects responding emotionally to stimuli that 
were not available to conscious awareness. This was cited as evidence of 
emotional responses occurring in the absence of cognitive mediation 
(Zajonc, 1980, 1984).
The studies reported in this thesis addressed these theoretical 
issues. Collectively, they provide substantial support for the 
theoretical basis of cognitive learning therapy. As has been detailed 
above the first group of studies investigated the self statement mood 
induction research. The results from these studies showed that the 
recent criticism of the evidence from this kind of research did not 
provide an adequate alternative explanation for these findings. The 
second group of studies investigated the specific cognitive processes 
identified by cognitive learning therapists as pertinent for emotion and 
provided empirical evidence that these processes can mediate emotion. 
The final group of studies fell short of providing evidence for the 
necessity of cognitive processes as mediators of emotion. However, these 
studies raised sufficient concern about the evidence cited in support of 
the argument for affective primacy that these claims must be viewed with 
caution. Therefore, it would seem that the current work has provided 
empirical support for the approach to emotional distress adopted by 
cognitive learning therapists which is based on a cognitive mediational 
model of emotion.
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10.5 Directions for Future Work
The limitations of the self statement mood induction procedure and 
the uncertainty associated with the validity of the mere exposure effect 
for nonrecognized stimuli have been outlined above. Therefore, of the 
three experimental paradigms employed in this research the computer game 
mood approach has the most potential for stimulating further work. It 
would appear that worthwhile additional work could be carried out in 
three directions.
First computer games or other experimental tasks at which success 
or failure was under experimental control could be used in the 
laboratory to expand the theoretical base for cognitions as mediators of 
emotion. Such procedures could usefully examine the mediational 
potential of other cognitive processes, tease out the individual 
contributions of particular cognitive processes, and further explore the 
possibility of positive and negative emotions responding to different 
cognitive events.
The second possibility would be to move out of the laboratory and 
assess the principles developed there with real life issues. Tapping 
real life issues would provide the opportunity to work with more 
strongly held evaluative beliefs than are likely to be available for 
laboratory tasks. Under these conditions a separation of processes like 
value and expectation may be more viable.
The final possibility would be to apply the theoretical principles 
developed here to clinical populations. A combination of process and 
outcome research techniques could be used to assess whether cognitive 
learning therapy procedures actually influence the cognitive processes 
thought to be responsible for generating clinical outcomes with clients 
experiencing emotional distress. Research of this nature would provide 
the ultimate test of the theoretical assumptions of cognitive learning
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therapy.
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APPENDIX A-l
The Believability Rating of 60 Elation and 60 Depression 
Self-Referent Statements (Velten, 1968).
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 62 second year administration students at the 
Canberra College of Advanced Education. Their age ranged from 18 years 
to 48 years with a mean age of 26.8 years. There were 32 males and 30 
females. All subjects were volunteers and course credit was not 
available for participation.
Materials
Subjects were given a booklet containing the experimental 
instructions, a Profile of Mood States (POMS), the 119 mood induction 
statements (there is one statement common to both sets) and the 
statement rating scales.
Procedure
Subjects were provided with a test booklet and asked to record 
their age and sex and to then complete the POMS. Subjects were then 
asked to read the following experimental instructions which were then 
read aloud by the experimenter:
This questionnaire is part of a research project which is 
evaluating techniques used to investigate emotions.
Various combinations of the following statements are used by 
researchers to artificially induce different mood states.
The statements are presented to subjects one at a time and the 
subject is asked to attempt to experience the feeling 
suggested by the statement.
Your task is to read each statement and to rate to what extent 
you believe it is a statement subjects could respond to
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e m o t i o n a l l y  b y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e  f e e l i n g  s u g g e s t e d  i n  i t .  T h a t  
i s ,  how b e l i e v a b l e  i t  w o u ld  b e  a s  a  mood i n d u c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t .
To r a t e  t h e  b e l i e v a b i l i t y  o f  e a c h  mood s t a t e m e n t  p l a c e  a  
c i r c l e  a r o u n d  t h e  n u m b er a b o v e  t h e  w o rd  w h ic h  m o s t c l o s e l y  
d e s c r i b e s  w h a t y o u  t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t .
F o r  e x a m p le , i f  y o u  th o u g h t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t
" T h is  i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  d a y  o f  my l i f e "
w as e x t r e m e ly  b e l i e v a b l e  ( i . e .  y o u  b e l i e v e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  i s  
o n e  s u b j e c t s  c o u l d  r e s p o n d  t o  e m o t i o n a l l y  b y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e  
f e e l i n g  e x p r e s s e d  i n  i t )  t h e n  y o u  w o u ld  r a t e  i t  a s  f o l l o w s :
d ?  ■ 3 4 5 6 1
extreaely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
H o w ev er, i f  y o u  th o u g h t  i t  w as a n  e x t r e m e ly  u n b e l i e v a b l e  mood 
s t a t e m e n t  ( i . e .  y o u  d o n ’ t  b e l i e v e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  i s  o n e  
s u b j e c t s  c o u l d  r e s p o n d  t o  e m o t i o n a l l y  b y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  th e  
f e e l i n g  e x p r e s s e d  i n  i t )  t h e n  y o u  w o u ld  r a t e  i t :
1 2 3 4 5 6 &
extreaely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
I f  y o u  r e a l l y  c a n n o t  d e c id e  how b e l i e v a b l e / u n b e l i e v a b l e  i t  w as 
a s  a  mood s t a t e m e n t  t h e n  you  w o u ld  r a t e  i t :
extreaely soaewhat soaewhat extreaely
believable believable believable neither unbelievable unbelievable unbelievable
I f  t h e r e  i s n ’ t  a  w o rd  t h a t  e x a c t l y  r e p r e s e n t s  how y o u  w o u ld  
r a t e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  c i r c l e  t h e  n u m b er a b o v e  t h e  w o rd  t h a t  i s  
c l o s e s t  t o  y o u r  e v a l u a t i o n .
T h e re  a r e  no  r i g h t  o r  w rong  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  b u t  
i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  y o u  a n s w e r  a s  t r u t h f u l l y  a n d  a s  a c c u r a t e l y  a s  
y o u  c a n .
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Make Bure you respond to all the statements and only circle 
one number for each statement.
Remember, your task is to rate how believable the statements 
were for you as mood induction statements not how well the 
statement describes your current feeling.
After the instructions had been read and questions answered 
subjects were asked to rate the statements.
After the statements had been rated subjects were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation in the experiment.
Results
The average ratings of the elation statements ranged from 2.5 to 
5.0 and for the depression statements from 2.4 to 4.8.
The 20 lowest rated (most believable) elation statements had a mean 
rating of 2.9 and the 20 lowest rated depression statements a mean 
rating of 3.05.
The 20 highest rated (least believable) elation statements had a 
mean rating of 3.86 and the 20 lowest rating depression statements a 
mean rating of 4.21.
The mean believability rating of the individual statements from the 
four experimental may be seen in Table 54.
A oneway analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for 
believability rating between statement sets, F(3,76) = 103.7, p<.0000.
Contrasts between the S^fs found the believable elation and depression 
statements to be significantly more believable than the unbelievable 
elation and depression statements, t(76) = 10.7, p<.000 and t(76) =
13.4, p<.000 respectively. There was no difference between the
believable elation and depression statements. The difference between the 
unbelievable elation and depression statements was significant, t(76) = 
4.3, p<.000. The unbelievable depression statements were less believable 
than the unbelievable elation statements.
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Table 54
Stateaent believability ratings for the believable elation and depression and 
the unbelievable elation and depression stateaent sets.
Mood induction Stateaent Valance
Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Elation Elation Depression Depression
Stateaent
Nuaber H H M M
1. 3.03 3.63 3.03 4.34
2. 2.52 3.56 2.68 4.23
3. 3.02 3.82 2.71 3.98
4. 2.60 3.77 2.52 3.98
5. 3.05 4.95 2.74 4.10
6. 2.89 4.05 3.02 4.10
7. 2.74 3.77 2.40 4.11
8. 2.95 3.43 2.87 4.07
9. 3.03 3.45 3.39 4.12
10. 2.92 3.97 3.08 4.23
11. 2.94 3.69 3.10 4.11
12. 3.05 3.66 3.15 4.16
13. 2.69 3.41 3.26 4.27
14. 2.94 4.27 3.44 4.11
15. 3.00 4.27 3.39 4.30
16. 2.98 4.16 3.00 4.03
17. 3.03 3.66 3.44 4.11
18. 2.77 3.66 2.95 4.79
19. 2.90 3.77 3.39 4.69
20. 3.00 3.77 3.35 4.36
Mean 2.90 3.83 3.05 4.21
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Discussion
The statement ratings clearly show that the statements have a 
differential cognitive impact on subjects. The believable statement sets 
are more acceptable to subjects than the unbelievable statements. 
However, the statement ratings are skewed toward the believable end of 
the 7 point scale such that while the believable statement sets are 
clearly in that range the unbelievable statement sets are more towards 
being neither believable nor unbelievable than actually unbelievable.
Therefore, it is likely that all the statements will act as mood 
inducers but the believable statements should be more powerful than the 
unbelievable ones.
217
APPENDIX A-2
Believable Elation Mood Induction Statements.
Card A.
THE NEXT CARD WILL BEGIN THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS. I WILL READ THE 
STATEMENTS TO MYSELF, THEN I WILL TRY TO EXPERIENCE THE MOOD AS WELL AS 
I CAN UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER INDICATES TO MOVE ON TO THE NEXT CARD. I 
WILL TRY TO BUILD MY MOOD AS I GO THROUGH THE CARDS.
Card 1.
TODAY IS NEITHER BETTER NOR WORSE THAN ANY OTHER DAY.
Card 2.
I DO FEEL PRETTY GOOD TODAY, THOUGH.
Card 3.
IF YOUR ATTITUDE IS GOOD, THEN THINGS ARE GOOD, AND MY ATTITUDE IS
GOOD.
Card 4.
I FEEL CHEERFUL AND LIVELY.
Card 5.
MY JUDGEMENT ABOUT MOST THINGS IS SOUND.
Card 6.
IF I SET MY MIND TO IT, I CAN MAKE THINGS TURN OUT FINE. 
Card 7.
I FEEL ENTHUSIASTIC AND CONFIDENT NOW.
Card 8.
MY FAVOURITE SONG KEEPS GOING THROUGH MY HEAD.
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Card 9
SOME OF MY FRIENDS ARE SO LIVELY AND OPTIMISTIC. 
Card 10.
I’M ABLE TO DO THINGS ACCURATELY AND EFFICIENTLY.
Card 11.
I KNOW GOOD AND WELL THAT I CAN ACHIEVE THE GOALS I SET.
Card 12.
I’M OPTIMISTIC THAT I CAN GET ALONG VERY WELL WITH MOST OF THE 
PEOPLE I MEET.
Card 13.
I’M FEELING AMAZINGLY GOOD TODAY.
Card 14.
THINGS LOOK GOOD— THINGS LOOK GREAT!
Card 15.
I FEEL THAT MANY OF MY FRIENDSHIPS WILL STICK WITH ME IN THE 
FUTURE.
Card 16.
LIFE IS SO MUCH FUN IT SEEMS TO OFFER SO MANY SOURCES OF 
FULFILLMENT.
Card 17.
I WISH SOMEONE WOULD PLAY SOME GOOD LOUD MUSIC.
Card 18.
I’M FULL OF ENERGY.
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Card 19
GOD, I FEEL GREAT!
Card 20.
MY PARENTS ARE PRETTY PROUD OF ME MOST OF THE TIME.
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APPENDIX A-3
Unbelievable Elation Mood Induction Statements.
Card A.
THE NEXT CARD WILL BEGIN THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS. I WILL READ THE 
STATEMENTS TO MYSELF, THEN I WILL TRY TO EXPERIENCE THE MOOD AS WELL AS 
I CAN UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER INDICATES TO MOVE ON TO THE NEXT CARD. I 
WILL TRY TO BUILD MY MOOD AS I GO THROUGH THE CARDS.
Card 1.
I FEEL LIGHT HEARTED.
Card 2.
THIS MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE ONE OF MY GOOD DAYS.
Card 3.
ON THE WHOLE I HAVE VERY LITTLE DIFFICULTY THINKING CLEARLY.
Card 4.
I’M GLAD I’M IN COLLEGE— IT’S THE KEY TO SUCCESS NOWDAYS.
Card 5.
IT’S ENCOURAGING THAT AS I GET FURTHER INTO MY MAJOR, IT’S GOING TO 
TAKE LESS STUDY TO GET GOOD GRADES.
Card 6.
I’M FULL OF ENERGY AND AMBITION— I FEEL LIKE I COULD GO A LONG TIME 
WITHOUT SLEEP.
Card 7.
THIS IS ONE OF THOSE DAYS WHEN I CAN GRIND OUT CLASSWORK WITH 
PRACTICALLY NO EFFORT AT ALL.
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Card 8
MY JUDGEMENT IS KEEN AND PRECISE TODAY— JUST LET SOMEONE TRY TO PUT 
SOMETHING OVER ON ME.
Card 9.
NOW THAT IT OCCURS TO ME, MOST OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE DEPRESSED ME 
WOULDN’T HAVE IF I’D JUST HAD THE RIGHT ATTITUDE.
Card 10.
I KNOW THAT IN THE FUTURE I WON’T OVER-EMPHASIZE SO-CALLED 
"PROBLEMS”.
Card 11.
I’M TO ABSORBED IN THINGS TO HAVE TIME FOR WORRY.
Card 12.
I AM PARTICULARLY INVENTIVE AND RESOURCEFUL IN THIS MOOD.
Card 13.
I FEEL SUPERB! I THINK 10 CAN WORK TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.
Card 14.
I FEEL SO GAY AND PLAYFUL TODAY. I FEEL LIKE SURPRISING SOMEONE BY 
TELLING A SILLY JOKE.
Card 15.
I FEEL AN EXHILARATING ANIMATION IN ALL I DO.
Card 16.
MY MEMORY IS IN RARE FORM TODAY.
Card 17.
I CAN CONCENTRATE HARD ON ANYTHING I DO.
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Card 18.
THINGS WILL BE BETTER AND BETTER TODAY.
Card 19.
I CAN MAKE DECISIONS RAPIDLY AND CORRECTLY; AND I CAN DEFEND THEM 
AGAINST CRITICISM EASILY.
Card 20.
I FEEL LIKE BURSTING WITH LAUGHTER— I WISH SOMEBODY WOULD TELL A 
JOKE AND GIVE ME AN EXCUSE!
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APPENDIX A-4
Believable Depression Mood Statements.
Card A.
THE NEXT CARD WILL BEGIN THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS. I WILL READ THE 
STATEMENTS TO MYSELF, THEN I WILL TRY TO EXPERIENCE THE MOOD AS WELL AS 
I CAN UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER INDICATES TO MOVE ON TO THE NEXT CARD. I 
WILL TRY TO BUILD MY MOOD AS I GO THROUGH THE CARDS.
Card 1.
TODAY IS NEITHER BETTER NOR WORSE THAN ANY OTHER DAY.
Card 2.
HOWEVER, I FEEL A LITTLE LOW TODAY.
Card 3.
I FEEL RATHER SLUGGISH NOW.
Card 4.
SOME TIMES I WONDER WHETHER COLLEGE IS ALL THAT WORTHWHILE.
Card 5.
EVERY NOW AND THEN I FEEL SO TIRED AND GLOOMY THAT I’D RATHER JUST 
SIT THAN DO ANYTHING.
Card 6.
I CAN REMEMBER TIMES WHEN EVERYONE BUT ME SEEMED FULL OF ENERGY. 
Card 7.
TOO OFTEN I HAVE FOUND MYSELF STARING LISTLESSLY INTO THE DISTANCE, 
MY MIND A BLANK, WHEN I DEFINITELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN STUDYING.
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Card 8.
I’VE HAD SOME IMPORTANT DECISIONS TO MAKE IN THE PAST, AND I’VE 
SOMETIMES MADE THE WRONG ONES.
Card 9.
PERHAPS COLLEGE TAKES MORE TIME, EFFORT, AND MONEY THAN IT’S WORTH. 
Card 10.
I’M AFRAID THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR MAY GET A LOT WORSE.
Card 11.
THERE HAVE BEEN DAYS WHEN I HAVE FELT WEAK AND CONFUSED, AND 
EVERYTHING WENT MISERABLY WRONG.
Card 12.
I FEEL TERRIBLY TIRED AND INDIFFERENT TO THINGS TODAY.
Card 13.
I’M BEGINNING TO FEEL SLEEPY, MY THOUGHTS ARE DRIFTING.
Card 14.
MY LIFE IS SO TIRESOME-- THE SAME OLD THING DAY AFTER DAY DEPRESSES
ME.
Card 15.
I WANT TO GO TO SLEEP-- 1 FEEL LIKE JUST CLOSING MY EYES AND GOING
TO SLEEP RIGHT HERE.
Card 16.
I FEEL TIRED AND DEPRESSED; I DON’T FEEL LIKE WORKING ON THE THINGS 
I KNOW I MUST GET DONE.
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Card 17
I’VE FELT SO ALONE BEFORE, THAT I COULD HAVE CRIED.
Card 18.
I’M SO TIRED.
Card 19.
I DON’T WANT TO DO ANYTHING.
Card 20.
I’M UNCERTAIN ABOUT MY FUTURE.
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APPENDIX A-5
Unbelievable Depression Mood Statements.
Card A.
THE NEXT CARD WILL BEGIN THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS. I WILL READ THE 
STATEMENTS TO MYSELF, THEN I WILL TRY TO EXPERIENCE THE MOOD AS WELL AS 
I CAN UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER INDICATES TO MOVE ON TO THE NEXT CARD. I 
WILL TRY TO BUILD MY MOOD AS I GO THROUGH THE CARDS.
Card 1.
IT HAS OCCURRED TO ME MORE THAN ONCE THAT STUDY IS BASICALLY 
USELESS, BECAUSE YOU FORGET ALMOST EVERYTHING YOU LEARN ANYWAY.
Card 2.
I'M ASHAMED THAT I’VE CAUSED MY PARENTS NEEDLESS WORRY.
Card 3.
JUST TO STAND UP WOULD TAKE A BIG EFFORT.
Card 4.
I JUST CAN'T MAKE UP MY MIND; IT’S SO HARD TO MAKE SIMPLE 
DECISIONS.
Card 5.
I’VE LAIN AWAKE AT NIGHT WORRYING SO LONG THAT I HATED MYSELF.
Card 6.
THE WAY I FEEL NOW, THE FUTURE LOOKS BORING AND HOPELESS.
Card 7.
SOME VERY IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO MAKE.
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Card 8
I HAVE THE FEELING THAT I JUST CAN’T REACH PEOPLE.
Card 9.
THINGS ARE EASIER AND BETTER FOR OTHER PEOPLE THAN FOR ME - I FEEL 
LIKE THERE IS NO USE IN TRYING AGAIN.
Card 10.
IT TAKES TO MUCH EFFORT TO CONVINCE PEOPLE OF ANYTHING.
Card 11.
MY THOUGHTS ARE SO SLOW AND DOWNCAST I DON’T WANT TO THINK OR TALK. 
Card 12.
I JUST DON’T CARE ABOUT ANYTHING - LIFE JUST ISN’T ANY FUN.
Card 13.
LIFE SEEMS TOO MUCH FOR ME ANYHOW---MY EFFORTS ARE WASTED.
Card 14.
I DON’T CONCENTRATE OR MOVE, I JUST WANT TO FORGET ABOUT 
EVERYTHING.
Card 15.
I HAVE TOO MANY BAD THINGS IN MY LIFE.
Card 16.
EVERYTHING SEEMS UTTERLY FUTILE AND EMPTY.
Card 17.
I FEEL DIZZY AND FAINT - I NEED TO PUT MY HEAD DOWN AND NOT MOVE.
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Card 18
ALL OF THE UNHAPPINESS OF MY PAST LIFE IS TAKING POSSESSION OF ME. 
Card 19.
I WANT TO GO TO SLEEP AND NEVER WAKE UP.
Card 20.
MY PARENTS NEVER REALLY TRIED TO UNDERSTAND ME.
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APPENDIX A-6
Neutral Mood Induction Statements.
Card A.
THE NEXT CARD WILL BEGIN THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS. I WILL READ THE 
STATEMENTS TO MYSELF, THEN I WILL TRY TO EXPERIENCE THE MOOD AS WELL AS 
I CAN UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER INDICATES TO MOVE ON TO THE NEXT CARD. I 
WILL TRY TO BUILD MY MOOD AS I GO THROUGH THE CARDS.
Card 1.
AT THE END APPEARS A SECTION ENTITLED "BIBLIOGRAPHY NOTES".
Card 2.
THIS BOOK OR ANY PART THEREOF MUST NOT BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM. 
Card 3.
SATURN IS SOMETIMES IN CONJUNCTION, BEYOND THE SUN FROM THE EARTH, 
AND IS NOT VISIBLE.
Card 4.
SOME STREETS WERE STILL SAID TO BE LISTED UNDER THEIR OLD NAMES. 
Card 5.
MANY STATES SUPPLY MILK FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN.
Card 6.
THE ORIENT EXPRESS TRAVELS BETWEEN PARIS AND ISTANBUL.
Card 7.
THE SHIP WAS ANCIENT AND WOULD SOON BE RETIRED FROM THE FLEET.
Card 8.
THERE ARE SOME FORMS IN WHICH NO OATH IS REQUIRED.
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Card 9
TWO MEN DRESSED AS REPAIRMEN WILL APPEAR SHORTLY AFTER THE VAN 
PULLS UP.
Card 10.
PAINTING IN A FEW OTHER NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IS TREATED IN A 
SEPARATE VOLUME.
Card 11.
THE NAMES ON THE CHRISTMAS MAILING LIST ARE ALPHABETICALLY ORDERED. 
Card 12.
THE MAGAZINE’S REPORT WAS SLANTED, AS USUAL.
Card 13.
BLACK AND WHITE PICTURES ARE ARRANGED IN TEN SECTIONS.
Card 14.
THE NOTICE MADE IT CLEAR THAT COFFEE BREAKS WERE BEING LIMITED.
Card 15.
BOEING’S MAIN PLANT IN SEATLE EMPLOYS 35,000 PEOPLE.
Card 16.
THE ORGANIZATION DEPENDED ON THE PEOPLE FOR SUPPORT.
Card 17.
IT ALL FITTED IN WITH THE OFFICER’S STORY.
Card 18.
THE MANSION WAS RENTED BY THE DELEGATION.
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Card 19.
THE CHINESE LANGUAGE HAS MANY DIALECTS, INCLUDING CANTONESE, 
MANDARIN, AND WU.
Card 20.
A FREE SAMPLE WILL BE GIVEN TO EACH PERSON WHO ENTERS THE STORE.
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APPENDIX B-l
Task Evaluation Scale
Instructions
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by placing a circle around the number 
that best represents your degree of agreement.
A circle around number one (1) indicates you strongly agree 
with the statement and a circle around number seven (7) 
indicates you strongly disagree with the statement. The other 
five numbers represent equal gradations between strongly agree 
and strongly disagree.
Scale Items
1. I enjoy the challenge of video games.
2. I never try hard at video games.
3. I can usually do quite well at things like video games.
4. How well I score on video games is not very important to me.
5. I’m usually not very good at things like video games.
6. I like to score as well as I can when I play video games.
7. How well I score on this video game is not important to me.
8. I want to do as well as I can on this video game.
Each item was followed by a seven point rating scale like the one 
below.
Strongly : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Strongly
Agree Disagree
Scale Analysis
The scale reliability was assessed with an item total correlational 
analysis. The Task Evaluation Scale had an alpha reliability coefficient
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of .769 and a honogeneity ratio of .296. The individual item total 
correlations ranged from .4 to .58 (see Table 55).
Table 55
Item Total Correlations for the Task Evaluation Scale
Item Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mean 3.98 4.62 3.34 2.86 3.86 5.09 3.55 5.14
Standard
Deviation
1.87 1.97 1.44 1.80 1.56 1.70 1.68 1.63
Correlation .51 .43 .52 .52 .58 .40 .42 .40
Note: Item Numbers 3, 5, 6, and 8 are reverse score items.
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APPENDIX B-2
Please answer the following questions about participating in the
Post Test Questionnaire
experiment.
1. Did you find the experiment:
(a) Tiring.... Yes____No
(b) Was it difficult to maintain concentration....  Yes___ No
(c) Was the computer equipment uncomfortable
to use.... Yes____No
(d) Any other comments:
2. I would rate my current scores on this video game as: (tick one)
(a) much better than average.... ...
(b) better than average.... ...
(c ) average.... ...
(d) worse than average.... ...
(e) much worse than average.... ...
You have now finished. Thank you for participating in the study,
your help has been greatly appreciated.
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APPENDIX C-l
Revised Task Evaluation Scale
TES (Value) Items
1. I usually try hard when I play video games.
2. I like to score better than other people when I play video games.
3. Scoring well on video games usually requires more effort than I am 
prepared to give. (R)
4. How successful I am at video games does not interest me.
5. Doing well at video games is reasonably important to me whenever I 
play.
6. Being able to score well at video games is not an ability I value 
very rauch. (R)
7. I usually lose interest in playing a video game before I become good 
at it. (R)
TES (Expectation) Items
1. I am usually easily bored by video games. (R)
2. I am usually quite good at things like video games.
3. Video games are usually exciting to play.
4. I usually manage to get by at things like video games.
5. I usually don’t understand the point of things like video games. (R)
6. I usually manage to work out how to do OK at things like video games.
7. My scores on video games are usually fairly low.
Note: (R) indicates reverse score item.
Scale Analysis
The revised Task Evaluation Scales were piloted on 182 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education. Both the TES (Value) and TES (Expectation) scales provided 
reliable indices of evaluative beliefs. Their alpha reliability
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coefficients were .843 and .787 respectively and their homogeneity
ratios were .439 and .349 respectively. The individual item total 
correlations ranged from .53 to .63 for the TES (Value) scale and from 
.40 to .64 for the TES (Expectation) scale (see Table 56).
Table 56
Item Total Correlations for the Revised Task Evaluation Scales
Item Number
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TES (Value)
Mean 2.66 2.95 3.96 4.47 4.51 5.41 4.41
Standard 1.52 1.61 1.91 1.86 1.84 1.72 2.08
Deviation
Correlation .59 .62 .53 .63 .62 .61 .61
TES (Expectation)
Mean 4.35 4.07 3.77 3.10 3.46 3.24 4.18
Standard 1.91 1.58 1.69 1.41 1.84 1.53 1.80
Deviation
Correlation .42 .64 .58 .40 .49 .52 .58
Note: The reverse score items for TES (Value) are 3, 4, 6, and 7 and
for TES (Expectation) are 1, 5, and 7.
237
APPENDIX C-2
Evaluative Beliefs Scale
Scale Analysis
The scale reliability was assessed with an item total correlational 
analysis. The Evaluative Beliefs Scale had a alpha reliability 
coefficient of .704. The individual item total correlations ranged fron 
.19 to .61 (see Table 57).
Table 57
Item Total Correlations for the Evaluative Beliefs Scale
Item Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean 4.12 2.98 3.28 4.16 4.07 4.74 3.15
Standard 1.91 1.85 1.83 1.79 2.10 1.72 1.64
Deviation
Correlation .53 .31 .19 .38 .61 .47 .42
Note: Item Numbers 2, 3, 5, and 7 are reverse score items.
Scale Items
The Evaluative Beliefs Scale items are listed in Appendix C-3.
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APPENDIX C-3
Revised Post Test Questionnaire
Instructions:
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by placing a circle around the number that best represents 
your degree of agreement.
Circle (1) 
Circle (2) 
Circle (3) 
Circle (4) 
Circle (5) 
Circle (6) 
Circle (7)
if you STRONGLY AGREE
if you MODERATELY AGREE
if you SLIGHTLY AGREE
if you NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
if you SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
if you MODERATELY DISAGREE
if you STRONGLY DISAGREE
It is not necessary to think over any item for very long. Mark your 
answer quickly and go on to the next statement.
Be sure to indicate how you actually feel about the statement, not how 
you think you should feel.
Try to avoid the neutral response (4) els much as possible. Select this 
answer only if you really cannot decide whether you tend to agree or 
disagree with the statement.
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Each item was presented with a seven point rating scale as shown below.
Strongly Strongly
: l : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 :
Agree Disagree
The items were!
1. My scores on this game were better than I expected.
2. I would rather other people did not know my scores on this game. (R)
3. My scores on this game reflect a low level of achievement. (R)
4. I believe I should have scored better on this game. (R)
5. The standard of my scores on this game was high.
6. I hope I get scores like these the next time I play a video game.
7. I think I could score better on this game. (R)
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Instructions:
Please answer the following questions by using the rating scales 
provided. Again, circle the number above the label on each scale that 
best describes your position.
1. I think my scores on this video game were:
Better than Worse than
AVERAGE : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : AVERAGE
very somewhat somewhat very
much much average much much
2. Please rate how satisfied you were with your scores on this video 
game.
SATISFIED: 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : DISSATISFIED
quite unsure quite
extremely somewhat somewhat extremely
3. Please rate how your scores on this video game compared to your 
expectations.
Better than
EXPECTED : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6
very somewhat somewhat
much much average much
_7__
very
much
Worse than 
EXPECTED
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4. What were the main reasons you were SATISFIED/DISSATISFIED with your
scores on this game.
5. Any other comments.
APPENDIX C-4
Scores Feedback Rating Sheet
Positive Feedback
SCORE SHEET
YOUR SCORE WAS: " XX "
VERY GOOD ...
G O O D .......
O K .........
AVERAGE ....
BELOW AVERAGE
POOR .......
VERY POOR ...
60 - 69 
50 - 59 
30 - 49 
20 - 29 
10 - 19 
0 - 9
Negative Feedback
SCORE SHEET
YOUR SCORE WAS: " XXX "
VERY GOOD ...
G O O D .......
O K .........
AVERAGE ....
BELOW AVERAGE
P O O R .......
VERY POOR ...
160 +
155 - 159 
150 - 154 
140 - 149 
125 - 139 
<- 75 - 124
0 - 7 4
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APPENDIX D-l
Association Values and Preference Ratings of the Stimulus Südes. 
Subjects
The 60 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 200 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra college of Advanced 
Education. Their age ranged form 17 to 48 years with a mean age of 23.65 
years. None of the subjects had previously taken part in an experiment 
involving any of the experimental material. The students who were 
subjects in the experiment received course credit for their 
participation.
Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were 80 stimulus slides of randomly generated 
10 point solid black on white shapes. The random generation procedure 
used was described by Vanderplas and Garvin (1959). The 10 point shapes 
were chosen because they represent a level of complexity that is in the 
average processing range of university students (Munsinger & Kessen, 
1964). It is thought that levels of stimulus complexity that are outside 
subjects processing capacity are also likely to be outside their 
judgmental capacity (Baltes & Wender, 1971). The appropriateness of 10 
point shapes for university student subject populations has been 
demonstrated by a study that found that these subjects' affective 
responses are maximized for 10 point shapes (Hamid, 1972). Furthermore, 
the mere exposure effect has been reported for these type of stimuli 
(Hamid, 1972; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980).
Equipment. The stimuli were projected on to a lecture room 
projection screen using the same projection equipment described in 
Experiment 6.
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Data record sheets. Subjects responses for each slide were
recorded on the following data record sheet.
1. (a) Remind you of something Yes___No__
(b) If possible what _________________
(c) :_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :_______
like somewhat neither somewhat dislike 
like dislike
Procedure
All 60 subjects were seated in a lecture theater and issued a 
booklet containing the experimental instructions, practice response 
sheet, and data record sheets. Subjects were asked to read the following 
instructions which were then read aloud by the experimenter.
I am investigating the rational behind techniques used in 
advertising. Initially, I need some people to help me evaluate 
the stimuli I am going to use in my research. This will 
involve looking at some slides and filling in some rating 
scales.
The slides will be of a variety of shapes. Each slide 
will be presented for only a brief time so you will need to 
concentrate on the screen when each slide is about to appear.
Some of the shapes may remind you of a familiar object or 
situation while others may not remind you of anything.
Therefore, after you have looked at each shape place a 
tick (/) either in the box marked "Yes" (if the shape reminded 
you of something) or in the box marked "No" (if it didn’t).
You must tick either "Yes" or "No" for every shape.
If the shape reminds you of something that you can 
describe in a word or two please write it down in the space 
provided. Sometimes you may not be able to decide what a shape 
reminds you of or you may not be able to describe it in just a 
word or two. If this happens just place a tick in the box 
marked "yes" and leave the description space blank.
Finally, rate your impression of each shape on the 
like/dislike scale provided. To do this place a cross on the 
line in the space above the word(s) that best represent(s) 
your degree of liking or dislike for the shape.
Work rapidly. There are no right or wrong answers. The 
impression you have of the particular shape is what is
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required. Don’t puzzle over individual shapes or worry about 
being consistent in your judgments. Often a vague impression 
is all you will have to go on so just indicate your first 
reaction when making each judgment.
Make sure you answer for every slide and make sure the 
slide number corresponds with the number in the answer 
booklet.
I will give the signal "Ready" just before each shape 
appears so you will know when to expect it.
Any Questions ? There are two practice slides before we 
begin so turn to the next page now.
The first practice slide was then presented on the screen. The 
exposure time was 1 second. Subjects were then assisted in making the 
three judgments on the following more detailed response sheet.
Indicate if the shape reminds you of something or not by 
placing a (/) in the appropriate box.
Yes No
If possible write down what the shape reminds you of
Place a cross on the in the space above the word(s) that 
best represent(s) your degree of liking or dislike for the 
shape.
like somewhat neither somewhat dislike 
like dislike
When all subjects were satisfied they understood the task the 
second practice slide was presented on the screen and subjects recorded 
their responses on a second practice response sheet. Subjects were then 
introduced to the abbreviated response sheet (see above) and the 80 
experimental stimuli were presented sequentially for rating.
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Results
The association value for each stimuli was calculated. The 
association value is the percentage of subjects who indicated the slide 
reminded them of something. The stimuli were rank ordered by association 
value and the 40 stimuli with the lowest association value were chosen 
to be stimuli for the current experimentation. These stimuli were then 
numbered from 1 to 40 (see Figures 2 and 3). Their association values 
ranged from 25.0 to 51.6 per cent (see Table 58).
The mean preference rating for each of these stimuli was also 
calculated. Preference ratings ranged from 2.4 to 3.42 on the 5 point 
like/dislike scale (see Table 58).
The stimulus slides were the assigned to stimulus set A or B as is 
shown in Table 59. The slides assigned to stimulus sets A and B were 
then assigned a ranking based on their mean preference ratings (see 
Table 59).
Each slide from set A was paired with a slide from set B on the 
basis of their preference ranking. The stimulus sets A and B were sub 
divided into the sub sets A1 and A2, B1 and B2 (see Table 60).
A one-way analysis of variance revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the mean association values and the mean 
preference ratings for the four stimulus sub sets (see Table 61).
A pilot study was conducted to compare the level of recognition of 
the stimulus sub sets. That is, sub set A1 was compared to sub set A2 
and sub set B1 was compared to sub set B2 (see Appendix D-2).
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Table 58
Table of Stiiuli Association Values and Hean Preference Ratings
Slide
Ho.
Association
Value
Preference
Rating
Slide
Ho.
Association
Value
Preference
Rating
1. 25.0 2.98 21. 40.0 3.10
2. 26.6 3.01 22. 41.6 2.80
3. 30.0 2.90 23. 41.6 2.93
4. 30.0 3.12 24. 41.6 2.88
5. 31.6 3.13 25. 41.6 2.95
6. 31.6 2.90 26. 45.0 2.75
7. 33.3 3.42 27. 45.0 3.05
8. 33.3 2.77 28. 46.6 2.68
9. 33.3 2.97 29. 46.6 2.82
10. 33.3 2.77 30. 46.6 2.82
11. 35.0 3.03 31. 46.6 2.40
12. 35.0 3.15 32. 48.3 2.77
13. 35.0 3.07 33. 48.3 2.88
14. 35.0 3.07 34. 48.3 2.90
15. 35.0 2.93 35. 48.3 2.65
16. 36.6 2.92 36. 48.3 2.65
17. 36.6 2.98 37. 48.3 3.13
18. 38.3 2.85 38. 51.6 2.67
19. 38.3 2.93 39. 51.6 2.73
20. 40.0 2.80 40. 51.6 2.67
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Figure 2. Stimulus slides 1 to 20 numbered from left to right and down 
the page.
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Figure 3. Stimulus slides 21 to 40 numbered from left to right and down 
the page
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Table 59
Stimulus Slides Assigned Sets A and B and their Preference Ranking
Stimulus Set A Stimulus Set B
Slide No. Ranking. Slide No. Ranking.
1 . 7 2. 5
4. 4 3. 9
5. 2 6. 10
8. 16 7. 1
9. 9 10. 15
12. 1 11. 4
13. 6 14. 2
16. 11 15. 6
17. 8 18. 12
20. 15 19. 7
21. 5 22. 14
24. 12 23. 8
25. 10 26. 16
28. 18 27. 3
29. 14 30. 13
32. 17 31. 20
33. 13 34. 11
36. 20 35. 19
37. 3 38. 18
40. 19 39. 17
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Table 60
Table of Slide Numbers Assigned Stimulus Sub Sets and Slide Pairings
Slide Pair
Stimulus Slide Sub Sets
A1 B1 A2 B2
1. 1. 19. 4. 11.
2. 8. 26. 5. 14.
3. 9. 3. 12. 23.
4. 16. 7. 13. 15.
5. 17. 34. 20. 10.
6. 24. 18. 21. 2.
7. 25. 6. 28. 38.
8. 32. 39. 29. 22.
9. 33. 30. 36. 31.
10. 40. 35. 37. 27.
Table 61
Mean Association Values and Preference Ratings for the Stimulus Sub Sets
Stimulus Association Preference
Sub Set Value Rating
A1 39.62 2.88
A2 40.14 2.97
Total 39.88 2.92
B1 41.13 2.89
B2 39.13 2.87
Total 40.13 2.88
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APPENDIX D-2
Pilot Study 1
Method
Subjects
The 24 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 180 first year 
psychology students at the Australian National University. They had not 
previously participated in any experiment using these experimental 
materials. Their age ranged from 17 to 45 years with a mean age of 25.25 
years. There were 11 males and 13 females. The students who volunteered 
received course credit for participating in the experiment.
Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were the stimulus sets A and B described in 
Appendix D-1.
Equipment. The projection and slide viewing equipment described in 
Experiment 6 was used here.
Data record sheets. Subjects recorded their responses on the data 
record sheets described in Experiment 6.
Procedure
Subject were randomly assigned to either stimulus set A or B as the 
training stimuli. The procedure was then the same as that used for the 
nonrecognition no instruction control subjects in Experiment 6.
Results
A two-way analysis of variance was used to analyze the data. The
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results are outlined below.
Effect of Stimulus Slide Set
There was no significant difference between the two stimulus slide 
sets A and B for the number of trained stimuli selected by either 
recognition or preference judgments. Furthermore, the mean number of 
trained stimuli selected was not significantly different to chance for 
either recognition or preference judgments for either stimulus set (see 
Table 62).
Effect of Stimulus Sub Set
There was no significant difference between the stimulus slide sub 
sets for the number of trained stimuli selected by either recognition or 
preference judgments. The mean number of trained stimuli selected did 
not differ significantly to chance for either recognition or preference 
judgments for any of the stimulus sub set groups (see Table 62).
Sets A and B Combined
The grand means for recognition and preference judgments represent 
a replication of the Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) study. As expected 
the recognition level of 55.25 per cent was not significantly different 
to chance. However, contrary to expectations the preference level of 
49.6 per cent was also not significantly different to chance.
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Table 62
Percentage of Trained Stimuli Selected by Recognition and Preference 
Judgments in Pilot Study 1.
Judgment
Stimulus 
Sub Set Recognition Preference
A1 52.50 45.00
A2 55.80 47.50
Mean (Al, A2) 54.20 46.3
B1 55.80 50.80
B2 56.70 55.00
Mean (B1,B2) 54.20 52.90
Grand Mean 55.25 49.60
Discussion
The results from this pilot study show that the stimulus sets and 
sub sets meet the empirical standards required for Experiment 6. The 
sets and sub sets are equally recognizable and attracted similar 
preference ratings (see Table 62).
The failure to replicate Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc’s (1980) findings 
for preference judgments was surprising since this pilot study was a 
replication of their methodology. The only difference here was the 
number of stimulus slides. There would appear to be no theoretical 
reason why the increased number of slides should adversely influence the 
mere exposure effect for stimuli whose repeated exposure was below 
perceptual threshold. However, since this was the only substantial 
methodological difference between the two studies it was decided to
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empirically test if the number of stimuli was critical for 
exposure effect when the repeated exposure was below the 
threshold (see Appendix D-3).
the mere 
perceptual
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APPENDIX D-3
Pilot Study 2
Method
Subjects
The 72 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 400 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education who had not previously taken part in any studies using the 
current experimental material. Their age ranged from 17 to 47 years with 
a mean age of 25.06 years. Students who were subjects in the experiment 
received course credit for their participation.
Design
The experimental design was a one-way factorial design with three 
levels of number of slides (6, 10, and 20).
Materials
Stimuli. The stimuli were six sets of slides (A,B,A1,B1,C,D). 
Stimulus slide sets A and B were 20 slide sets, A1 and B1 were 10 slide 
sets, and C and D were 6 slide sets. The sets A, B, A1, and B1 were the 
same as in previous studies. The sets C and D were 6 slide sub sets of 
sets A and B respectively. Set C was made up of second, fifth, and 
eighth slide from stimulus sets A1 and A2. Set D was made up of the 
stimulus pairs from set B1 and B2 of the stimuli in set C (see Table 
63).
Equipment. The projection and slide viewing equipment was that 
used in Experiment 6.
Data Record Sheets. Subjects recorded their responses on the data
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record sheets used in Experiment 6.
Table 63
Stimulus Slides Assigned to Stimulus Sets C and D
Stimulus Slide Sub Set
Slide No.
1 .
2 .
3 .
4.
5 .
6.
C
4
9
16
21
28
33
D
11
3
7
2
38
30
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the 6, 10, or 20 stimulus 
slide set conditions. The procedure was then that used for Pilot 1.
Results
A one-way analysis of variance was used to analyze the data. The 
results are outlined below.
Effect of Number of Stimuli
There was no significant difference between the three groups for 
the mean number of trained slides selected by recognition judgments. The 
mean number of trained slides selected by recognition judgments was not 
significantly different to chance for any of the three experimental
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groups (see Table 64).
There was a significant difference between the number of trained 
slides preferred by the stimulus slide groups, F (2,69) = 3.12, p<.05. 
The 10 stimulus slide group preferred significantly more trained slides 
than the 6 stimulus slide group, t (46) = p<.02. There were no other 
significant differences for preferences between the groups and none of 
the groups’ degree of preference for trained slides was significantly 
different to chance (see Table 64).
Table 64
Percentage of Trained Recognized and Preferred 
by the 6, 10, and 20 Stimulus Slide Groups
Stimulus Slide Set
Judgment 6 10 20
Recognition 49.3 54.2 49.2
Preference 43.8 56.3 52.1
Discussion
The results form this study confirm that there is no empirical 
reason not to use stimulus sets of 20 stimuli. There were no significant 
differences between the 10 and 20 stimulus slide groups. There was 
surprisingly a significant difference between the 6 and 10 stimulus 
slide groups. It is possible that for the 6 stimulus slide group that 6 
judgments are not sufficient to obtain a reliable estimate of subjects 
recognition and preference for trained stimuli.
It was also surprising to once again fail to find a mere exposure 
effect for any of the experimental groups. That is, the number of
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trained stimuli selected as the preferred stimuli was not significantly 
different to chance for any of the experimental groups. This failure to 
find a mere exposure effect for stimuli trained below the perceptual 
threshold is again contrary to the results reported by Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980).
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APPENDIX D-4
Recognition and Preference Judgment Data Sheets
Recognition Judgment
Circle One
1. (a) Which slide have you seen before .... Left Right
(b) How sure are you about your choice ....
: 1______: 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 :
very sure sure neither unsure very unsure
sure/unsure
Preference Judgment
Circle One
1. (a) Which slide do you prefer ....
(b) How sure are you about your choice 
: 1 : 2 : 3
Left Right
very sure sure neither 
sure/unsure
unsure very unsure
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APPENDIX D-5
Development of the Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity Scale.
The Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity Scale was developed to 
measure subjects1 value of intelligence and creativity as a personal 
attribute. The 20 item scale was constructed from an original pool of 50 
items. The original 50 items were based on suggestions from a sample of 
30 first year behavioural science students at the Canberra College of 
Advanced Education. The students were asked to write down items that 
would reflect a value of intelligence and creativity as a personal 
attribute. These suggested items were then edited to ensure (a) the 
wording of the items were suitable, that is double negatives etc were 
removed, (b) that there were approximately even numbers of positive and 
negatively worded items, and (c) that a representative range of values 
were included. The 50 items were then submitted to 96 students for 
rating on a 6-point agree-disagree scale.
Method
Subjects
The 96 subjects were volunteers from a pool of 180 first year 
behavioural science students at the Canberra College of Advanced 
Education. Their age ranged from 17 to 48 years with a mean age of 25.2 
years. The subjects had not previously taken part in an experiment that 
involved the use of any of the experimental materials. The subjects 
received course credit for taking part in the experiment.
Materials
The 50 items were typed on A4 paper with a 6-point agree-disagree 
scale for each item. The items in a booklet titled Attitudes to
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Intelligence and Creativity Questionnaire.
Procedure
The questionnaires were administered in small groups of 
approximately 15 students at a time. Each subject was seated at a desk 
and given the questionnaire booklet. On the first page of the booklet 
were the following instructions.
This questionnaire is being used to develop a scale to 
measure attitudes about intelligence and creativity.
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, 
but it is important you answer as truthfully and as accurately 
as you can. The way you answer will be used to select items to 
be used in the final scale.
Please rate how strongly you agree/disagree with each 
statement by putting an "X" in the space above the word which 
most closely describes what you think about the statement.
Make sure you respond to each item and only use the 
spaces provided. Remember your response does not have to be 
exactly right, just the closest to what you think.
Example:
A. Intelligent and creative people are usually good chess players.
If for example you strongly agree with this statement you would place 
your "X" as follows:
: X :__________ :__________ :__________ :__________ :__________ :
strongly agree somewhat somewhat disagree strongly
agree agree disagree disagree
However, if you disagree with the statement you would place your "X" els 
follows:
_________ :__________ :__________ :__________ : X :_________
strongly agree somewhat somewhat disagree strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree
and so on choosing the description that best fits your position.
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Subjects were then instructed to go ahead and rate the following 50 
items.
Scale Itons:
1. Intelligent and creative people are often insensitive. (R)
2. A civilized society depends on the leadership of it’s intelligent 
and creative members.
3. Creative and intelligent people usually have high self esteem.
4. Intelligent and creative people are frequently difficult to 
understand. (R)
5. Many of the world’s problems have been created by intelligent and 
creative people. (R)
6. I would like to be thought of as intelligent and creative.
7. Narrow minded people place the highest value on intelligence and 
creativity. (R)
8. I like being in the company of intelligent and creative people.
9. Intelligent and creative people make the best partners. (R)
10. Intelligence sind creativity are the most valuable human qualities.
11. Intelligent and creative people rarely make practical contributions 
to society. (R)
12. Intelligent and creative people are usually difficult to get to 
know. (R )
13. I find that intelligent and creative people are usually honest.
14. I admire and respect intelligent and creative people.
15. Intelligent and creative people are interesting to talk to.
16. I believe intelligent and creative people are also courageous.
17. Ordinary people are unlikely to be intelligent and creative. (R)
18. Intelligence and creativity is not always reflected by the kind of 
work we do.
19. I find intelligent and creative people to be undemonstrative. (R)
20. Intelligent and creative people are often selfish. (R)
21. I think intelligent and creative people are often immature. (R)
22. To succeed in life you need to be intelligent and creative.
23. Intelligent and creative people are usually unambitious. (R)
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24. Intelligent and creative people make good leaders.
25. Most worthwhile people value intelligence and creativity.
26. I find intelligent and creative people are often demanding. (R)
27. Intelligent and creative people are usually also artistic.
28. I think intelligent and creative people are often boring to talk to.
(R)
29. Intelligent and creative people often behave irresponsibly. (R)
30. Intelligent and creative people develop new and different ways of 
doing things.
31. Intelligence and creativity are essential for effective 
communication.
32. I find that intelligent and creative people are often unreliable.
(R)
33. Intelligent and creative people usually adopt conservative ways. (R)
34. I think intelligent and creative people are usually warm and loving 
human beings.
35. Intelligent and creative people usually do things the same way that 
other people do them. (R)
36. I think intelligent and creative people are fun to be with.
37. Success in business relies on intelligence and creativity.
38. I think intelligent and creativity contribute to developing self 
respect.
39. I think intelligence and creativity is associated with narrow 
mindedness. (R )
40. Intelligent and creative politicians usually lose touch with grass 
roots opinion. (R)
41. I think intelligent and creative people are usually conformists. (R)
42. Intelligent and creative people usually support the status quo. (R)
43. I like the enthusiasm that intelligent and creative people usually 
have.
44. I find intelligent and creative people are usually unfriendly. (R)
45. Success in life usually depends on intelligence and creativity.
46. Intelligent and creative people are easy to live with.
47. I would like to foster intelligence and creativity in my children.
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48# I believe intelligent and creative people often lack a sense of 
humour. (R)
49. Intelligent and creative people have a healthy natural curiosity.
50. I usually avoid making friends with intelligent and creative people.
(R)
Results
The results were analyzed by item total correlations and rating 
category frequencies. The negatively worded items were reverse scored 
prior to analysis. The 10 positively worded items and the 10 negatively 
worded items whose item total correlations were in the range .25 to .5 
and whose cumulative frequency for the three agree and the three 
disagree categories was in the range 20 to 80 per cent, were chosen for 
the Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity Scale (see Table 65).
The 20 item Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity Scale had a 
alpha reliability coefficient of .73.
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Table 65
Item Total Correlations and Frequency Distribution of Items in the 
Attitude to Intelligence and Creativity Scale
Item No. Correlation Agree (%) Disagree (%)
1 . .39 22.9 77.1
2. .30 80.0 20.0
4. .25 44.8 55.2
5. .29 60.4 39.6
7. .34 46.9 53.1
9. .28 64.6 35.4
12. .36 24.0 76.0
16. .25 30.2 69.8
20. .29 32.3 67.7
21. .49 20.7 79.3
22. .24 38.5 61.5
24. .44 77.1 oo q
25. .28 64.6 35.4
29. .33 31.3 68.7
32. .50 29.2 70.8
34. .36 54.2 ’ 45.8
37. .41 77.1 22.9
38. .34 80.3 19.7
40. .25 51.0 49.0
45. .35 45.8 54.2
267
APPENDIX D-6
Experiment 6 Post Test Questionnaire.
Please answer the following questions about participating in the 
experiment.
1. Did you find the experiment:
(a) Tiring .... Yes No
(b) Was it difficult to maintain 
concentration .... Yes No
(c) Was the viewing tunnel 
uncomfortable to use .... Yes No
(d) Any other comments:
2. The previous research suggested that intelligent, creative people 
preferred familiar/unfamiliar material (Circle the correct word).
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3. How likely did you think it was that intelligent, creative people
preferred familiar (unfamiliar) material:
(a) Before you attended the experiment
likely somewhat
likely
neither somewhat
unlikely
unlikely
After hearing about 
viewing the slides
the previous research but before
likely somewhat
likely
neither somewhat
unlikely
unlikely
After viewing the slides
likely somewhat
likely
neither somewhat
unlikely
unlikely
4. Was the exposure time for the slide pairs adequate for you to 
judgments of preference, recognition and certainty.
Yes___ No___
You have now finished. Thank you for participating in 
study, your help has been greatly appreciated.
make
the
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